Media attention to policing has brought a proliferation of narratives seeking to contextualize incidents of police violence. Here, we test whether exposure to such narratives shift Americans’ opinion or behavior. To do so, we first identify and track the media prevalence of two of these narratives: one focused on racial bias in policing and a second focused on the dangers of the profession. Despite the presence of these narratives in media, we find, experimentally, that public opinion about police violence is stable, regardless of the media narrative used. Finally, to better understand these null results, we use a content analysis of open-ended responses to uncover the demographic and ideological characteristics that are most more deterministic of their reactions to police violence. Altogether, these findings indicate attitudes about policing and planned political participation are ossified and unresponsive to media narratives.

This article examines how the discursive logic of quasi-markets in Swedish university real-estate management enables depoliticisation while consolidating state control. Sweden is a distinctive case where universities are public agencies, yet most campus property is owned by Akademiska Hus AB, a profit-seeking corporation wholly owned by the state. Using interpretive policy and frame analysis of legislation, government decisions, and public debate, we trace how market rents were introduced and justified. We show that depoliticising narratives portraying academics as fiscally unaccountable and university space as wasteful legitimise New Public Management reforms. Extending the ‘ghost in the machine’ metaphor, we demonstrate how political logics permeate welfare governance but are rendered less visible. The quasi-market sustains centralised control and fuels distrust between universities and government, risking a cycle of expanding quasi-market instruments and reduced institutional autonomy. Diminished autonomy may in turn have implications for academic freedom.

Research shows that information cues influence public opinion on international cooperation, yet it is unclear whether all cues are equally effective in the context of a global crisis. This paper sheds light on this issue by analysing how frames in public discourse influence support for multilateral vaccine cooperation during Covid‐19. Building on research on in‐group favouritism, decision‐making under uncertainty, and public support for multilateralism, the paper argues that frames emphasizing vaccine nationalism are more potent than those emphasizing international cooperation and that nationalist political identities moderate these framing effects. An original survey experiment in the United Kingdom confirms this argument and shows that public support for multilateralism is substantial but vulnerable. A vaccine nationalism frame reduces support for multilateralism, while an international cooperation frame has no effect. Moreover, ‘Brexit identities’ moderate this framing effect, with ‘Leavers’ being more susceptible to the detrimental effect of the vaccine nationalism frame than ‘Remainers’.

Despite the generally accepted weakness of trade unions at the European Union level, an analysis of two high profile cases – the Services Directive and the Port Directive – shows that trade unions are able to mobilise effectively at the European level and, within constellations of actors, crucially impact EU decision making. In contrast to common claims that a lack of access to EU institutions makes such groups powerless, it is argued here that the exclusion of large opposing societal groups from consultations is neither a quick nor a sure fire recipe for dismantling opposition. On the contrary, it politicises the process and may lead to opposing groups mobilising in more contentious ways.

John Kingdon's Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) constitutes a powerful tool for understanding the policy process, and more specifically, agenda‐setting, through three separate streams: problems, policies and politics. This article argues that the MSF would benefit from further development of the problem stream. It introduces a clearer conception of agency into the problem stream by suggesting the inclusion of the problem broker. The problem broker is a role in which actors frame conditions as public problems and work to make policy makers accept these frames. The problem broker makes use of knowledge, values and emotions in the framing of problems. The use of these three elements is seen as a prerequisite for successful problem brokering – that is, for establishing a frame in the policy sphere. Other important factors are: persistence, access to policy makers, credibility and willingness. Problem brokers also need to know who to talk to, how and when in order to make an impact. The context, in terms of, for example, audience and national mood, is also crucial. The inclusion of the problem broker into the MSF strengthens the analytical separation between streams. According to Kingdon, policies can be developed independently from problems. The MSF, therefore, enables a study of policy generation. The inclusion of the problem broker, in the same sense, makes it possible to investigate problem framing as a separate process and enables a study of actors that frame problems without making policy suggestions. The MSF is, in its current form, not able to capture what these actors do. The main argument of this article is that it is crucial to study these actors as problem framing affects the work of policy entrepreneurs and, thereby, agenda‐setting and decision making.

Despite a growing evidence of transmigrants’ political activism, empirical research is still in its infancy. This paper examined how migrants’ political agency was constructed by their emotions, identities and transnational contexts. Data were collected from in-depth interviews with 11 Korean migrants who were residing in Brisbane, the third largest city of Australia, and engaging in home-country politics through self-organized activities. The study found that participants developed a human rights frame to suit their identities and contexts and in turn, the frame shaped their identities and political agency around human rights. The concepts of ‘framing’ and ‘small group development’ assisted in understanding interview participants’ experiences of negotiating differences in conceptualization and strategization of social issues.

