This chapter describes how dependence on coffee and other primary commodities exacerbated foreign dependency, especially during fluctuations in global primary commodity prices. The chapter discusses the Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) origins, including the key paradigmatic ideological foundations of the party while discussing the civil war and the 1994 genocide. The chapter ends by outlining three periods of the evolution of political settlement under RPF rule. Between 1994 and 2000, RPF loyalists were rewarded, while there was increased concentration of power among Tutsi RPF members. In the 2000s, until the early 2010s, RPF leadership centralised control among a smaller clique within the RPF, with increasing elite fragmentation characterising this period. In the third phase after the early 2010s, there has been increased external reliance, and the visible threat of transnational coalitions, comprising RPF dissidents and disenchanted domestic elites, has emerged but been contained.

Bieral’s service in the Civil War, particularly at the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, transformed his public image from thug to hero. The chapter chronicles his bravery, injuries, and subsequent court martial, revealing tensions between his violent past and military discipline. Bieral’s postwar activities – supporting Reconstruction, working in customs, and engaging in political violence – illustrate the persistence of private coercion in public life. His association with figures such as Boss Tweed and involvement in the Erie Railroad wars underscore the continuity of corruption and brutality. The chapter situates Bieral within the contested terrain of postbellum governance and reform.

The introduction justifies telling the story of the forgotten bully Louis Bieral. His life was extraordinary not only because of his interactions with famous people, but also because of his wide range of adventures. Moreover, his brutal career helps us understand the importance of private, nonlethal violence to the operation of nineteenth-century America.

Minerva Historicals told something like a sequential counter-history of England from the earliest attacks of the Vikings to the Monmouth Rebellion against Charles II in the late seventeenth century. Focusing on moments of crisis, conflict and war, they debated pressing contemporary issues of monarchical succession, political legitimacy, power, violence, loyalty, treason, ambition, war and civil war in disguised censor-evading ways. Centering their fiction on family relationships within and between noble or royal houses gave these histories a domestic cast, but this accurately reflected the historical reality of monarchical and baronial government before Parliament gained ascendancy over the royal household during the nineteenth century, and wrote women at all ranks back into history. The last section shows Anna Maria Mackenzie, Agnes Musgrave and anonymous others answering criticism of the genre by arguing the superior truth of historical fiction to supposedly “true” conjectural histories and teaching readers how to evaluate an historical narrative’s relation to fact.

The introductory chapter presents an overview of the classical doctrine of civil war and discusses some of the reasons for studying them. It argues that some doctrine of civil war is an inevitable component of any international legal system. Observing how the doctrine of civil war that existed in the age of sail and steam has come to seem rather opaque and remote in the present day, this study aims to offer modern readers a valuable review of that past tradition and to help them remember how such a doctrine once came to be and what happened to it. At the same time, the purpose of the book is not to argue for a revival of or return to the classical law, but rather to better understand the aspirations and limitations of the law of past generations, which may not be too unlike those of our own times.

This chapter charts the origins of the classical law of civil war. It observes the doctrine’s roots in the old Roman ius gentium and argues that the classical doctrine itself was born in the early modern period alongside the European colonial empires and the Westphalian understanding of the law of nations. The chapter then illustrates this process by examining in detail the impact of insurgent prize jurisdictions and belligerent counter-revolutionary actions on foreign diplomacy during the Dutch Revolt (1566–1648) and the English Civil War (1642–1651).In light of these events, the chapter summarises the key doctrinal developments of the law of civil war in the writings of Grotius, Gentili, and their contemporaries, and the crystallisation of the classical doctrine of civil war in Emer de Vattel’s Droit des gens. The chapter concludes here, having set the scene for the legal debates of the age of revolutions.

This chapter concludes the book by revisiting its key findings and by reflecting on their meaning from a broader perspective. The first half of the chapter consists of a summary of the rise and fall of the classical doctrine of civil war as explained in the preceding chapters. The second half assesses the overall legacy of the classical doctrine in the light of modern legal theory, and observes how the classical law was hardly better able to overcome the problems of indeterminacy and recognition than current principles are. Yet this does not mean that the classical doctrine would have been meaningless, as its practical utility may have been based precisely on its limited effectiveness and inevitable ambiguity.

