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American gay military life writing emerged as a discrete literary genre in the last decades of the twentieth century. These memoirs include tales by older men who served in World War II and accounts by younger soldiers who navigated the challenges of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell. In this chapter, I compare these two cohorts of writers to examine their experiences of institutional life and male bonding in the American forces. Their stories, and their purpose for writing, reveal how the forces shaped sexual and political subjectivities. Gay men from the 1940s used their narratives to document the service of “fairies” and butch men attracted to one another, straight soldiers and commanders who accepted gay personnel despite official policies, and the infinite opportunities for sex and friendship. Servicemen of recent decades tell a different story of protest. Their gay life was lonelier than their ancestors, and their memoirs function as conversion narratives. In “coming out,” they craft a respectable masculine self to demand the right to serve openly. Soldiers in both eras recall experiences of prejudice and resistance in an organization hostile and conducive to sex and love between men.
New military recruits, typically emerging adults, must rapidly adapt to the stressors of basic combat training (BCT) – a developmentally significant and intentionally stressful experience. Drawing on a developmental psychopathology framework of risk and resilience, we prospectively examined predictors of psychological adaptation in a longitudinal sample of recruits (age mean = 19.0, SD = 3.0) assessed before and after BCT (59.7% of those eligible for follow-up; N = 657). Pre-registered hierarchical linear regressions tested direct and moderating effects of individual difference variables previously linked to risk and resilience. Higher levels of prior adversity, worse self-regulatory difficulties, and (unexpectedly) higher general cognitive ability at baseline were associated with worsening post-BCT internalizing distress, after accounting for baseline symptoms. Gender, baseline social support, and baseline Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) scales were not associated with longitudinal changes in internalizing distress, and no moderation effects were found. Our findings suggest that bolstering emotion regulation skills, especially among those with prior adversity, may be important for preventing the emergence of psychopathology and promoting more successful adaptation to military roles. The unexpected association between cognitive ability and distress may reflect context sensitivity, suggesting that the demands of BCT may alter the typical adaptive function of cognitive strengths.
Overseas large-scale combat operations (LSCOs) could require domestic hospitals to treat large numbers of combat casualties. Our goal was to evaluate the financial impact on hospitals of treating combat casualties during an LSCO.
Methods
Using a discrete event simulation model, we explored how 5 civilian hospitals in Omaha, Nebraska, would fare after accepting combat casualties during a National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) activation. We compared changes in financial measures (government payments, hospital revenues) and occupancy measures (civilian patient displacement) under different scenarios for combat casualty reimbursement rates as fractions (75%-125%) of Medicare rates.
Results
Combat casualties replaced 100% of civilian patients at 3 of 5 hospitals, displacing a total of 10,905 civilian patients [95% CI: 10551-11248]. Combat casualty reimbursement at 125% of Medicare rates resulted in government payments of $462 million and net income gains for civilian hospitals of approximately 23 times pre-activation baselines. Combat casualty reimbursement below 125% of Medicare rates led to net income losses.
Conclusions
Large influxes of combat casualties could result in rapid, profound displacement of civilian patients and revenue loss at NDMS-participating facilities, potentially affecting hospitals’ ability and willingness to treat them. Policymakers need to identify appropriate reimbursement rates for combat casualties.
Why are legislatures in some authoritarian regimes more powerful than others? Why does influence on policies and politics vary across dictatorships? To answer these questions, Lawmaking under Authoritarianism extends the power-sharing theory of authoritarian government to argue that autocracies with balanced factional politics have more influential legislatures than regimes with unbalanced or unstable factional politics. Where factional politics is balanced, autocracies have reviser legislatures that amend and reject significant shares of executive initiatives and are able to block or reverse policies preferred by dictators. When factional politics is unbalanced, notary legislatures may amend executive bills but rarely reject them, and regimes with unstable factional politics oscillate between these two extremes. Lawmaking under Authoritarianism employs novel datasets based on extensive archival research to support these findings, including strong qualitative case studies for past dictatorships in Argentina, Brazil, and Spain.
