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Social cognitive deficits are common across many psychiatric conditions and contribute to broader social dysfunction. One hypothesized mechanism involves altered basic visual processing, which may disrupt the perception of low-level social cues and, in turn, compromise broader social cognitive processes. Here, we examined relations between basic visual processing and different levels of social cognition in a transdiagnostic youth sample.
Methods
A sample of 148 youth, ranging from healthy individuals to individuals with neuropsychiatric diagnoses and significant social dysfunction, completed two measures of basic visual processing (contrast sensitivity and visual integration) and a battery of social cognition tasks spanning lower-level (gaze perception) to mid-level (emotion recognition) to higher-level (theory of mind) social cognition. We used a four-level path model to test whether basic visual processing predicts gaze perception, which in turn predicts emotion recognition, which predicts theory of mind.
Results
Poorer contrast sensitivity and visual integration were associated with less precise gaze perception, which was, in turn, associated with worse emotion recognition, which was associated with worse theory of mind. This four-level path model demonstrated good fit and showed superior fit compared to alternative models.
Conclusions
These findings suggest that basic visual processing influences the perception of basic social cues (e.g. gaze direction), which subsequently impairs more complex social perception and inference. Notably, this study extends prior observations from individuals with chronic schizophrenia to a transdiagnostic youth sample, indicating that altered basic visual processing may be a shared mechanism contributing to social cognitive deficits across psychiatric disorders and illness stages.
In this paper, we introduce the action language C-MT (Mind Transition Language), built on top of answer set programs and transition systems to represent how human mental states evolve in response to sequences of observable actions. Drawing on well-established psychological theories, such as the Appraisal Theory of Emotion, we formalize mental states, such as emotions, as multi-dimensional configurations. To enable controlled agent behavior and limit undesirable effects such as undue psychological influence, we introduce a novel causal rule, forbids to cause, together with constructs tailored to mental state dynamics. These allow the specification of valid transitions as constraints and invariance properties, which are rigorously evaluated over trajectories in transition systems. The framework supports reasoning about and comparing different dynamics of mental change under varying constraints. We apply the action language to design models for emotion verification.
This longitudinal study monitored Theory-of-Mind development in monolingually raised but bilingually educated Spanish children (age 5–6) with varied L2-English curricula (13%–83%) to assess whether higher L2-exposure resulted in advantages on seven ToM concepts (emotion, desires, belief, reference, moral-reasoning, lies, sarcasm). Attention (selective, switching, inhibition) and a full suite of individual-difference effects were also monitored. GLMMs linked greater L2-exposure to higher ToM accuracy, and although all three attention measures contributed to ToM scores, the effect of selective attention was the strongest. L1-vocabulary and NVR routinely predicted ToM scores, and girls surpassed boys on sarcasm. We conclude that bilingualism spurs ToM development quickly and is not linked to L2-vocabulary at this stage. In addition, the fact that L2-exposure and individual differences impacted cognitive, affective, and conative ToM differentially supports an approach that analyses these components separately.
Studies persuasively show that parental power assertion contributes to children’s hostile (defensive) mindsets, but most examined severe forms of control (abuse, harsh punishment) and aggressive children. Less is known about processes linking power assertion with children’s hostile mindsets in typical, low-risk families. Further, specific mechanisms accounting for associations between parenting and hostile mindsets are unclear; children’s theory of mind (ToM) and regulation have been suggested, implying equifinality in developmental cascades. Finally, factors that moderate impact of parenting on children’s hostile mindsets, implying multifinality, are unclear. In a study of 200 mothers, fathers, and children, we proposed that links between parental power assertion and children’s hostile mindsets are (a) accounted for by two parallel mediators – children’s poor ToM and poor regulation, and (b) moderated by their representations of parents. We expected links between power assertion and hostile mindset to be significant for children with negative representations, but defused, or absent, for children with positive representations. Parental power assertion was assessed at toddler and preschool age, ToM and regulation at preschool age, and hostile mindsets and representations of parents at early school age. We supported both mediated paths for mother–child dyads, mediation via child regulation for father–child dyads, and moderation for both.
