Competition lies at the heart of our economic, social, and political lives. Studies show that competitions motivate higher performance, but they can also have a dark side, by which competitors engage in deceptive, dishonest, and sabotaging conduct. In the paper’s primary study, we compare competitive behavior at 4 levels of competition intensity. As expected, we find that intensifying the competition has a general effect of increasing both the effort invested in the task and the tendency to sabotage the counterpart. We were particularly interested in whether participants would engage in sabotaging behavior at the lower boundary of competitive intensity that was devoid of any incentive to outperform the counterpart and also precluded any prospect for social comparison or social facilitation. In this condition, participants were matched with another person performing the same task, knowing that their relative performance will have no effect on payoffs and will not even be shared with each other. We found that, by itself, this illusory competition did not motivate higher performance, but when given the option to engage in (costly) sabotage, almost one quarter of participants chose to sabotage their illusory counterpart. The paper’s secondary study replicated this finding using a stimulus that included a comprehension test. These findings reveal competitive behavior under circumstances that, to the best of our knowledge, fall short of previously investigated types of competition. Theoretical explanations and normative implications are discussed.

Narcissism is a personality trait characterized by a sense of being more important and entitled than others. Narcissism is high in adolescence and puts adolescents at risk of psychopathology and problematic social relationships. Why is narcissism persistent in adolescence? Bridging insights from developmental, clinical, social, and personality psychology, we examined whether adolescents (ages 11–15) high in narcissism maintain narcissism through downward social comparisons (e.g., “I am better than my classmates”), not downward temporal comparisons (e.g., “I am better now than when I was younger”). A cross-sectional study (N = 382, 97% Dutch) showed that adolescents higher in narcissism made more downward social and temporal comparisons. In a longitudinal study (N = 389, 99% Dutch), we assessed adolescents’ narcissism levels at the beginning of the school year and at 3-month follow-up. In-between, we captured adolescents’ comparisons through daily diary assessments. Adolescents higher in narcissism made more downward social and temporal comparisons. Downward social – but not temporal – comparisons partially mediated the 3-month stability of narcissism. In both studies, self-esteem was unrelated to downward comparisons. Thus, downward social – but not temporal – comparisons contribute to the maintenance of adolescent narcissism, and these comparisons constitute a potentially malleable developmental mechanism to curtail narcissism.

In this paper we study the effect of downward social information in contribution decisions to fund public goods. We describe the results of a field experiment run in conjunction with the fundraising campaigns of a public radio station. Renewing members are presented with social information (information about another donor's contribution) which is either above or below their previous (last year's) contribution. We find that respondents change their contribution in the direction of the social information; increasing their contribution when the social information is above their previous contribution, and decreasing their contribution when the social information is below. We hypothesize about the psychological motivations that may cause the results and test these hypotheses by comparing the relative size of the upward and downward shifts. These results improve our understanding of cooperation in public good provision and suggest differential costs and benefits to fundraisers in providing social information.

Decisions under risk are often embedded in a social context that we usually abstract from when studying decision-making in the laboratory. In contrast to that practice, our experiment investigates whether risk-taking is affected by social comparisons. In particular, we focus on situations where some amount of money has to be allocated to two parties: either the amount can be shared, or a random device allocates the entire amount to one of the parties. We find that the social context of the decision matters strongly: When participants are in a disadvantageous initial position compared to the other party, they select the risky option much more often than in a purely individual decision, identical in all other respects. Overall, we find that individuals are relatively more risk-seeking in the socially unfavorable domain than in isolation, in contrast to the favorable one, where we find no or little change in elicited risk attitudes in comparison to an isolated decision.

Self-promotion, widespread in the workplace, has received extensive attention from scholars. However, due to the narrow one-dimensional structure of traditional self-promotion and the limitations of theoretical thinking, its antecedents and consequences are still unclear. Therefore, we propose a new pair of self-promotion behaviors (sole self-promotion and joint self-promotion), and develop the measures based on a more grounded definition of self-promotion. In phase 1, we developed the scales of sole self-promotion and joint self-promotion (sample 1), and assessed their psychometric properties (i.e., content validity, factor structure, and reliability) by using two samples (samples 2 and 3). In phase 2, using three-wave data (sample 4) with two sources (employees and coworkers), we tested the overall model based on social comparison theory, examining the antecedents and consequences of sole and joint self-promotion, and exploring the different effects of these two behaviors on career success. Overall, our research offers new insight into self-promotion research and provides a useful tool to evaluate employee self-promotion. Implications for theory and practice, and suggestions for future research are discussed.