Integrating AI into military decision processes on the resort to force raises new moral challenges. A key question is: How can we assign responsibility in cases where AI systems shape the decision-making process on the resort to force? AI systems do not qualify as moral agents, and due to their opaqueness and the “problem of many hands,” responsibility for decisions made by a machine cannot be attributed to any one individual. To address this socio-technical responsibility gap, I suggest establishing “proxy responsibility” relations. Proxy responsibility means that an actor takes responsibility for the decisions made by another actor or synthetic agent who cannot be attributed with responsibility for their decisions. This article discusses the option to integrate an AI oversight body to establish proxy responsibility relations within decision-making processes regarding the resort to force. I argue that integrating an AI oversight body creates the preconditions necessary for attributing proxy responsibility to individuals.
What shapes military attitudes of trust in artificial intelligence (AI) used for strategic-level decision-making? When used in concert with humans, AI is thought to help militaries maintain lethal overmatch of adversaries on the battlefield as well as optimize leaders’ decision-making in the war room. Yet it is unclear what shapes servicemembers’ trust in AI used for strategic-level decision-making. In October 2023, I administered a conjoint survey experiment among an elite sample of officers attending the US Army and Naval War Colleges to assess what shapes servicemembers’ trust in AI used for strategic-level deliberations. I find that their trust in AI used for strategic-level deliberations is shaped by a tightly calibrated set of technical, operational, and oversight considerations. These results provide the first experimental evidence for military attitudes of trust toward AI during crisis escalation, which have important research, policy, and modernization implications.
This essay examines the Army’s efforts to cultivate and gain congressional support for the GI Bill in the 1980s. Focusing on the relationship between Representative Sonny Montgomery, senior Army leaders like Maxwell R. Thurman and Robert Elton, and the staffers who worked for each of them, it illustrates the intentionality with which Army leaders worked to cultivate congressional support for and to head off congressional and presidential opposition to a bill that they saw as essential. Analyzing their public and private efforts at critical moments when the legislation was imperiled reveals that relations between the Army and Congress are more intricate than testimony at hearings and budget requests might reveal, that throughout the 1980s, Army leaders remained deeply concerned about sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, and that the ultimate success of that force and the legislation that helped ensure it rested with individuals who built and then leveraged personal relationships.
Republican candidate Richard M. Nixon’s promise during the 1968 presidential election campaign to extricate the United States from the Vietnam War, combined with the loss of American domestic political support resulting from the January 1968 Tet Offensive, saw a fundamental change to how the war was conducted. The United States began a process of withdrawing their own combat forces and placing the burden for future combat operations on ARVN formations. While the Australian Government was aware of this change in policy, it was not actively included in American political deliberations and hence was unable to take an active position in the face of Vietnamisation. Left with no detailed guidance on the intended timelines for American withdrawal, the Australian Government could provide no direction to Army on the level of future commitment to the war, other than to reinforce the existing rhetoric that participation in the conflict remained vital for Australian national interests. In this policy vacuum, Army leadership concentrated on the military aspects of the war, with the CGS Exercises of both 1967 and 1968 exploring the implications of increasing the size of the force deployed to South Vietnam.
On 29 April 1965 the Australian Government announced the commitment of an Australian battalion to South Vietnam. Prior to the public announcement, discussions had taken place in Hawaii as to the nature of any future commitment in Vietnam. The staff talks, held early May to late April, were between the American Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command, Admiral U.S.G. Sharp Jr, an Australian delegation led by Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, and a New Zealand delegation headed by the Chief of the New Zealand Defence Staff, Admiral Sir Peter Phipps. The participants discussed broad American strategy and possible options as to where any future Australian and New Zealand forces could be deployed within the overall American design. Sharp strongly supported the concept of American forces being deployed in enclaves. He believed that the mere existence of American forces within these enclaves would deprive the North Vietnamese Government of an opportunity for victory and thus encourage them to begin negotiations. If the Australians and New Zealanders did deploy in an enclave, the Americans would provide all combat support capabilities (armour, artillery and air support) as well as the necessary logistic support.
The announcement by Prime Minster Holt on 8 March 1966 to send a task force to South Vietnam represented an expansion of the policy associated with the initial deployment of the battalion group. While 1RAR was making an Australian contribution to the conflict, the small size of the force meant it had operational and political limitations. A battalion was too small to conduct operations independently from an American parent unit, reducing its operational flexibility and the political effect of the Australian involvement. Increasing the size of the Australian commitment to a task force would enable Australian forces to exercise their own operational doctrine. It would also placate some criticism that under American leadership 1RAR was suffering a disproportionate number of casualties compared to the American battalions – even if such criticism was unwarranted. Politically, a task force would mark a substantial Australian contribution to the war and thus further reinforce the Australian commitment to ANZUS.