This chapter concludes the historical story arc of the book by identifying the final surrender of the classical doctrine of civil war in international law during the twentieth century. First, it examines the rise of the concept of non-international armed conflicts in the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and its breakthrough in the Geneva Conference of 1949. As the conference rejected the option of framing Common Article 3 in the conceptual language of the classical doctrine, it in fact abandoned the classical law of civil war by choice. The chapter then shows that many international lawyers soon realised the significance of the event, but notes how the classical concepts nevertheless continued to persist in academic writings, especially in Europe. Finally, the chapter discusses the meetings of the Institut de droit international in 1973 and 1975, where academic lawyers as well accepted the end of the classical doctrine.

The classical doctrine of civil war had a second coming in the scholarly writings of international lawyers. This began in the 1890s around the time of the Chilean and Brazilian naval revolts and the Spanish-American War of 1898. Members of the new cosmopolitan profession of international lawyers sought to formulate a branch of international law to manage the phenomenon of civil war, combining the elements of belligerent recognition, recognition of insurgency, the laws of war, intervention, and state responsibility. Doing so, they produced something of a francophone synthesis of the classical doctrine of civil war at the turn of the century. This chapter explores the gradual process of this synthesis, from the writings of Carlos Wiesse and Antoine Rougier to the work of the Institut de droit international. However, it then concludes with an overview of the great disillusionment of the 1930s and shows how the legal debates during the Spanish Civil War laid bare the bankruptcy of the classical doctrine.

This chapter explores the golden era of the classical doctrine of civil war, which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century. Its focus is on the Spanish American revolutions and the emergence of the law of neutrality in the context of civil wars. The several case examples illustrate how the familiar questions and disputes from the previous chapters persisted and developed in state practice throughout the period. In addition to the Spanish American revolutions, the chapter also discusses the impact of European and American revolutionary ideologies on international movements and illustrates the significant practical limitations of the classical doctrine: while it stemmed from the practice of the transatlantic world, elsewhere in the world it often seemed absent or selectively applied to deny the legal standing of indigenous and colonial insurgents, or to legitimise local rebellions within Oriental empires.

This chapter focuses on the American Revolution of 1775–1783, which often appears as the first cause célèbre in the subsequent literature on the law of civil war. Studying closely the legal documents and case law during the revolution, it argues that the revolution of the thirteen colonies displayed a typical structure of transatlantic civil wars that was common with the early modern civil wars of Chapter 1 as well as the subsequent transatlantic revolutions. Its key features include the early emergence of an insurgent prize jurisdiction, the diplomatic disputes caused by the imperial counter-revolutionary responses, the question of foreign intervention, and ultimately the connection between sovereignty and state responsibility. It also links these phenomena with the rise of international arbitration as an essential technique of post-revolutionary settlements in the classical law of nations.

The decline of the classical doctrine of civil war in state practice began right after the American Civil War, when the concept of belligerent recognition had barely been coined in the legal literature. There were several reasons for this. First, after the abolition of privateers in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the maritime powers had essentially deprived future insurgents of their primary weapon at sea, the privateer. Second, developments in the law of neutrality after the Geneva arbitration raised the prospect of state responsibility towards belligerents for neutral states. Third, as indeterminate pragmatism became a diplomatic norm, new legal vocabularies began to develop that were seemingly independent of questions of formal recognition. New, deliberately ambiguous approaches to recognition emerged, especially in the Latin American insurgencies, such as the recognition of insurgency doctrine.

The American Civil War (1861–1865) represents the high-water mark in the history of the classical doctrine of civil war. The war was fought on an unprecedented scale on land and at sea, and its global repercussions led to unavoidable diplomatic confrontations between the belligerents and neutral foreign powers unlike ever before. Through the key documents and cases of the conflict, this chapter illustrates how the thoroughly legalistic civil war came to be the culmination of the classical doctrine, and how it led to the coining of ‘recognition of belligerency’, a core concept of the mature doctrine of civil war. The chapter also explores the final breakthrough of international arbitration and state responsibility as a response to disputes raised by civil wars in this period, and traces the canonisation of these new developments in jurisprudence in America and in Europe.