This article offers a DE SE THEORY of person indexicals, wherein first- and second-person indexical pronouns indicate REFERENCE DE SE (also called SELF-ASCRIPTION). Long observed for first-person pronouns (Castañeda 1977, Kaplan 1977, Perry 1979, inter alia), self-ascription is extended here to second person as well. The person feature of a pronoun specifies the speech-act roles that must be played by the self-ascribers: the speakers (uttering a first-person pronoun), the addressees (interpreting a second-person pronoun), or both (for first-person inclusive). Other agents who are not among the designated self-ascribers for a given pronoun interpret the pronoun indirectly by inferring the self-ascriber's interpretation, a process requiring THEORY OF MIND, that is, the cognitive ability to impute mental states to others (Premack & Woodruff 1978). This de se theory is supported by convergent evidence from multiple domains: (i) It explains a typological universal: first- and second-person plurals always allow associative semantics (‘speaker(s) plus others’, 'addressee(s) plus others') rather than requiring regular plural semantics ('speakers only', ‘addressees only‘) (Greenberg 1988, Noyer 1992, Cysouw 2003, Bobaljik 2008). (ii) It belongs to a family of approaches that solve the problem of the essential indexical (Perry 1979). (iii) It correctly predicts observed patterns of indexical pronoun production and comprehension by two populations lacking a fully developed theory of mind: typically developing children in the stage before theory of mind has developed, and children with autism. (iv) It correctly predicts the interpretation of second-person pronouns in utterances with multiple addressees.
Social cognitive impairments are a fundamental aspect of schizophrenia, exerting a substantial influence on patients’ functional outcomes. However, to date, there have been no meta-analyses of comprehensive pharmacological interventions covering all domains of social cognition. The aim of the present study was to address this knowledge gap by conducting a network meta-analysis, a comprehensive approach that systematically compares the efficacy of pharmacological interventions across all domains of social cognition.
Methods
A literature search for randomized controlled trials (RCTs) was conducted using PubMed, Embase, the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, PsycINFO, ClinicalTrials.gov, and the International Clinical Trials Registry Platform. The Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis guidelines were followed.
Results
A total of 8,752 records were screened, and 60 RCTs involving 4,270 subjects were included in the systematic review. Thirty-six pharmacological interventions were extracted, but no compounds had a significant ameliorative effect on social cognition in comparison with placebo. In each domain of social cognition, the following compounds were identified as the most probable candidates for treatment selection: selective glycine uptake inhibitor (standardized mean difference [SMD], 0.46; 95% credible interval [CI], −0.52 to 1.44) and stimulant (SMD, 0.44; 95% CI, −0.57 to 1.45) for emotion perception in comparison with placebo. In the context of emotion processing, γ-aminobutyric acid (A) α2/α3 partial agonist (SMD, 0.33; 95% CI, −0.53 to 1.19) emerged as the top compound.
Conclusions
To date, no pharmacological interventions have demonstrated efficacy for social cognitive impairments in schizophrenia.
In this commentary, we emphasize the importance of the observations presented by Kissine (2021) in his target article for our understanding of the nonmonolithic nature of pragmatics. Our first aim is to complement Kissine's argument, discussing some critical cases of linguistic processes that demonstrate the need for a finer-grained characterization of pragmatic phenomena. In addition, we report some findings that suggest that perspective taking may emerge as atypical even in autistic individuals who appear to be able to pass the standard theory-of-mind tasks. Our second aim is thus to argue that, albeit difficult to spot in experimental settings, the atypical theory-of-mind profile of low- and high-functioning autistic individuals is mirrored in their difficulties in everyday sociocommunicative interactions. Moreover, we claim that subtle differences in perspective-taking abilities may explain the highly heterogeneous linguistic profile of autistic individuals. Ultimately, with this commentary we wish to highlight the need for an increased appreciation of the role of perspective taking in typical and atypical language acquisition. This is crucial to our understanding of the nature of language acquisition, and can shed more light on the interaction between language and other aspects of human cognition.