In 1962 the Australian Government deployed Australian military forces in support of the Republic of Vietnam. Before the cessation of combat operations and complete withdrawal in 1972, this commitment would escalate from an initial advisory team, to a battalion group, to a three-battalion task force with supporting armour, cavalry, aviation, artillery and associated logistics elements.After the war in Afghanistan, this would be the Australian Army’s second-longest conflict, lasting almost 11 years and surpassing the previous longest Australian commitment which was to the Malayan Emergency (1955 to 1963).
Conscription has gained renewed relevance after the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Beyond its military purpose, conscription has historically been linked to citizenship and may significantly influence civic outcomes. Drawing on classic arguments about the civic effects of conscription, alongside recent studies suggesting a negative impact on institutional trust and increased authoritarian attitudes, we investigate whether conscription shapes a broad spectrum of outcomes, including national attachment, prosocial motivation, trust, political preferences, political interest, and authoritarian attitudes. To test this, we use the Danish conscription lottery in combination with survey data, assessing the causal effects of peacetime conscription on these key civic outcomes at the individual level. The results indicate only limited effects, suggesting that peacetime conscription does not impose a general civic penalty. These results contribute to the literature on conscription and are relevant for debates in many European countries about its potential reintroduction.
In 1962, the Australian Government deployed Australian military forces in support of the Republic of Vietnam. Supporting the Commitment: Australian Army Logistics in South Vietnam, 1962–1973 investigates how the Australian Army structured its logistics to support its operations in Vietnam. This book examines how the Australian Army interacted with the US Army's logistic framework to secure its own logistic support for the training team, the battalion group and then the task force. Particular attention is given to the logistic units which supported these deployments, including the raising, siting and operations of the 1st Australian Logistic Support Company (1ALSC) and the 1st Australian Logistic Support Group (1ALSG). Acknowledging that the Australian Army's involvement in South Vietnam was a war of choice, the book explores how Army's institutional attitudes towards logistics influenced the nature of support provided.
This chapter focuses on the Chinese volunteers who fought in Korea during the Korean War. It looks at the interactions between the Chinese volunteers and North Korean civilians. It shows how the CCP strove to shape the emotions of the volunteers and inspire feelings of empathy toward North Korean civilians. Through using new North Korean source materials, it shows how the North Korean government sought to shape popular perceptions of the volunteers.
Establishing civilian control of the military is an important challenge for new democracies. Surprisingly, however, there is no established conceptual framework for understanding what civilian control entails and how exactly weak or absent civilian control impinges upon democratic quality. This article addresses these lacunae, developing a new concept of civilian control for emerging democracies. It proposes to understand civilian control as the situation in which civilians have decision-making power in all relevant political matters. Differentiating civilian control as consisting of five decision-making areas, this new concept allows for a nuanced analysis of civilian control and comparative analysis. It also provides a comprehensive framework for systematically assessing the impact of incomplete civilian control on the various dimensions of liberal democracy.
Since Foucault’s seminal work in the 1960s on the consequences of eighteenth-century discursive shifts in medicine, the establishment of hospitals during this period has often been interpreted as a progressive innovation driven primarily by medical scientists. However, less attention has been given to the ways in which the founding of hospitals was intertwined with domestic traditions and the practical challenges inherent in their implementation. By examining the establishment of the Seraphim Hospital in Stockholm, along with subsequent hospital foundations in Sweden, the practical difficulties involved become evident. Some of these challenges, particularly those related to funding difficulties, bear a striking resemblance to contemporary discussions on enhancing the efficiency of healthcare, despite the differing historical contexts. In the Swedish eighteenth-century context, ecclesiastical authority in medical matters persisted and played a role in the establishment process, while the military character of the kingdom also influenced hospital development. The conclusion drawn is that both national and local conditions shaped how medical reforms were conceived and practised. The historiographical emphasis on novelty and change may, at times, obscure the continuity of past practices, which undeniably played a crucial role in shaping the new. The concept of path dependency is thus employed not only to trace these historical connections but also to explore the ways in which they influenced the Swedish context, ultimately shaping the trajectory of hospital development in the country.
