Boethius’ initial question in the Consolation of Philosophy is why God, who orders the natural universe beautifully, would allow human affairs to proceed in a chaotic fashion, even permitting the wicked to trample on the virtuous and go unpunished. Lady Philosophy responds that God governs everything well. What seem to limited human beings to be misfortunes can all be turned to good. This introduces the importance of human free will and a perennial question for Christian philosophers: If God foreknows future choices, can they be free? Human foreknowledge is a sign that the foreknown event does not happen voluntarily. God, being eternal, sees all time as present, and so divine foreknowledge does not impose or indicate any necessity that would conflict with free will. Boethius concludes by expressing theist compatibilism: Even free choices fall under the absolute sovereignty of God.

Theological compatibilists have considered the will of God and creaturely wills to be aligned, such that divine election or determination does not undermine but rather preserves the free will of the creature. In the person of Jesus Christ this compatibility is held to be utterly flawless, and the human will of Christ to “follow after” or conform itself perfectly, and without sin, to the divine will. As a theological compatibilist I am persuaded by this largely Augustinian and Cyrillian Christology. However, critics may well wonder whether Christ’s agony in the Garden of Gethsemane does not make such a view implausible, perhaps incoherent, and leads to an undermining of a proper doctrine of atonement. This essay undertakes to examine the narratives of Gethsemane in light of this criticism, and to offer a reply.

I raise two challenges for theological determinism. First, a prominent criticism of theological determinism holds that human moral responsibility is incompatible with theological determinism. Many theological determinists resist this criticism by maintaining that determinism is compatible with moral responsibility. I attempt to break new ground in this debate by arguing that the theological determinist cannot adequately avoid moral luck. I argue that opponents of theological determinism can embrace a truly luck-free notion of responsibility, on which nothing beyond the agent’s control impacts their praiseworthiness or blameworthiness. But theological determinists, insofar as they are not skeptics about human responsibility, are stuck accepting that luck impacts responsibility. Thus theological determinists are committed to intuitive unfairness, which their opponents can avoid. Second, although I grant that some free will theodicies are available to theological determinists, I argue that they cannot make use of the most attractive type of free will theodicy. Finally, I draw an interesting connection between my approach to moral luck and my preferred sort of free will theodicy.

Divine determinism has been an unpopular topic in recent theology – widely dismissed, habitually avoided. One might wonder, therefore, what a theological contribution to understanding this possibility might look like. Some have proposed that reflection on divine transcendence helps us avoid misunderstandings that put secondary, creaturely agency in competition with God’s. I argue that this “non-competitive” approach offers limited insight into the agential and theodical problems raised by divine determinism. Drawing on doctrines of election, I then explore the possibility that divine love itself might require determinism. If, having imagined specific characters in a particular story, God loves them and desires to bring them to life, God might find it necessary for history to take the directions required for them to come to be. This possibility challenges caricatures of a determining God as tyrannical and suggests that even divine authorship may face constraints in eliminating evil.

An important tradition of thinking about divine and human agency takes divine transcendence as key to reconciling human freedom with God’s universal causality. Proponents of this tradition, who often claim Aquinas as their inspiration, sometimes maintain that this “transcendence approach” (TA) offers a third way that defies classification as libertarian or compatibilist. I argue that, carefully defined, libertarianism and compatibilism are mutually exclusive and exhaustive options for those affirming free will, but that it is an open question whether a view that affirms free will alongside God’s universal causality is compatibilist or libertarian. I then consider the interesting strategies employed by proponents of TA and argue that they leave it unclear whether TA is a libertarian or compatibilist view. Finally, I argue that a consistent deployment of these strategies results in a version of TA that is clearly libertarian, but which maintains a strong view of divine sovereignty and providence.

Many philosophers are compatibilists about moral responsibility and (natural) determinism, which is to say that they think there can be morally responsible agents in worlds with deterministic laws. According to some of these philosophers, however, if God (rather than natural events/laws) determines everything that happens, then no human being is morally responsible for anything. On this combination of views, God’s setting everything up would undermine our moral responsibility, whereas being “set up” by chance would not undermine our moral responsibility. In this chapter, I argue that this combination of views is untenable, and my argument draws from recent work on the manipulation argument against (natural) compatibilism, especially from criticisms of the so-called “soft-line” reply to the manipulation argument.

In this chapter, I explore how an indeterminist/libertarian model and a determinist/compatibilist model fare with regards to understanding divine providence, with particular emphasis on the issue of the extent to which it is variously open on these views to hold that humanity (and each of us as individuals) is intended. Is it possible for someone who holds a view of divine providence that is “looser” than the meticulous view that comes when one sees the world through theological-deterministic lenses to see humanity in general and each of us as individuals as other than unintended? To what extent are we here “by accident”?

This chapter explores the constraints that a commitment to the inevitability of sin places on an understanding of the existence and nature of human freedom, and the implications of this understanding for debates about divine providence. It is argued, first, that the New Testament univocally attests to the inevitability of sin, and second, that given this biblical witness, Christians should not be swayed by one reason commonly given for rejecting theological determinism: in order to preserve libertarian freedom for humans at large. Still, considerations regarding the inevitability of human sin leave untouched another common argument against theological determinism: that it makes God the author of sin. Considerations of the inevitability (and culpability) of sin, on the one hand, and concerns about divine authorship of sin, on the other, might push one toward an uncommon combination of compatibilism and theological indeterminism. However, given the apparent unfairness of punishing individuals for sins they could not have avoided committing, a position between standard compatibilism and free will skepticism is tentatively endorsed.

The limited nature of self-control gives rise to awkward questions. Are people who get into trouble due to poor self-control really to blame, or simply the innocent victims of circumstances beyond their control? This long and pivotal chapter addresses what the limited nature of self-control means for moral responsibility. On the one hand, poor self-control might at times be a valid excuse, but on the other, we would not want a world in which everyone can claim to be nothing but the innocent victims of their endowments from birth and their social background. These considerations lead straight to one of the most vexing problems in philosophy: How is moral responsibility possible in a universe in which everything is caused by what came before? My strategy for tackling this question is to introduce three distinct epistemological standpoints to look at the problem and to consult two bodies of knowledge: the vast literature on free will and the scholarship on folk intuitions regarding criminal sentencing. Together, these three standpoints and two bodies of knowledge furnish the building blocks for guidelines to decide on matters of poor self-control and moral responsibility.

This chapter discusses the relation between causation and moral responsibility. We generally hold adult human beings morally responsible for their actions, yet those action are also events in the natural world, enmeshed in causal chains that extend backwards in time long before the agent’s birth. If the causes in those chains necessitate their effects, it would appear that we must either give up the view that humans are morally responsible for their actions, or embrace the paradoxical view that humans are morally responsible for actions necessitated by events over which they have no control. Tuozzo argues that Aristotle’s causal theory avoids this dilemma by recognising two distinct types of causal chain or nexus. In one of these, the links between cause and effect are indeed necessary, from beginning to end. But chains of this sort are necessarily finite, with a definite beginning and end. Each of these necessary, finite causal chains are also enmeshed in a different sort of causal nexus, one that does extend indefinitely into the past. But this sort of indefinite causal chain is possible only because it contains links that are not necessitated. This enables Aristotle to account for moral responsibility by locating the necessitating cause of a human action in the agent herself. Nonetheless, Tuozzo concludes, Aristotle’s theory does have the paradoxical implication that, although the state of the world at a given time does not necessitate all subsequent events, a complete description of it would, in principle, allow all subsequent events – including human actions – to be predicted.