Mikhail Kissine's (2021) target article examines autism in order to mine questions about language use and its cognitive underpinnings. Among these, we focus on the question concerning the role of mind reading in language interpretation. Kissine claims that the selective pragmatic profile of highly verbal autistic individuals undermines the existence of an ‘intrinsic link’ between language interpretation and mind reading. We advocate for a more cautious approach based on both theoretical and empirical arguments. Theoretically speaking, data from autism are compatible with the view that language interpretation is the result of a special-purpose form of mind reading, dedicated to the domain of intentional communication. Empirically speaking, the data are neither clear nor consistent enough for making strong claims about what exactly are the communicative challenges of highly verbal autistic individuals.
Impairments in mentalizing, or theory of mind, occur across psychiatric disorders. Static illustrations are widely used to assess mentalizing due to their simplicity, and they allow assessment of specific cognitive processes. However, systematic comparisons of impairments between psychiatric disorders, neurodevelopmental disorders, and at-risk groups in mentalizing tasks with static illustrations are currently lacking.
Methods
A systematic review with pairwise and network meta-analyses (NMA) was conducted to evaluate mentalizing impairments using tasks with static illustrations across psychiatric disorders compared to healthy controls (HCs) and between groups. Subgroup analyses examined specific mentalizing domains (false belief, humor, and intentionality), and meta-regression analyses explored potential moderators. The ceiling effects of specific tasks were also examined.
Results
Eighty-nine studies were included, involving 9,038 participants and 11 psychiatric conditions. Significant mentalizing deficits were observed across all conditions versus HCs, except for the familial risk for bipolar disorder group. NMA demonstrated that schizophrenia (g = −0.960) and early schizophrenia (g = −0.785) exhibited the most pronounced impairments, followed by borderline personality disorder (g = −0.612) and obsessive-compulsive disorder (g = −0.613). Particularly, schizophrenia showed significantly greater deficits than autism, bipolar disorder, clinical and familial high risk for schizophrenia, and depression. Domain-specific analyses highlighted differential impairment patterns. The presence of prominent ceiling effects suggests major limitations of tasks with static illustrations.
Conclusions
This review provides detailed insights into transdiagnostic and disorder-specific patterns of mentalizing impairments with tasks using static illustrations. Findings highlight the importance of domain-specific approaches, examining interindividual variability, refining assessment tools, and implementing targeted interventions.
In this chapter, we examine the foundations of the development of social cognition—how children come to understand themselves and others. We begin by looking at the development of theory of mind– how children come to understand that people’s behavior is influenced by their beliefs and desires. We then examine the development of social learning, the acquisition of social information and behavior, which is responsible for humans’ ability to transfer information with such high fidelity from one person (and generation) to another. We then examine the development of the self, including self-concept, self-esteem, and self-efficacy. We conclude the chapter by looking at a related topic, identity formation in adolescence, including the development of ethnic identity.
Human success in navigating the social world is typically attributed to our capacity to represent other minds—a mentalistic stance. We argue that humans are endowed with a second equally powerful intuitive theory: an institutional stance. In contrast to the mentalistic stance, which helps us predict and explain unconstrained behavior via unobservable mental states, the institutional stance interprets social interactions in terms of role-based structures that constrain and regulate behavior via rule-like behavioral expectations. We argue that this stance is supported by a generative grammar that builds structured models of social collectives, enabling people to rapidly infer, track, and manipulate the social world. The institutional stance emerges early in development and its precursors can be traced across social species, but its full-fledged generative capacity is uniquely human. Once in place, the ability to reason about institutional structures takes on a causal role, allowing people to create and modify social structures, supporting new forms of institutional life. Human social cognition is best understood as an interplay between a system for representing the unconstrained behavior of individuals in terms of minds and a system for representing the constrained behavior of social collectives in terms of institutional structures composed of interlocking sets of roles.
This Element describes the development of a Theory of Mind, or mentalizing, in infancy and early childhood. Theory of Mind is a key social cognitive ability that permits children to predict and explain human behaviors by attributing mental states to other people. Understanding mental states gradually progresses from basic desires to false beliefs. The Element reviews the proximal and distal cognitive and social determinants that facilitate early Theory of Mind development. Discoveries in neuroscience contribute to understanding the ontogeny of Theory of Mind. This Element presents an overview of the main theoretical accounts of Theory of Mind development and offers suggestions for future research.
