This paper argues that abortion access is an important subject for bioethics scholarship and reflects on the relationship between legal frameworks and access to care. The author uses the example of the United Kingdom to examine the benefits and limitations of abortion-permissive legal frameworks in terms of access. These are legal frameworks that enable the provision of abortion but subject to restrictions. An abortion-permissive regime—first in Great Britain and then in Northern Ireland—has gone some way to improving access to care over time. However, aspects of the regime (that lead to its description as permissive rather than supportive of abortion) have the potential to endanger abortion access in the future and so legal reform is necessary.

The practice of solitary confinement (SC) is established within the literature as a common occurrence of torture within the prison system, andmany international and national human rights organizations have called for its abolition. A somewhat more contentious topic in the literature is the practice of force feeding (FF) of hunger-striking prisoners. The paper aims to make a case against FF by establishing a parity argument that states the following: If SC is considered an immoral practice (and indeed it should be), it should follow that FF is morally impermissible as well. In conclusion, this paper will argue that FF of hunger-striking prisoners is a violation of their fundamental moral rights and constitutes cruel and inhumane treatment and, therefore, should be abolished.

Non-human animal chimeras, containing human neurological cells, have been created in the laboratory. Despite a great deal of debate, the status of such beings has not been resolved. Under normal definitions, such a being could either be unconventionally human or abnormally animal. Practical investigations in animal sentience, artificial intelligence, and now chimera research, suggest that such beings may be assumed to have no legal rights, so philosophy could provide a different answer. In this vein, therefore, we can ask: What would a chimera, if it could think, think about? Thinking is used to capture the phenomena of a novel, chimeric being perceiving its terrible predicament as no more than a laboratory experiment. The creation of a thinking chimera therefore forces us to reconsider our assumptions about what makes human beings (potentially) unique (and other sentient animals different), because, as such, a chimera’s existence bridges our social and legal expectations about definitions of human and animal. Society has often evolved new social norms based on different kinds of (ir)rational contrivances; the imperative of non-contradiction, which is defended here, therefore requires a specific philosophical response to the rights of a thinking chimeric being.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s Dobbs ruling triggered a global debate about access to abortion and the legislative models governing it. In the United States, there was a sudden reversal of federal guidance about pregnancy termination that is unprecedented in Western and high-income countries. The strong polarization on the issue of abortion and the difficulty of finding a point of compromise lead one to consider the experiences of countries that have had different paths. Italy stands as a candidate for being a partially alternative model because it allows abortion up to 12 weeks, but without considering it a subjective right. The legislation in place since 1978 aims to balance the interests of the fetus and those of the woman. An issue often raised concerning Italian law is that of conscientious objection granted to doctors. Many gynecologists declare themselves objectors, and this makes access to abortion more difficult in some regions of Italy. After discussing this issue and envisaging different ways to deal with it, the article concludes by highlighting new dilemmas about a possible divorce between the law and medical ethics in different directions and offers some avenues to begin setting up a response.

John Rawls has held up as a model of public reason the U.S. Supreme Court. I argue that the Dobbs Court is justifiably criticized for failing to respect public reason. First, the entire opinion is governed by an originalist ideological logic almost entirely incongruent with public reason in a liberal, pluralistic, democratic society. Second, Alito’s emphasis on “ordered liberty” seems completely at odds with the “disordered liberty” regarding abortion already evident among the states. Third, describing the embryo/fetus from conception until birth as an “unborn human being” begs the question of the legal status of the embryo/fetus, as if an obiter dictum settled the matter. Fourth, Alito accuses the Roe court of failing to exercise judicial restraint, although Alito argued to overturn Roe in its entirety. In brief, the Dobbs opinion is an illiberal, disingenuous, ideological swamp that swallows up public reason and the reproductive rights of women.

