For centuries, Italy was in the forefront of studying and spreading knowledge on China in the West. Some of the leaders of the exceptional cultural exchanges of the seventeenth century were Italian. After a period of decline, from the second half of the twentieth century, there has been a revival of China studies. Following the growth of China's international impact, the traditional research fields have been supplemented by new specializations. Studies on modern China, its language, politics, institutions, society, economy, media etc., have enriched the Sinological panorama and multiplied university courses.

After an overview of Italian Sinology of the past, this study will focus on the recent developments: the universities, the research fields, the scholars, the associations and journals involved. The challenges the Sinologists are facing, due to the current Chinese political situation, will be highlighted, together with some consideration of the future of Italian Sinology.

This article addresses the protest against the 2019 Nobel Prize in Literature to Peter Handke as an example of transnational memory activism. It analyzes from a transnational mobilization perspective how activists achieved a globally visible protest in Stockholm and what role memory played in the protest mobilization and framing. Genocide survivors and former refugees, human rights activists, journalists, and academics formed a transnational protest coalition. In this way, they drew international attention to their outrage at the honoring of an author who is criticized for denying the Bosnian genocide. The analysis shows that memories of the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and genocide united the diverse protesters as a “memory community” and shaped their framing. The protesters warned of the potential repercussions of the Nobel Prize to Handke for the internationalization and normalization of genocide denial. They argued that locally, Serb nationalist politicians can find legitimation in it for divisive politics. Moreover, they put the prize in a larger context of globally rising right extremism and islamophobia that find inspiration in the very Serb nationalist ideology and its propagators of the 1990s conflict.

This study aims to examine functional idiosyncrasies of seemingly synonymous constructions and explain their frequency distributions in different spoken registers. To this end, lexical and discoursal approaches in the corpus-based research of constructions are combined to investigate how significant collocates of three suggesting constructions – namely, let's, what/how about and why don't you/we – are contextually situated in British English. Constructional analyses of the spoken part of the British National Corpus show that the three suggesting constructions primarily perform different metadiscourse and directive functions. Based on these functional variations, the present study explains the distribution and usage of the three suggesting constructions across the five spoken registers.

This article reviews three recent books on nationalism, each focusing on a different aspect of this multifaceted phenomenon. Mylonas and Radnitz’s volume explores the relationships between nationalism and the politics of treason, Hadžidedic’s book zooms in on the historical interdependence of capitalism and nationalism, while Maxwell’s historical monograph explores nationalist habitus as a form of lived experience. These three insightful contributions show the diversity and plasticity of nationalist ideology and practice.

Spanish verb-complement (VC) compounds, one of the most common compound types in Spanish, raise interesting questions, because they are inflected, prototypically containing a verb in the third-person singular of the present indicative. This complexity seems paradoxical, given the strong restrictions of Romance languages on word compounding.

Based on a self-compiled corpus of over 1,400 VC compounds, we show that the compound’s verb may display different persons and illocutionary forces. We claim that all Spanish VC compounds can be parsimoniously accounted for as involving a grammaticalized perspective-indexing structure, setting up a non-actual enunciation. We identify three subtypes of nominal VC compounds according to whether they refer to: (i) the fictive addresser of the non-actual enunciation it is composed of (e.g. metomentodo [I+put+myself+into+everything], ‘meddler’), (ii) the fictive addressee (e.g. tentetieso [hold+yourself+upright], ‘tilting doll’), or (iii) the fictive conversational topic (e.g. pintalabios [paints+lips], ‘lipstick’). We further argue that, despite undeniable morphological constraints, Spanish VC compounds involve a similarly complex semantic and morphological structure as English multi-word compounds like ‘wanna-be(s)’, ‘forget-me-not(s)’, or ‘bring-and-buy sale’. This reveals that intersubjectivity can be central to word formation.

This article describes the usage of partial interrogatives without wh such as And you went…? in French and Spanish, and analyses the variation between such in-situ-Ø and in-situ-wh-interrogatives such as And you went where? On the basis of an analysis of in-situ-Ø-interrogatives in a corpus of spoken French and Spanish, these interrogatives are described as a particularly efficient means of realizing an information request. Due to the fact that their use is bound to contexts in which the information request is highly expected by the hearer, they can be produced using a minimal syntactic format and simultaneously ensure that the addressee produces the desired response. In comparison, the use of in-situ-wh is less context-sensitive. The analysis also investigates the possibility of differences between French and Spanish as regards the productivity of these interrogatives. An acceptability study of these interrogatives finds no significant difference in terms of the productivity and acceptability of in-situ-Ø in French and Spanish, whereas in-situ-wh reaches a higher acceptability in French than in Spanish. I interpret these results as evidence for a description of in-situ-Ø as an ad-hoc interactional resource whose use does not depend on conventionalization processes, whereas information-requesting in-situ-wh has become conventional in French.

Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 was the end of the Arctic cooperation between states and others as we knew it, despite the fact that Russia’s illegal actions are not occurring in the Arctic region. Russia’s attack on Ukraine caused pronounced security fears and responses, particularly from the European and North American countries, including the other Arctic states. This naturally affected Arctic cooperation because it is precisely in the Arctic region that Russia is such a vastly central actor. For example, the region’s pre-eminent inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council, is struggling to continue its activities in full, as the seven western Arctic states paused participating in meetings held in and activities involving Russia. On the other hand, the first in-person meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) fisheries agreement in late November 2022 successfully adopted its COP Rules of Procedure by consensus, including Russia. The purpose of this article is to investigate how adversely Arctic international cooperation in inter-governmental forums and treaties has suffered due to the Ukraine war, utilising a qualitative research methodology to collect internal and sensitive information from key informants. In particular, the article aims to find an answer to the following question: In which types of Arctic inter-governmental structures have the states been able to continue the cooperation and for what reasons? The hypothesis that will be tested in this article is whether treaty-based cooperation has fared better than cooperation founded on soft law. This article will flesh out the current state of Arctic cooperative frameworks and actual cooperative activities under them, analysing three soft law-based cooperative frameworks, including the Arctic Council and several treaty-based cooperative frameworks, such as the CAO fisheries agreement and Arctic Science Cooperation Agreement. This article is based on the facts as of 22 February 2023.