The celebration of the anniversary of the Center for Health Law, Ethics & Human Rights (the “Center”) provides an opportunity to reflect on what defines the field of health law, as well as its conjoined twins of bioethics and human rights. The related fields are vast, and the subjects they encompass are ever-expanding. It is probably impossible to lay out a summary that does justice to their expansive, interdisciplinary scope. Instead, my discussion of the Center examines a subject that barely existed when the Center was formed in 19581 and that continues to make headlines more than sixty–six years later — organ transplantation. Transplantation is useful as an illustration of the joint fields of health law, bioethics, and human rights. It is a field that grew with us from infancy to maturity during the time of the Center’s growth and that illustrates how several related disciplines — most notably law and medical sciences — are essential to the development of organ transplantation. Additionally, organ transplantation and experiments involving organ transplantation have produced some of the most spectacular cases of human experimentation. Because of both the novelty and human drama these experiments involve, I will use some of them as examples of the pivotal health law and bioethics work the Center engages in. These examples, and others that will be touched on, lead me to conclude that there is no field that matches the life and death drama of health law, especially in the human organ transplantation field. This selective history of health law at the Center, including the definition of death and the limits of surrogate consent, suggest that the legal and bioethical issues brought to us by innovative organ transplantation surgery are unlikely to be exhausted any time soon.

Thousands of people will suffer and die this year because we do not donate enough substances of human origin, including blood plasma. To solve this, some recommend that we allow commercial organizations to assist in collecting these and that we permit donor compensation as a tool to encourage donations. Many object to these proposals, including for semiotic or expressive reasons. But insofar as these objections rely on meanings and these meanings are social constructs, we can revise the meaning of these practices to avoid commodification. Revision may work in principle, but in practice some complain that changing meanings may be too difficult or practically infeasible. This essay attempts to show that this is not so in a wide range of cases and uses the case of commercial compensated blood plasma collection as an illustration. Getting people to conceive of this practice not as payment for blood plasma but as compensation for the time, effort, and inconvenience associated with the giving of plasma is practically feasible and preferable to prohibition.

Legal theorists agree widely on two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal system: a legal system exists if (i) legal officials adopt a critically reflective attitude toward the legal system’s foundational rule, and (ii) the substantive laws of the system are “by and large” efficacious. The latter “efficacy condition” plausibly applies to all posited law, paradigmatically including modern centralized legal systems and less paradigmatic instances like international law. And yet, philosophers have also frequently pointed out the difficulty in determining precisely what this efficacy amounts to. In this article, I argue that the persisting difficulty of explaining the efficacy of law results from three tempting but inadequate assumptions about posited law and that our basic assumptions need to be revised accordingly.

The article takes Boethius’s theory of musical harmony as a starting point, in particular studying the collective dimension embedded in this concept. The dynamics of contact and interdetermination, between humans and other-than-human, are explored and understood as factors co-involved in the possibility of common living. The role of the notions of ecology and economy in rereading the concept of harmony provided by Boethius’s theory is also reviewed. The text then explores a site-specific work that experiments with these issues through the creation of an acousmatic patch that is superimposed onto a broken ecology, showing how this serves as an agent for a reharmonisation of a drought-ravaged river. The article concludes by addressing the implications that a territorially situated musical approach might represent for recovery of the broken link between humans and the other-than-human.