Pattern-based reasons are reasons for action deriving not from the features of our own actions, but from the features of the larger patterns of action in which we might be participating. These reasons might relate to the patterns of action that will actually be carried out, or they might relate to merely hypothetical patterns. In past work, I have argued that accepting merely hypothetical pattern-based reasons, together with a plausible account of how to weigh these reasons, can lead to disastrous consequences. However, in this article, I argue that this problem is not limited to hypothetical pattern-based reasons: it turns out that there are analogous issues for reasons deriving from actual patterns. I then suggest that we can avoid this problem by adopting a different account of the weight of pattern-based reasons.

In June 2022, the Supreme Court of the United States overturned Roe v. Wade. The European Court of Human Rights is also expected to decide on several abortion cases. In this paper, the interpretative approaches of both courts are compared. Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization decided on an originalist approach to the Constitution, the highest European court has always regarded the European Convention on Human Rights as a living instrument. As a result, domestic laws regulating the interruption of pregnancy are seen by the Strasbourg court as interferences with a fundamental right, the right to respect for private life. Although member states of the Council of Europe enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the circumstances in which abortion will be permitted, its highest court put forward the state’s positive obligation to secure pregnant women’s right to effective respect for their physical and psychological integrity in several landmark judgments. In this way, it ensures the existence of effective mechanisms in countries with a poor record of implementing the right to a lawful abortion. Albeit at a minimum, the Strasbourg court offers protection, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court no longer does.

In 2021, the debate about the spaces in which Europe’s Muslim citizens should be permitted to wear religious veils was reanimated by the introduction of new prohibitions introduced in Switzerland and France, and the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union in joined cases C-804/18 and C-341/19. This article examines the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning veiling. We argue that veil bans reduce the ability of Muslim women to actualize themselves as citizens by limiting their capacity to develop their identity through autonomous action. As such, we argue, the right ultimately at stake—which should protect rights in respect of veiling—is the right to a private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and judicial and popular conceptions of veiling should be reoriented to accommodate this view. Doing so, we argue, highlights the full range of functions that veiling implicates—including religious but also secular identarian concerns and exposes how a usually expansive right has been curtailed in cases involving veiling.

The increasing focus on business and human rights (BHR) in civil society and policymaking has not been matched by research on corporate actions to respect and protect human rights. The lack of research on BHR is especially acute outside of Western Europe and Anglo-centric contexts. This paper seeks to investigate how the largest Russian firms conceptualize and fulfil their human rights obligations under the UN Guiding Principles and the extent to which internationalization of those firms may have impacted these behaviours. I use a unique dataset created from a sample made of the 100 largest firms listed on the Moscow Stock Exchange. Using the theoretical construct of institutional conflict, I find that cross-listing on other stock exchanges and the extent to which firms frame their broader social responsibility issues as ‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable development’ rather than ‘corporate social responsibility’ has a substantial impact on firm attention to human rights. While this attention is encouraging, firm disclosure of actions taken to mitigate against violations and protect human rights is extremely limited and the strength of domestic institutional pressures has resulted in very little firm action in the face of the extreme and widespread human rights violations being committed in Ukraine by Russia.

Miranda de Ebro was created in 1937 to imprison Republicans and foreigners who fought with the International Brigades in Spanish Civil War. From 1940, the camp was used only to concentrate detained foreign refugees with no proper documents. More than 15 000 people, most of them from France and Poland, were kept there until the camp was closed in January 1947. Playing both sides of the international divide, fascist Spain at various points in time allowed passage and was a country of refuge both for those escaping Nazism and for Nazis and collaborators who, at the end of World War II (WWII), sought to escape justice. Treatment of each of these groups passing through Miranda was very different: real repression was meted out to the members of the International Brigades (IB), tolerance shown towards those escaping Nazism, and protection and active cooperation given to former Nazis and their collaborators. For the first time, data about foreign physicians imprisoned in Miranda de Ebro were consulted in the Guadalajara Military Archive (Spain). From 1937 to 1947, 151 doctors were imprisoned, most of them in 1942 and 1943, which represents around 1% of the prisoners. Fifty-two of the doctors were released thanks to diplomatic efforts, thirty-two by the Red Cross, and ten were sent to other prisons, directly released or managed to escape. All of them survived. After consulting private and public archives, it was possible to reconstruct some biographies and fill the previous existing gap in the history of migration and exile of doctors during the Second World War.

