To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Chapter 1 introduces the key concepts of the book, lays out the main argument, and discusses the empirical approach and data used in later chapters. It emphasizes that variation in governance outcomes cannot be understood without examining the incentives and interactions of politicians, bureaucrats, and voters. Ultimately, I argue that politicians in developing democracies have incentives to hire competent bureaucrats but will simultaneously retain tools to influence their career progression. Using tools of career control – interference in bureaucrats’ promotions, work locations, and day-to-day work tasks – politicians can extract bureaucratic loyalty. The introduction also situates the book within existing scholarship. The empirical strategy combines qualitative interviews, survey experiments, and observational data, largely drawn from Ghana but supplemented with comparative insights. Ultimately, the chapter frames the book as an inquiry into how the competing incentives of politicians and bureaucrats shape governance.
Chapter 6 shifts from procurement to the spatial allocation of local public goods, examining how partisan considerations shape the placement of infrastructure in communities. It begins by outlining the formal planning processes, in which bureaucrats are expected to design allocations based on community needs. However, interviews and prior research reveal frequent deviations from these plans, often driven by political pressure. Using data from Ghana’s Central Region, the chapter shows a strong correlation between the ruling party’s prior vote share and the number of projects a community receives. At the same time, the analysis highlights the role of need: poorer communities are more likely to secure projects than wealthier ones. These patterns suggest a dual influence – politicians seek to reward co-partisan communities, while bureaucrats attempt to prioritize developmental considerations. To probe this further, the chapter employs a survey experiment across eighty local governments. Results confirm that bureaucrats perceive both partisanship and need as influential, but partisan alignment often outweighs need in determining outcomes. The evidence thus reveals a tug-of-war between politicians and bureaucrats, with distributive outcomes shaped by the balance of partisan incentives and bureaucratic resistance. This politicization of allocation ultimately undermines equitable and efficient public service delivery.
Chapter 2 develops the theoretical framework that underpins the book. It argues that politicians in developing democracies face a dual incentive: they need competent bureaucrats who can implement programs effectively, yet they also desire control over those bureaucrats to secure loyalty and political advantage. As a result, politicians often recruit based on merit but retain formal or informal levers of influence, such as control over promotions or geographic transfers. The chapter distinguishes between programmatic and non-programmatic distribution, emphasizing that politicians often require bureaucratic loyalty to engage in non-programmatic distribution. Further, politicians have greater incentives to engage in non-programmatic distribution when local elections are highly competitive. Accordingly, I expect that intense local electoral competition will result in worse governance outcomes, including higher levels of corruption and partisan allocation of public goods. This framework provides the theoretical lens to interpret the empirical evidence presented in subsequent chapters and situates the book’s contribution within broader debates on state capacity, bureaucratic autonomy, clientelism, and democratic accountability.
The concluding chapter synthesizes the book’s core findings and situates them within debates on foreign aid and economic development, the political economy of development in Africa, and China’s global economic strategy. Overall, the allocation of finance in all three country case studies, Ethiopia, Zambia, and Ghana, serves to secure political support and sustain incumbents in power. However, the strategies employed to achieve these goals differ based on each country’s unique political history and ethnic dynamics. In Ethiopia’s authoritarian context, the central challenge is maintaining loyalty and support from non-coethnics within the state. The EPRDF established ethnic federalism and justified centralized control through economic growth. In Zambia, the focus is on allocating finance to maintain the support of coethnics, prioritizing loyalty within the ethnic group. In Ghana, on the other hand, preserving power involves attracting swing voters through nonethnic coalitions, resulting in the distribution of finance aimed at broad-based support. The chapter concludes by drawing policy implications for financiers and governments, emphasizing designs that account for political incentives and strengthen transparency and oversight.