The Roman Empire was rooted in violent acts. The spread of Roman control over the provinces was a lengthy process, but one that fundamentally changed the nature of political relationships. Settlers extruded from Italy. Large amounts of wealth changed hands. Land tenure was reconfigured. The population was divided first into provinces, then into assize districts. Subject populations were registered, counted, and taxed. The process put immense amounts of strain on the internal structures of communities. Roman governors were tasked with administering this new political landscape, where their position was tenuous. They distrusted new local elites who, along with Roman settlers, were prone to take advantage of local people. These same people were also responsible for tax collection, which, along with keeping the peace, was the governor’s ultimate responsibility. This systemic tension opened a space for provincial legalism.

This chapter examines the early development of Constantine’s religious imagery following his victory at the Battle of the Milvian Bridge in 312 ce. It argues that Constantine’s administration swiftly began portraying the civil war against Maxentius as a religious conflict, with Constantine defeating Satan through the aid of the archangel Michael. The chapter highlights the apocalyptic nature of this imagery, emphasizing Michael’s role not only as a heavenly warrior but also as a herald of the end times and Christ’s millennial reign. Scholars have overlooked both the early emergence of this imagery and Michael’s significance within it. While the imperial court may have believed in this narrative, its promotion in the aftermath of civil war suggests that not all Christians in Constantine’s new territories necessarily welcomed their new emperor.

Octavia, sister of the later Augustus, often stands in the shadows of great matronae, such as Fulvia and Livia Drusilla, in modern scholarship. Yet she played a vital part in the triumviral political programme and exercised significant influence on state and triumviral politics in the years 39–32 BCE. This chapter argues for Octavia’s political influence on M. Antonius and Young Caesar being instrumental in maintaining peace between the two colleagues from the aftermath of the Bellum Perusinum to the eventual final collapse of relations between the two triumvirs in 32. This chapter further argues that the historical Octavia built on traditional modes of influence originating from the socio-political elite milieu of the Late Republic but that the Octavia constructed in the historical narratives looked ahead to the creation of the ideal matrona of the Imperial domus all while paying tribute to her vital role in preserving concordia in the res publica.

This chapter explores the often-overlooked role of women in stasis and civil war, focusing on Fulvia’s involvement in the Perusine War and the funeral of Publius Clodius. Fulvia’s actions, particularly her display of Clodius’ unwashed wounds, set a precedent for Antonius’ later display of Caesar’s body, highlighting the antebellum politics and rhetoric of civil war. The chapter argues that Fulvia’s political role, enhanced during times of stasis and civil war, was crucial in inciting civil strife. Evidence from both sides of the civil war suggests that Fulvia’s actions were politically motivated rather than mere expressions of grief. By reappraising Fulvia’s role, this study aims to better understand Rome’s systemic breakdown before the civil war and the impact of her actions on the political landscape. The chapter concludes that Fulvia’s incitement to stasis was a significant factor in the unfolding of civil war dynamics.

This article advances four arguments about Constantine’s Roman Arch (315). First, it posits that its imagery and inscription endeavored to please a single viewer: the emperor Constantine. That argument narrows the interpretative possibilities regarding its meaning. From presumed anonymous observers of differing faiths, the field narrows to a single imperial viewer, a recent convert to Christianity and a victor in a civil war. Second, the lens of civil war illuminates previously unrecognized Augustan rhetorical and visual tropes that guided the Arch’s makers in legitimating the monument and Constantine’s victory against Maxentius. Third, the article uncovers Christian connotations in the arch’s inscription. Fourth, the neglected Christian subtext opens the possibility for identifying the Arch and the Colossus next to it as the first openly Christian imperial monuments in Rome. The article therefore demonstrates the syncretism of traditional imperial rhetoric and insignia with Christian ideas long before traditionally assumed.