In the years 1947–57, following a turbulent retirement, Ugo Cerletti, the father of electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) (1938), invested his energies in a new audacious project conceived as an extension of his ECT research. Forced to leave the direction of the Sapienza University Clinic, he got funds from the National Research Council of Italy to carry out his experimental activities, and founded a ‘Center for the study of the physiopathology of Electro-shock’ in Rome. The Center was aimed at studying liquid substances extracted from electro-shocked animals’ brains that Cerletti named acroagonine and injected into human patients. Inspired by coeval literature, Cerletti believed that electroshock efficacy was due to stimulating some homeostatic processes in the brain, specifically in the meso-diencephalic area (i.e. involving neuroendocrine response in the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis). Cerletti’s team wished not only to find these effects, but also to reproduce them. With this hypothesis, that proved ineffective, Cerletti anticipated intuitions on the neuroendocrine effects of ECT and the necessity for the development of psychopharmacology. In this article, I cross-combined previously unexplored archival materials stored at Sapienza University of Rome (‘ES Section’) with established bibliographic and archival sources.

On 24 June 2022, the Contracting Parties of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) finalized discussions on the modernization of the treaty. After fifteen rounds of negotiations, an agreement in principle was reached to be adopted by the Energy Charter Conference on 22 November 2022 in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.1 The ECT, adopted in 1994, establishes a legal framework that aims to promote international cooperation in the energy sector.2 It has a membership of 53 countries primarily from Europe and Central Asia, as well as the European Union (EU) and the European Atomic Energy Community. In recent years, the ECT attracted widespread public attention due to its impact on states’ environmental and climate policies. Particularly, the treaty’s provisions on investment protection, with investor-to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) at the centre, allow foreign investors in the energy sector to challenge adverse state action before international arbitration and claim compensation for measures affecting their business activities. Fossil fuel investors have increasingly used the ECT to challenge environmental and climate measures, such as phasing out coal-fired power generation, banning offshore oil drilling in coastal areas, and prohibiting gas fracking projects. Such cases have fuelled concerns regarding the abilities of governments to roll-out large-scale climate action. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned that international investment agreements (IIAs) like the ECT could ‘be used by fossil-fuel companies to block national legislation aimed at phasing out the use of their assets’.3 With some of these damage claims running into billions of euros, the ECT enables fossil fuel investors to offload the costs and risks associated with their affected assets onto society at large in the face of necessary climate action. This would go, in the words of the editorial board of the Financial Times, against the ‘heart of the capitalist social contract’ and the ‘ability of markets to deal adequately with the challenge of climate change’.4

In this paper, I will examine the Supreme Court of the United States’ (SCOTUS) arguments in the majority decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, and I will show how some of those arguments are flawed. Primarily, I will show that the right to bodily autonomy is a well-established right, both in the courts and in societal practices, and that the right to an abortion should be understood as an example of the right to bodily autonomy or bodily integrity. Second, I will examine the justices’ arguments that viability is not a reasonable place to restrict abortion access, in contrast to both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and will offer arguments that defend viability as a valid point to limit abortion access. Third, I will highlight some politicians’ goals to enact a federal ban on abortion, and show how the attempt to pass Personhood Amendments is a pathway for doing so. The upshot of this essay to is show how the SCOTUS decision is flawed, and how granting personhood to “potential life” has consequences that extend beyond abortion access.

This article provides a corpus-driven overview of the ‘epistemic space’ surrounding the use of two lockwords of Early and Late Modern English writings on midwifery and childbirth, child and uterus. Rather than searching for epistemic stance markers themselves, this study employs the ‘bottom-up’ approach by examining the propositions containing these lockwords, and then seeing what particular epistemic meanings are signalled by the surrounding discourse context. Both treatises and periodicals representative of medical writing from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries are examined, thus allowing any diachronic trends characteristic of a period that witnessed much change in midwifery practices, and medicine more broadly, to be uncovered. Data are drawn from the Early Modern English Medical Texts (EMEMT) and Late Modern English Medical Texts (LMEMT) corpora.