Why do some communities have access to roads and schools while others go without for decades? Keyi Tang's Power Over Progress investigates how external accountability and domestic political competition shape the allocation of fund in development finance across 48 African countries. While traditional donors attempt to curb favoritism through stricter conditions, their efforts are frequently undercut by domestic political incentives. Tang reveals how development finance from China, the World Bank, and Western donors often favors political power over need. She draws on newly geocoded data of subnational electoral results and development projects, alongside case studies of Zambia, Ethiopia, and Ghana, to explain how heightened political competition can intensify favoritism, diverting funds to strongholds or swing regions rather than the most underserved areas. Offering convincing data-driven analysis, Tang challenges conventional wisdom with crucial insights for rethinking development partnerships in the Global South.
Japan is the world’s fourth-largest economy and a close ally of the United States. Yet its politics are highly anomalous: It is a democracy in which one party, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), wins nearly every election. Even an electoral reform, expected to bring about alternations in power between two large parties, has. The chapter uses data on the outcomes of every Lower House election held since the LDP’s inception in 1955 and public opinion surveys to flesh out the puzzle of LDP dominance. It surveys three explanations for this. One emphasizes structural features of the electoral systems Japan has used and explains how they have translated into advantages for the LDP. The other two probe the reasons why voters vote for the LDP. One holds that voters vote for the LDP because they prefer its policy positions, ideological orientation, leaders, or reputation for competence. The other holds that voters vote for the LDP because of the access to central government resources its politicians enjoy. This chapter explains how over time, real-world events and empirical studies have chipped away at the explanatory power of each account. This warrants another look at this question.
While a large body of research explores the federal-level influences over distributive politics decisions, very little attention has been given to the active role state and local governments play in the geographic distribution of federal funds. Before presidents, legislators, and agency leaders can influence the selection of federal grants, state and local governments must expend time and resources to submit grant proposals. We focus on grant applications as our unit of analysis and advance a theory that congressional representation influences the grant application behavior of state and local governments. We analyze US Department of Transportation grant applications and awards from 2009 to 2022 and find evidence that congressional representation meaningfully influences state-level grant application behavior. States apply more aggressively for federal transportation grants when represented by senators in the Senate majority party, and states apply more efficiently for grants when represented by a senator holding an advantageous committee leadership post.
Elected officials can often successfully increase voter support in their district by “bringing home the bacon,” yet theory suggests that the electoral effects of such efforts may depend on the legislator’s gender and whether the legislator delivered benefits in a stereotypically feminine (e.g., healthcare) or masculine (e.g., agriculture) issue area. Using both observational and experimental data in the United States, we find weak, limited evidence that issue area conditions the electoral impact of credit claiming for legislators of either gender. In addition, we show that men and women are rewarded comparably when they secure benefits for their district, regardless of issue area. Our findings suggest that women legislators — typically more effective than men at securing these benefits — can use distributive politics and credit claiming as an effective electoral strategy without concern that issue-based gender biases in the electorate will get in the way.
Edited by
Olaf Zenker, Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Germany,Cherryl Walker, Stellenbosch University, South Africa,Zsa-Zsa Boggenpoel, Stellenbosch University, South Africa
The idea that the central issue for South Africa’s redistribution is ‘the land’ is a familiar one, but it becomes harder to sustain with each passing year, as agriculture is a small and shrinking proportion of the country’s economic output, and historic land loss just one of a great many ways that black South Africans are disadvantaged in distributive terms. Under the circumstances, it might be best to de-emphasise the focus on land and concentrate limited resources on direct measures of income support such as a basic income grant. This chapter uses a consideration of the campaign for a basic income grant in Namibia to show that there may be an alternative to the binary choice that this way of putting the problem suggests. By understanding the maldistribution of ‘the nation’s wealth’ as the product of colonialism and historical dispossession while identifying concrete and universalistic remedies via programmes of income distribution and monthly cash payments, the Namibian activists have shown a possible way to combine the righteous demand for ownership of one’s own country with a politically pragmatic and economically well-conceived campaign targeting income rather than land.