People often object to inequity; they react negatively to receiving less than others (disadvantageous inequity aversion), and more than others (advantageous inequity aversion). Here we study people’s folk intuitions about inequity aversion: what do people infer about others’ fairness concerns, when they observe their reactions to disadvantageous or advantageous inequity? We hypothesized that, people would not intuitively regard disadvantageous inequity aversion by itself as being rooted in fairness, but they would regard advantageous inequity aversion by itself as being rooted in fairness. In four studies, we used vignettes describing inequity aversion of a made up alien species to assess people’s folk intuitions about inequity aversion. The studies supported our main hypothesis that disadvantageous inequity aversion, without advantageous inequity aversion, does not fit people’s folk conception of fairness. Instead, participants reported it to be rooted in envy. According to these results, the claim that disadvantageous inequity aversion reveals a concern with fairness, does not readily accord with people’s intuitions. We connect these findings to other pieces of evidence in the literatures of behavioral economics, developmental psychology, and social psychology, indicating that lay people’s intuitions may be on the mark in this case. Specifically, unlike advantageous inequity aversion, disadvantageous inequity aversion need not be rooted in a sense of fairness.

People often use tools for tasks, and sometimes there is uncertainty about whether a given task can be completed with a given tool. This project explored whether, when, and how people’s optimism about successfully completing a task with a given tool is affected by the contextual salience of a better or worse tool. In six studies, participants were faced with novel tasks. For each task, they were assigned a tool but also exposed to a comparison tool that was better or worse in utility (or sometimes similar in utility). In some studies, the tool comparisons were essentially social comparisons, because the tool was assigned to another person. In other studies, the tool comparisons were merely counterfactual rather than social. The studies revealed contrast effects on optimism, and the effect worked in both directions. That is, worse comparison tools boosted optimism and better tools depressed optimism. The contrast effects were observed regardless of the general type of comparison (e.g., social, counterfactual). The comparisons also influenced discrete decisions about which task to attempt (for a prize), which is an important finding for ruling out superficial scaling explanations for the contrast effects. It appears that people fail to exclude irrelevant tool-comparison information from consideration when assessing their likelihood of success on a task, resulting in biased optimism and decisions.

The construction of social preferences often requires one to reconcile various social motives, such as concern with unfavorable inequality and maximization of social welfare. We propose a novel theory whereby people’s level of agency influences the relative intensities of their social motives, and thus their social preferences. Agency in this context refers to decision makers’ active involvement in the processes that produce social outcomes. Nonagentic decision makers are not involved in creating the outcomes. Therefore, the comparison between self and others is highly informative for them and they shun settings in which their outcome appears to be inferior. Conversely, agentic decision makers, who take action to influence social outcomes, care more about others’ outcomes and are more inclined to promote social welfare. We report five studies testing the agency hypothesis. Participants were presented with realistic scenarios involving outcomes for themselves and another person. In each scenario, the outcome for oneself was fixed, while the outcome for the other person varied. The participants’ task was to indicate their satisfaction with the other person obtaining either the same outcome as their own or a better one. We found that participants who were involved in creating the outcomes (agentic condition) were more satisfied with the other getting the better option than were participants who were not involved (nonagentic condition). Even low levels of influence on the outcomes were sufficient for a strong agency effect to occur. We discuss the agency hypothesis in relation to theories of social preference, the effects of voicing and participation in decision processes, and trade-offs in public policy.

Indicators are important sources of information about problems across many policy areas. However, despite a growing number of indicators across most policy areas, such as health care, business promotion, or environmental protection, we still know little about if, how, and when such indicators affect the policy agenda. This article develops a theoretical answer to these questions and examines the implications using a new large-n dataset with 220,000 parliamentary questions asked by government and opposition MPs in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. The data contain information on political attention to 17 problems, such as unemployment, C02 emission, and crime from 1960 to 2015. Across this wealth of data, the article demonstrates that politicians respond to the severity and development of problem indicators over time and in comparison to other countries. Results also show that politicians respond much more when problem indicators develop negatively than when they develop positively.