Today, autocratization is the predominant trend of regime development. However, if we focus on autocratization as democratic erosion or decline, such a trend is not matched by an equivalent increase in the number of democratic breakdowns or autocracies. Why (and how) do some democracies survive autocratization, while others do not? Current research on autocratization has recently turned toward studies on democratic endurance. In particular, mostly large-N contributions focusing on structural factors protecting democracy from autocratization onset (democratic resilience) have lately been complemented by numerous small-N contributions exploring concrete actions that can stop ongoing autocratization processes before democratic breakdown (democratic resistance). However, due to its necessarily limited scope, such qualitative evidence on democratic resistance may be subject to internal and external validity issues. Therefore, we systematically advance the research on resistance to autocratization within a comparative framework. Using a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis, we examine 69 autocratization episodes that began in democracies in the 21st century (2000–23). Our analysis reveals the combinations of institutional, political, social, and external conditions of democratic resistance that impede democratic collapse during autocratization episodes. While the success of individual actions is mainly context-specific, we demonstrate that it is the cooperation across various areas of resistance (unity makes strength) that characterizes the multiple, and cross-nationally robust, sufficient configurations of democratic survival during autocratization processes. Through alternative analytical choices, robustness tests, and integration of sources, we bolster the validity of prior studies on democratic resistance to autocratization and point to further research avenues.

The COVID‐19 pandemic led to widespread fear among the population. Early studies suggested that this resulted in exclusionary attitudes and increased support for discriminatory policy measures. We still lack an understanding of the longer‐term, potentially erosive consequences that COVID‐19‐specific anxieties may carry for citizens' commitment to liberal democratic norms. In this research note, we present evidence from an original experiment in which we manipulate individuals' cognitive accessibility of their fears related to COVID‐19. We implemented this experiment in Hungary and Romania – two cases where illiberal attitudes are most likely to amplify under conditions of fear – a year and a half after the outbreak of the pandemic. The results show that our intervention is successful in elevating respondents' levels of worry, anxiety and fear when thinking about infectious diseases like COVID‐19. However, these emotions do not carry secondary effects on individuals' levels of right‐wing authoritarianism, nationalism or outgroup hostility, nor do they affect preferences for specific discriminatory policy measures aimed to fight a potential resurgence of COVID‐19. We discuss these findings in light of the literature on the demand‐side determinants of democratic backsliding and the consequences of emotions on political behaviour.

The debate on regime change has experienced a U-turn. Attention has shifted from the regime transitions occurred during the so-called third wave of democratization to the signals of an incipient reverse trend. However, the actual import and urgency of the problem remain unclear, due to a growing confusion concerning what a process opposite to democratization is, how many distinct forms it can take, and consequently what the empirical referents of the phenomenon are. Building on the notion of “autocratization”, or regime change towards autocracy, the paper elaborates a framework for the comparative analysis of regime changes opposite to democratization. Specifically, we identify political participation, public contestation and executive limitation as the main dimensions of regime variance, define autocratization accordingly, illustrate and systematize the different regime transitions that fall under this label, and clarify what autocratization is not. The proposed conceptual and analytical framework could support future research on comparative autocratization.

This article offers an institutionalist assessment of the more recent chapters of political opposition in Erdoğan’s Turkey. There is good reason to suppose that the institutional features of a given regime can explain the performance of opposition parties to a significant extent. That said, the case of Turkey provides impressive evidence that there are striking limits to institutionalizing political predominance, to undermining political oppositions by institutional means, and to explaining the performance of opposition parties with the prevailing institutional resources and constraints. Specifically, attempts at institutionalizing a predominant power status carry particular risks of generating inverse effects, including increased political vulnerability. However, there are no automatic effects. Rather, as the Turkish experience suggests, reasonably vigorous actors to become politically relevant must seize the particular (if usually limited) opportunities arising from advanced institutional autocratization.