Are states more interested in claiming territories that have economic resources? While previous theories of international relations assume that resources make a territory more tempting to claim, all else equal, I argue that certain types of economic resources can make states less willing to claim a territory. The presence of capital-intensive resources—such as oil or minerals—raises concerns about how the benefits of acquiring the territory would be distributed within the nation. These distributional concerns make it harder and costlier for leaders to mobilize widespread and consistent support for claiming resource-rich lands. Using original geocoded data on territorial claims in South America from 1830 to 2001, I show that states are indeed less likely to claim lands that have oil or minerals, even when they can be claimed for historical or administrative reasons. I then illustrate the theoretical mechanism through a case study of Bolivia, comparing Bolivian attitudes toward reclaiming its two lost provinces, the Chaco and the Litoral. By showing how the presence of economic resources can become a liability in mobilizing unified support, this paper questions the widespread assumption that resources make territories more desirable to claim.
How do bureaucrats implement public policy when faced with political intermediation? This article examines this issue in the distribution of land rights to informal settlements in the municipality of São Paulo, Brazil. Land regularization is a policy established over three decades, where politicians’ requests for land titles to their constituencies play a relevant role. Based on interviews and documents, this study finds that bureaucrats adopt a twofold approach to regulate distribution: they document informal settlements, enacting eligibility criteria; then, they manage and prioritize beneficiaries, accommodating qualifying political demands. In this process, they enforce eligibility rules consistently across cases, constraining political intermediation to a rational scheme. Therefore, bureaucrats reconcile nonprogrammatic politics and policy rules by separating eligibility assessment from beneficiary selection. This paper bridges urban distributive politics and street-level bureaucracy literature by revealing that policy implementers may use technical expertise to curb political influence and negotiate conflicting interests and constraints.
Bringing home federal spending projects to the district is a common reelection strategy for members of the U.S. Congress, and congresswomen tend to outperform congressmen in securing district spending. However, for legislators to turn distributive benefits into higher approval and electoral rewards, constituents must recognize that public spending has taken place in their community and attribute credit to the correct public official. I theorize that congresswomen face a gender bias when claiming credit for federal projects, and I test this theory through an online survey experiment. Contrary to expectations, I find no evidence that legislator gender influences the public’s reaction to congressional credit claims, indicating that congresswomen can effectively use distributive politics to counter gendered vulnerability in the U.S. Congress. This research advances the literature on gender and politics by investigating whether a gender bias in credit claiming prevents congresswomen from turning their representational efforts into electoral capital.
The scarce state’s actions – especially the invention of chieftaincy – have had lasting implications for distributive politics. This chapter connects clientelism to the scarce state’s actions, showing that one particularly large effect of the state on political competition has been through the creation of the community-level brokers that allow parties to engage in clientelism at scale. Clientelism in this hinterland is facilitated most effectively by the chiefs that the state itself created.
In Chapter 3, Eric M. Patashnik, Patrick Tucker, and Alan S. Gerber employ evidence from two original survey experiments to explore voter responses to representatives’ actions. In the first set of experiments, voters learn that their representative has claimed credit for bringing the district a grant. But how do voters evaluate the lawmaker’s performance? Do they rely on the absolute size of the grant, or on its size relative to other grants when allocating rewards and punishment to a representative? The authors find that individuals are responsive to information about the relative, but not absolute, size of grants, and are more inclined to punish legislators for delivering below-average grants than reward them for securing above-average ones. The second set of experiments manipulates information about different kinds of benefits, and shows respondents react more strongly to information about specific policies than abstract ones. Together, the results indicate that citizens’ ability to hold representatives accountable depends on citizens’ ability to put policy actions into a concrete context they find meaningful.