In light of the German government's long‐held preference against EU‐wide fiscal burden‐sharing, a hallmark of the Euro crisis, its support for an EU‐wide debt‐instrument during the COVID‐19 pandemic constitutes a dramatic policy U‐turn. To make sense of the ‘Berlin puzzle’, we develop a theoretical mechanism that explores why an initially reluctant German government heeded to the call for transnational fiscal solidarity: First, to avoid a ‘common bad’ of a large‐scale economic contraction, proposals for an EU‐wide fiscal response became a political imperative. Second, the successful framing of the crisis as ‘nobody's fault’ rendered the call for European solidarity as the dominant standard of legitimacy to which all governments subscribed. Third, governments whose preferences were not aligned with this standard faced mounting normative pressure and isolation. As a result, governments changed their positions, but not their preferences. We probe this mechanism by carrying out a process‐tracing analysis of the German government's fiscal policy U‐turn in the crucial months preceding the adoption of the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery plan in July 2020. The paper contributes to the growing literature on fiscal burden‐sharing in the EU by demonstrating when and how member states can change their stance on transnational fiscal burden‐sharing.

Scholars have used varying terminology for describing non-state entities seeking to influence public policy or work with the EU’s institutions. This paper argues that the use of this terminology is not and should not be random, as different ‘frames’ come with different normative visions about the role(s) of these entities in EU democracy. A novel bibliometric analysis of 780 academic publications between 1992 and 2020 reveals that three frames stand out: The interest group frame, the NGO frame, as well as the civil society organisation frame; a number of publications also use multiple frames. This article reveals the specific democratic visions contained in these frames, including a pluralist view for interest groups; a governance view for NGOs as ‘third sector’ organisations, and participatory and deliberative democracy contributions for civil society organisations. The use of these frames has dynamically changed over time, with ‘interest groups’ on the rise. The results demonstrate the shifting focus of studies on non-state actors in the EU and consolidation within the sub-field; the original visions of European policy-makers emerging from the 2001 White Paper on governance may only partially come true.

This article addresses debates on the formulation of public policy, building upon a body of literature which has focused on the interconnectedness between the venues of policy action and the way issues are defined. It does so by focusing on the strategic role of policy actors in a policy subfield and their attempts at manipulating either frames or venues in order to shape policy. The novelty here consists in pointing to the involvement of regulators in such strategic action. An emerging body of research has indeed shown that the activity of formally independent regulators is not necessarily limited to the implementation of delegated regulatory competencies and that they are increasingly engaged in policy‐making activities. Thus, by resorting to the agenda‐setting and framing literature, the article sheds light on novel pathways through which regulators intervene in policy‐making activities, making a claim that they have very good ‘tools’ at their disposal in order to shape policy. These dynamics are examined in the case of the last piece of the EU's pharmaceutical framework – the 2004 Directive on Traditional Herbal Medicines – which provoked intense debate among manufacturers of herbals, retailers, consumers, and both EU‐level and domestic‐level regulatory authorities.

The proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) since the 1970s has generated a wealth of research as to the causes and implications of the rise of this sector. Public awareness of NGOs and their activities has grown as well, at least in part due to increased media coverage of the organizations and the situations to which they respond. Although NGOs are not new to global polity, media attention to them as a sector only really began to take off in the 1990s. Using quantitative and qualitative analysis of two international newspapers from 1985-2010, this study explores the legitimation process of NGOs and examines the role of categorization and labeling in this process. The results show that the establishment of a distinct label in the media served to propel cognitive recognition of NGOs, and that media coverage reflects changes in cognitive legitimacy over time.

This article discusses the potential of case study and process-tracing methods for studying lobbying and framing in the European Union (EU). It argues that case studies and process tracing allow us to explore different sets of questions than large-N and quantitative approaches and to shed light on the mechanisms that contribute to policy change. Through these methods it is possible to study long-term processes and under-researched areas, to analyse the social construction of frames and to single out the conditions that lead to successful framing. In order to show the advantages of case studies and process tracing, illustrative examples drawn from the case study of EU foreign policy towards the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are provided.

Along with the nuclear renaissance in China, anti-nuclear sentiments are emerging, that are yet to be comprehensively studied by scholars. Conflicts arise due to rapid development and enormous social change, puzzling that stability remains in the society while these conflicts take place. This article analyses the relationship between social mobilizations and social stability in China in the context of anti-nuclear incidents and argues that there are political opportunities and resources for petitioners to exert their influence on the political system. The opportunities arise out of the decentralization and fragmentation of the political system, such as the diverging priorities of the central and local government. Furthermore, if the petitioners blame specific local governments and raise specific demands, local interest groups have a high chance to achieve their desired goals. Petitions facilitate communication between local interest groups and governments which may resolve social conflicts and preserve social stability.