Rather than thinking of nature versus nurture it is better to think about interactions between genes and the environment. The Santa Barbara School of evolutionary psychology proposed that human cognition is the result of innately specified domain-specific mental modules. Babies have certain expectations of the way that the physical world operates. Infants of at least three months of age have the knowledge that objects exist independently of their ability to perceive them. Babies have preference for face-like stimuli from birth and learn the details of human faces rapidly. Young children have an understanding of the role of mental states as a cause of behaviour. This skill, known as theory of mind, becomes more sophisticated as children develop. It is measured by a number of tasks such as false belief task and the eyes test, in which participants are required to judge how people feel from looking at their eyes.
Chapter 3 picks up on the topic of cheating and the benefits this adaptation confers to those who are able to pillage others’ resources undetected. It looks at the evolutionary implications of this capability in the human species, which can be traced back to the development of Theory of Mind. It then proceeds to consider cognitive adaptations that characterise mental life in the human species, marked by biases and heuristics that confer evolutionary advantages in terms of efficiency in the cognitive processing of salient information. These include stereotyping and xenophobia, which enabled our ancestors to distinguish friend from foe and to limit collaboration with similarly interested others for mutual benefit.
In this chapter, we focus on the neuronal networks underlying the socio-affective capacities empathy and compassion. We first provide definitions of empathy and compassion and give an overview of the historical development in social neuroscience related to empathy and compassion research, with a focus on differentiating between empathy, empathic distress, compassion, and related concepts of social understanding like Theory of Mind. We then examine the neuronal networks underlying these distinct social capacities and discuss the latest discoveries in this field. Next, we turn to the plasticity of the social brain and compare training approaches in their efficacy in improving socio-affective and socio-cognitive capacities. This is followed by the exploration of how psychopathological symptoms are differentially related to empathy, compassion, and socio-cognitive skills. Lastly, we conclude the main findings of this chapter and provide questions for future neuroscientific and psychological research on empathy and compassion.
Impairments in social interaction are common symptoms of dementia and necessitate the use of validated neuropsychological instruments to measure social cognition. We aim to investigate the Hinting Task – Dutch version (HT-NL), which measures the ability to infer intentions behind indirect speech to assess Theory of Mind, in dementia.
Method:
Sixty-six patients with dementia, of whom 22 had behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), 21 had primary progressive aphasia, and 23 had Alzheimer’s disease (AD), and 99 healthy control participants were included. We examined the HT-NL’s psychometric properties, including internal consistency, between-group differences using analyses of covariance with Bonferroni-adjusted post hoc comparisons, discriminative ability and concurrent validity using the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), and construct validity using Spearman rank correlations with other cognitive tests.
Results:
Internal consistency was acceptable (Cronbach’s α = 0.74). All patient groups scored lower on the HT-NL than the control group. Patients with bvFTD scored lower than patients with AD dementia. The HT-NL showed excellent discriminative ability (AUC = 0.83), comparable to a test of emotion recognition (ΔAUC = 0.03, p = .67). The HT-NL correlated significantly with a test for emotion recognition (r = .45), and with measures of memory and language (r = [.31, .40]), but not with measures of information processing speed, executive functioning, or working memory (r = [.00, .17]). Preliminary normative data are provided.
Conclusions:
The HT-NL is a psychometrically sound and valid instrument and is useful for identifying Theory of Mind impairments in patients with dementia.
Exposure to multiple languages may support the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) in neurotypical (NT) and autistic children. However, previous research mainly applied group comparisons between monolingual and bilingual children, and the underlying mechanism of the observed difference remains unclear. The present study, therefore, sheds light on the effect of bilingualism on ToM in both NT and autistic children by measuring language experiences with a continuous operationalization. We measure ToM with a behavioral, linguistically simple tablet-based task, allowing inclusive assessment in autistic children. Analyses revealed no difference between monolingual and bilingual NT and autistic children. However, more balanced exposure to different languages within contexts positively predicted first-order false belief understanding in NT children but not autistic children. Mediation analysis showed that the impact in NT children was a direct effect and not mediated via other cognitive skills.