In 2010, the United States Congress placed a moratorium on earmarks – congressionally mandated spending projects. But did the earmark moratorium actually rid public policy of earmarks? I use earmark data and 2010–2020 state-level highway funding metrics to examine the relationship between previously expired transportation earmarks and federal highway funding during the earmark moratorium. Earmarks in the 2005 surface transportation law (SAFETEA-LU) continued to benefit certain states in 2020, even though the projects technically expired in 2009. This is because the funding “formulas” established by all post-2009 surface transportation laws were fully determined by the highway allocation percentage each state received in the preceding year, inclusive of earmarks. Further, I find the relationship between SAFETEA-LU earmarks and state funding disparities strengthened from 2010 to 2020, meaning the expired earmarks increased in policy significance during the moratorium. Highly earmarked states became even more advantaged after the earmarks were institutionalised into the highway funding formula.
In path-breaking work, Weingast et al. argue that there is a positive relationship between legislature size and inefficiency in public expenditures. Their proposition is currently known as the ‘law of 1/n’ and has been widely debated in political science and public administration. However, recent studies have questioned the validity of the theory. In this letter, we conduct the first meta-analysis that assesses the generality of the ‘law of 1/n’. Based on a sample of thirty articles, we find no robust evidence suggesting that legislature size has either a positive or a negative effect on government budgets. Yet, the aggregate results mask considerable heterogeneity. Our findings provide moderate support for the ‘law of 1/n’ in unicameral legislatures and in upper houses, but they also indicate that studies using panel/fixed-effects models or regression-discontinuity designs report negative public spending estimates. We find only limited evidence that electoral systems impact public spending, which suggests that proportional representation systems may not be more prone to overspending than majoritarian ones.
Research has shown that presidents tend to benefit local level copartisans when distributing resources, which can improve the provision of public goods, such as security. Considering that fear of crime is among the main concerns of citizens worldwide, we examine whether alignment affects criminality. Drawing on rich administrative data from Chile and a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we study the impact of alignment on a broad set of crimes against the person and property-related. We show that aligned municipalities experience a significant reduction in crimes that both affect property and occur in public. As a potential mechanism, we find that aligned municipalities receive more projects to improve urban infrastructure, thus making public spaces less vulnerable to crime.
Two dominant explanations for ethnic bias in distributional outcomes are electoral incentives and out-group prejudice. This article proposes a novel and complementary explanation for the phenomenon: variation in legibility across ethnic groups. The author argues that states will allocate fewer resources to groups from which they cannot gather accurate information or collect taxes. The argument is supported by original data on state aid from the 1891/1892 famine in the Russian Empire. Qualitative and quantitative analyses show that districts with a larger Muslim population experienced higher famine mortality and received less generous public assistance. The Muslims, historically ruled via religious intermediaries, were less legible to state officials and generated lower fiscal revenues. State officials could not count on the repayment of food loans or collect tax arrears from Muslim communes, so they were more likely to withhold aid. State relief did not vary with the presence of other minorities that were more legible and generated more revenue.
Land fiscalization in China is a local development strategy intended to tilt the distribution of interests disproportionately toward local officials. We propose that the degree of power concentration among provincial Chinese leaders affects their need for support from lower-level bureaucrats. The more that power is dispersed among provincial leaders, the more they are incentivized to dispense benefits to local officials. To test this hypothesis, we used provincial-year panel data spanning 2003–2012 to examine how power concentration among provincial leaders affected land fiscalization within their jurisdictions. The empirical results robustly supported the hypothesis.
The literature suggests that the distributive allocations of local public goods help politicians secure support and thus contribute to political survival. We argue that the selective assignment of state-led infrastructure projects can bolster political control in peripheral areas by inducing the government's investment in essential administrative and security apparatus for project implementation and long-term state building. Drawing on a unique county-level dataset, we study the effects of poverty alleviation transfers in Xinjiang. We find that poverty alleviation was associated with significant increases in government spending on public management and security. In contrast, these alleviation transfers had a small and ambiguous effect on increasing agricultural production and reducing ethnic violence in the province. Our findings highlight the importance of comparing the capacity and welfare implications of distributive politics, as fiscal subsidies may change the actions of the leader's local agents more than altering the behaviors and attitudes of those who may benefit from these transfers.