Besides elections, the sub-Saharan wave of political reforms of the 1990s led several countries to introduce limits to the number of terms that a chief executive can serve, even though several leaders managed to bypass them. While Africa’s executive term limits (ETLs) politics has gained scholarly attention, the literature mostly consists of in-depth small-N analyses. Systematic comparative research is rare. To contribute filling this gap, this article presents a new Africa Executive Term Limits (AETL) dataset. Covering 49 sub-Saharan polities throughout the 1990–2019 period, AETL represents the most complete and updated collection of data on Africa’s ETLs politics, and a versatile research tool to address several questions on the present and future of this continent. A preliminary assessment of the new data finds ETLs to be increasingly respected, and to have positive returns for government alternation and development. These findings point to new research avenues that AETL may help travel.

Since the 1990s, incumbent-led autocratization in democracies is increasingly common. However, there is surprisingly little systematic and comparative research into the actions would-be autocrats actually take when they undermine democracy. We analyse the wealth of in-depth case studies of all cases of incumbent-led autocratization in democracies from 1990 until 2023 to develop such an overview of autocratic actions inductively. This empirically based would-be autocrats’ toolkit encompasses over 400 unique autocratic actions which we classify into seven overarching modes of autocratization: evasion, manipulation, infiltration, duplication, restriction, prohibition, and delegitimation. Would-be autocrats selectively use these different modes in varying arenas of democracy to gradually erode democracy. The toolkit provides a starting point to more systematically study autocratization within and across different cases, enabling the identification of sequencing and diffusion patterns, and helping generate better understanding of when autocratization is successful.

As Catholic churches played a tremendous role in the third wave of democratization, it is crucial to examine their role in the current trends of autocratization. Given the potential for democratic backsliding resulting from elections, I study the official stances of national Catholic churches toward electoral manipulation in 59 cases across different regions, post-Third Wave. I find that 32% of the Catholic churches resisted electoral manipulation, while 34% called for peace, and 34% took no stance. I argue that beyond religious market dynamics, historical context also shapes Catholic churches’ cost-benefit calculations. Using logistic and multinomial regression models, I contend that Catholic churches resist electoral manipulation when government favoritism toward Catholicism is too low, even when they control a considerable proportion of the population. Additionally, the historical pro-democratizing role of Catholic churches positively influences their decision to resist electoral manipulation, particularly for those facing high competition in the religious market.

When do citizens vote against autocratizing incumbents? A growing body of literature addresses this question, yielding mixed results. I argue that an important component is how visible autocratization is to the average citizen. I conceptualize “visibility of autocratization” and posit that it is essential for understanding when citizens vote out incumbents attempting to entrench their power. I test the relationship between visible autocratization and incumbent re-election in the universe of competitive African elections since 1990. I show that voters punish autocratizing incumbents by voting them out, but they only do so when autocratization is visible. Additional analysis of Afrobarometer data in four countries experiencing autocratization shows that citizens’ perception of autocratization is systematically related to preference for opposition candidates, even after controlling for partisanship and economic performance, and irrespective of levels of partisan animosity. This study contributes both theoretically and empirically to understandings of political behavior under autocratization.

Although far-right insurrections often catch worldwide attention, little is known about whether and how these autocratization events affect other countries. This article studies the spillover of a prototype of such coup attempts – the January 6th Capitol insurrection. I argue that a far-right insurrection abroad can trigger a transnational learning process, which increases the salience of the far-right’s anti-democratic potential. Consequently, due to shaming and changes in voting calculus, citizens are less likely to support a domestic far-right party. To test this expectation, I use two panel datasets in Western Europe fielded amid the Capitol insurrection. Both analyses show that the expressed support for domestic far-right parties decreased after this autocratization event. I discuss how these findings enrich the literature on autocratization, the far-right, and transnational learning.