In a late October 2022 international YouGov public opinion poll, findings indicated that more Indians attributed responsibility for the Russian invasion of Ukraine to ‘the West’ rather than Russia (28% compared to 27%, while 45% indicated both were accountable or expressed uncertainty). This study seeks to elucidate why such perceptions prevail, drawing upon the longstanding strategic partnership between the former Soviet Union and, subsequently, Russia, with India dating back to the 1950s and the portrayal of the Russian invasion within Indian broadcast news media. We argue that the media coverage of the conflict exhibits three main frames: the invasion as an attack by Russia on Ukrainian sovereignty, an anti-West pro-Russia frame, and a perspective aligning with Indian national interests. Both international and domestic proponents of these frames actively seek to shape the narrative presented, with media organizations deciding which frames to prioritize and which political actors to endorse. Consequently, we argue that the news media plays a pivotal role in shaping public perceptions of the conflict, influencing the Indian government's approach toward the war.

News reporting typically has a dual function: it mirrors what is going on in real life, but it also shapes how actors behave. Previous studies suggest that media presence, by way of shaping public and policy perceptions, influence how well nonprofits are able to raise funds and mobilize human resources. Yet, we are lacking insights into how the third sector is actually framed in the media, in particular with regard to innovation, which increasingly complements the more traditional functions of advocacy and service provision. To find out, we performed a longitudinal content analysis and an in-depth framing analysis on national and regional newspapers from nine European countries. The analyses demonstrate that third sector activities, especially those related to social innovation, are largely ignored. We find no systematic evidence that crises increase news attention to nonprofit activities. The third sector is becoming more newsworthy when it co-engages with government and business actors, but can benefit only little from this “positive glow”. We suggest how research on these matters can be taken forward, with a specific focus on the agenda-setting theory of mass media, the strategic management of nonprofit organizations, and collaboration in the context of social innovation.

One of the principal chants that was raised during the Egyptian uprising of 2011 was aish, huriyya, karama insaniyya, or ‘bread, freedom, human dignity’. This slogan encapsulated the three primary collective action frames that activists employed during the uprising. I argue that these frames were drawn from, and engaged with, three broad themes in Egypt's political discourse that had been developed over the previous decade: poor economic conditions, lack of democracy, and police abuse.

In the hydrofracturing controversy in New York advocates hotly contested notions of the problem, what should be done, by whom, and how. This controversy can be characterized as “crowded advocacy,” involving intense mobilization and counter-mobilization of advocates with competing perspectives. Extant theories about the expansion of advocacy organizations are unclear about how advocates’ interactions shape the policy arena, particularly when there is competition within and across multiple coalitions. This article contributes by asking: How do advocates’ interactive framing dynamics shape public discourse when advocacy is crowded? It assumes that advocacy in general, and framing in particular, evolves as advocates respond to each other. I find that competing “discourse coalitions” collectively influence public discourse by articulating divergent notions of (1) what constitutes credible knowledge, (2) who can speak with authority on the issues, and (3) what institutional arrangements should be activated to manage risks. The consequence is that advocates have to react to others' framing on these issues—to defend their knowledge, their credibility, and specific institutions, rather than arguing their case on the merits. The implication is that advocacy is not only the means of influence (strategy) but also creates the context of advocacy in particular ways in a crowded field.

Political science has for some time been afflicted with an existential and empirical angst concerning impact and relevance. This is by no means a new or unique disciplinary pathology, but it is one that has intensified in recent years. The reasons for this intensification have been explored in a burgeoning literature on ‘the tyranny of impact’. The central argument of this article is that a focus on the ‘relevance gap’ within political science, and vis-à-vis the social sciences more generally, risks failing to comprehend the emergence of a far broader and multifaceted ‘expectations gap’. The core argument and contribution of this article is that the future of political science will depend on the politics and management of the ‘expectations gap’ that has emerged. Put slightly differently, the study of politics needs to have a sharper grasp of the politics of its own discipline and the importance of framing, positioning, connecting vis-à-vis the broader social context.

This study explores the role of framing, time pressure (TP), and gender in modulating altruism in preschoolers (4- and 5-year-olds, N = 115), using a Dictator Game (DG) paradigm. Besides confirming a strong tendency toward altruistic sharing in this age cohort, results allow us to investigate the psychological factors behind such a tendency. Initial resource allocation is manipulated by presenting both a Give and a Take condition to participants, which reveals the combined influence of status quo bias (more resources are shared in the Take condition than in the Give condition) and the endowment effect (fewer resources are shared in the Give condition than in the Take condition). Introducing TP results in greater sharing across both conditions, which confirms previous results and improves on them, allowing us to clarify that the intuitive heuristic activated by TP favors sharing specifically, rather than mere preservation of the status quo (otherwise we would observe increased sharing with TP only in the Take condition). Finally, a significant interaction between framing and gender is observed, with girls sharing more than boys in the Give condition and less than boys in the Take condition. This suggests that the traditional view of girls as being more generous than boys in DGs may be an experimental artifact of overreliance on Give-only paradigms, and it reveals instead that girls are more sensitive to fairness, whereas boys are more influenced by respect for the initial resource allocation. Overall, these findings provide valuable insight into the psychological determinants of altruism in early childhood, with important implications for adult studies as well.