During 1969, growing GI dissent intersected with movement outreach and the opening of new coffeehouses to expand civilian/military collaboration. More government leaders publicly supported antiwar activism. The Woodstock festival was the most visible sign of increased overlap between political and cultural dissent. Various elements of the movement coalesced into the most spectacular outpouring of antiwar passion in the nation’s history during the October Moratorium. Repression of the antiwar movement escalated under the Nixon administration. Activists faced local red squads and vigilante attacks on GI coffeehouses, as well as administration threats against the media, conspiracy trials, and intelligence agencies using COINTELPRO and Operation CHAOS. The president’s fear of stimulating additional antiwar sentiment contributed to his decision to keep secret his expansion of the air war into Cambodia. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met with various dissenting groups to buy additional time. Once Nixon developed his Vietnamization policy, it forced the movement to adapt to new circumstances, but local grassroots activism and conventional dissent persisted.
This chapter explores the relationship between technology and US national security. While it affirms the continuing importance of “traditional” historical subjects like war and diplomacy, it calls for scholars to bring more rigorous research and critical sophistication to bear on them. In other words, it calls for scholars to take a “process-based” approach to these historical subjects rather than the “outcome-based” approach favored by strategic studies scholars. It explains how the author came to study the relationship between technology and national security and how other scholars influenced her approach, which seeks to blend empiricism with theory and benefits from a comparative perspective. Next, the chapter offers tips for conducting broad and deep archival research, emphasizing the value of finding aids and the need to minimize reliance on intermediaries between the researcher and the evidence. It also offers tips on reading in and across subfields and disciplines. Finally, the chapter highlights the importance of taking technical matter, whether it be weapons technology or law, seriously on its own terms while also understanding its constructed nature.
The primary aim of this study was to evaluate whether military occupations with repetitive exposure to low-level blast (i.e., breachers and snipers) display poorer neurocognitive status compared to military controls without prior occupational engagement as breachers and/or snipers, and whether that effect is mediated by self-reported mental health symptoms.
Method:
With data collected from Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) breachers and snipers and sex- and age-matched CAF controls (n = 112), mental health was assessed using the PCL-5 (PTSD) and the Brief Symptoms Inventory, and neurocognitive function based on a set of computerized tasks (i.e., four-choice reaction time task, delayed matching-to-sample, n-back, Stroop). Directed Acyclic Graphs (DAGs) were created to establish a causal framework describing the potential effect of occupation on neurocognitive function while considering mental health. Factor analysis modeling was used to establish the latent construct of neurocognitive function, which was then incorporated into student-t models for effect estimation, following assumptions derived from causal inference principles.
Results:
Our results demonstrated that it is snipers specifically who displayed lower neurocognitive performance compared to breachers and controls. Critically, this effect was not mediated by mental health status. In fact, mental health was generally better in both breachers and snipers when compared to controls.
Conclusions:
When the focus is on occupations with repetitive exposure to low-level blast, the snipers in particular are impacted most in terms of neurocognitive function. We speculate that this might be due to additional impact of recoil forces exacerbating the effect of blast overpressure on the nervous system.
Our research reviews theory and evidence in the economics literature to provide a standard value of a statistical life (VSL) applicable to the Department of Defense (DOD). We follow Viscusi (Best estimate selection bias in the value of a statistical life, Journal of Benefit-Cost Analysis, 9(2), 205–246, 2018a) by conducting a meta-analysis of 1,025 VSL estimates from 68 different labor market studies and find a best-set average VSL estimate of $11.8 million (US$2021) across all studies. For DOD analysts and practitioners, we advocate using our best-set VSL estimate for the vast majority of benefit–cost analyses (BCAs) within the DOD. In addition to providing a VSL benchmark to use in DOD BCAs, we disaggregate casualty types and provide a range of VSL estimates to use in sensitivity analyses. Employing restricted data from the DOD on over 6,700 US military fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 to 2021, we show that (1) fatalities are highly concentrated among young, White and enlisted males, and that (2) the Army and Marines account for the vast majority of the fatality totals (73 and 22%, respectively), in contrast to the low number of fatalities (<5%) in the Air Force and Navy. The monetized cost of US military fatalities in Afghanistan and Iraq would involve individual VSL levels that range from $3.2 to $27.6 million per statistical life (US$2021), after applying standard pay grade and income adjustments.