This article re-examines the association between democratization and the cost of borrowing abroad in the first era of globalization. Using two representative datasets the literature offers but employing an improved method for panel event study, we find that democratization's impact on the costs of foreign borrowing is uncertain. In one case, the estimated coefficients are similar to the sign and magnitude of the original study but with larger standard errors, rendering the impact statistically insignificant. In the other case, the estimated coefficients hover around zero and are not statistically different from zero.

A major focus of the democratic backsliding literature has been on “executive aggrandizement” in electoral, institutional, and civil societal arenas. An influential explanation of the strength of opposition to aggrandizers contends that the more democratic accountability remains despite illiberal stratagems, the stronger the pushback is likely to be. A single-country temporal comparison of three aggrandizing Philippine presidents—Ferdinand Marcos Sr., Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and Rodrigo Duterte—demonstrates that this view not only fails to account for stark variation in opposition, it predicts the reverse of what actually occurred. Despite election fraud, constitutional manipulation, and protest crackdowns, Marcos Sr. and Arroyo confronted stronger pushback. By contrast, opposition against Duterte gained little traction although elections remained competitive, institutions were left largely intact, and there was little repression of peaceful protests. This suggests that opposition efficacy is more dependent on how effectively it can contest democratic legitimation claims used to disguise autocratization.

The ‘waves and ebbs’ model proposed by Huntington in his 1991's The Third Wave has profoundly shaped how scholars interpret global trends of democratization and autocratization, but has also received criticisms, especially concerning its ability to explain regime change in the three decades following the end of the Cold War. I contend that, rather than an alternation between democratization waves and authoritarian ebbs, the post-Cold War period could be more fruitfully described as a phase of ‘regime convergence’ characterized by a tendency of both democracies and autocracies to shift towards hybrid forms of political regime. By showing that between 1990 and 2023 transitions to hybrid regimes significantly exceeded transitions in other directions, I demonstrate the empirical relevance of hybridization as a process affecting both democracies and autocracies, and I encourage renewed attention to this phenomenon distinct from both democratization and autocratization.

Democratic backsliding has posed significant challenges to democracies in many countries. Recent calls for a better theorization of pushback against backsliding have triggered renewed scholarly interest in the field of opposition and its role in stopping or reversing creeping authoritarian rule. This study calls for a theoretical and empirical recalibration of the concept of opposition to account for multifaceted ‘non-partisan’ actors and venues of oppositional mobilization. It proposes a new classification of resilient civic opposition. The explanatory typology is based on two factors: (1) the ability of civic opposition to bring multiple grievances together and to balance between on-street and off-street mediums, and (2) the rapport between political opposition parties and civic opposition. Four cases of civic opposition from Hungary and Turkey illustrate the proposed typology empirically.

While scholars have devoted significant attention to religious institutions’ role in democratization, less attention has been given to their role in autocratization. Moreover, religious economy approaches suggest that religious institutions are flexible to offer whatever is of interest to the marketplace, but here the role the institutions played in the third wave of democratization suggests a stable commitment. I test the impact of religious monopoly and the historical pro-democratizing role on 52 dominant religious institutions’ stances towards autocratic practices related to regime survival in the post-third wave period. Logistic regression models reveal that stronger religious monopolies decrease the probability of opposing regime survival, while the historical pro-democratizing role of the dominant religious groups in the third wave increases the probability. Furthermore, when the religious market is highly monopolized, the commitment to a democratic role in the third wave is weak, and it is strengthened when there is intense religious competition.

How does a democracy that has survived a close brush with authoritarianism start to recreate conditions of meaningful democratic political competition? What steps are to be taken, and in what order? Certain lessons can be gleaned from comparative experience with the challenges of “front-sliding”—that is, the process of rebuilding the necessary political, legal, epistemic, and sociological components of democracy. This essay maps out those challenges, examines the distinctive and difficult question of punishing individuals who have been drivers of democratic backsliding, and reflects on how to sequence different elements of front-sliding.