Spontaneous mentalizing refers to the capacity to attribute mental states to oneself and others without explicit prompts or conscious deliberation. This process enables individuals to comprehend and anticipate social behaviors in a more intuitive manner. Individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia frequently demonstrate deficits in this domain, which contribute to impaired social functioning. The present meta-analysis aims to assess the extent of spontaneous mentalizing impairments in schizophrenia.
Methods
A comprehensive search was conducted in four prominent databases: MEDLINE, EMBASE, CENTRAL, and Web of Science. Following the review of the retrieved records and subsequent citation searching, a total of 15 studies were selected for inclusion in the quantitative synthesis. The data of 526 patients diagnosed with schizophrenia and 536 controls were subjected to analysis. Effect sizes for intentionality and appropriateness were computed utilizing weighted or standardized mean differences, and heterogeneity was evaluated.
Results
Patients with schizophrenia exhibited substantial impairments in intentionality and appropriateness during mentalizing tasks, with large effect sizes. No significant differences were observed in random movement tasks, although patients also demonstrated deficits in interpreting goal-directed movements. Furthermore, high heterogeneity in some outcomes and variability in study methodologies were also noted.
Conclusions
This analysis corroborates substantial spontaneous mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia, underscoring their potential role in impaired social functioning. In conjunction with previous analyses, the present findings emphasize the pervasive nature of mentalizing deficits in schizophrenia, encompassing explicit, implicit, and spontaneous dimensions. These results hold significant implications for therapeutic strategies designed to augment social cognition in individuals with schizophrenia.
Mentalizing defines the set of social cognitive imaginative activities that enable interpretation of behaviors as arising from intentional mental states. Mentalization impairments have been related to childhood trauma (CT) and are widely present in people suffering from mental disorders. Nevertheless, the link between CT exposure, mentalization abilities, and related psychopathology remains unclear. This study aims to systematically review the evidence in this domain.
Methods
A Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA)-compliant systematic review of literature published until December 2022 was conducted through an Ovid search (Medline, Embase, and PsycINFO). The review was registered in the Prospective Register of Systematic Reviews (PROSPERO) (CRD42023455602).
Results
Twenty-nine studies were included in the qualitative synthesis. Twenty studies (69%) showed a significant negative correlation between CT and mentalization. There was solid evidence for this association in patients with psychotic disorders, as almost half the studies focused on this population. The few studies focusing on unipolar depression, personality disorders, and opioid addiction also reported a negative impact of CT on mentalization. In contrast, evidence for post-traumatic stress disorder was inconsistent, and no evidence was found for bipolar disorder. When stratifying for subtypes of CT, there was solid evidence that neglect (physical and emotional) decreased mentalization capacity, while abuse (physical, emotional, or sexual) was not associated with mentalization impairments.
Conclusions
Although causality cannot be established, there was substantial evidence that CT negatively affects mentalization across various psychiatric disorders, particularly psychotic disorders. These findings highlight the potential of targeting mentalization impairments in prevention and treatment strategies aiming to reduce the incidence and the social functioning burden of mental illness.
This book recovers an important set of American literary texts from the turn of the nineteenth century to the Civil War that focus on bodies that seem to have minds of their own. Artists such as Charles Brockden Brown, Robert Montgomery Bird, Edwin Forrest, Henry Box Brown, Elizabeth Stuart Phelps, and Herman Melville represented the evocative expressiveness of these literary bodies. With twitches and roars, flushes and blushes, these lively literary bodies shaped the development of American Literature even as they challenged the structures of chattel slavery, market capitalism, and the patriarchy. Situated within its historical context, this new story of nineteenth-century American Literature thus reveals how American literary expression-from novels to melodramas, from panoramas to magic tricks-represented less repressive, more capacious possibilities of conscious existence, and new forms of the human for those dehumanized in the nineteenth century.