Do citizens prefer national policies that are designed collaboratively over those produced by national government alone? The question is relevant, especially in Latin America, where citizens are sceptical of government’s capacity to address complex problems. In this article, we hypothesize that collaboratively crafted policies will be preferred over those produced by government alone in Argentina and Chile. We design conjoint experiments that ask respondents to choose among three pairs of policies, each of which varies randomly in terms of whether and with whom the government collaborates. We find that citizens in both countries tend to prefer collaboratively produced policies. This is especially the case when citizens have higher levels of trust in the actors with whom the national government collaborates. One important insight of our study is that, despite the costs of collaborative approaches to policymaking, citizen preferences for it could incentivize national governments to invest more resources in collaborative governance.

Popular willingness to compromise is an important step for conflict resolution. A key argument suggests that improving expectations about the prospects of peace can increase public support for concessions. Yet a competing view, anchored in broader debates about preferences and expectations, suggests that prior ideological dispositions motivate biased future expectations rather than vice versa. This tension, however, remains understudied in violent conflicts. In this study, we leverage rich survey data from Israel to disentangle the causal relationship between expectations and preferences for compromise in a long-standing conflict. Using two decades of aggregate monthly series and two exogenous shocks to peace expectations, we find that changes in prospective expectations do predict subsequent shifts in support for compromise. We find no contrary evidence for a null, opposite, or heterogeneous relationship. The findings contribute to ongoing debates about the interrelations between expectations and preferences and provide insights into their implications for conflict resolution.

Democracy requires responsiveness. While empirical responsiveness research tends to focus on opinion polls, there are other ways elites listen to public opinion. Therefore, we need to examine those forms of public opinion that elites see and hear. This is explored through a dataset of letters to Australian Prime Minister John Howard, coded consistent with the Comparative Agendas Project. I find evidence of deliberate, systemic non-responsiveness in the political agenda (measured by the topics of Mr Howard’s speeches) to the volume of letters. Mr Howard knowingly, deliberately ignored this public opinion. There are, however, indications that the topics of the letters are responding to government announcements. The findings highlight the selective nature of elite engagement with public opinion. The study contributes to understanding political agenda-setting, representation and the institutional conditions under which public input is ignored. These results have implications for theories of representation and responsiveness in policymaking.

Motivated political reasoning is a central phenomenon in political psychology, but no scholarly consensus exists as to its cause. In one influential account, motivated political reasoning is caused by goals to control emotional states. This explanation is often assumed, but has rarely been tested empirically. It implies, I argue, that individual differences in how people control their emotions (i.e., in emotion regulation strategies) should influence outcomes caused by motivated political reasoning, such as perceptual divides over politically relevant facts. I hypothesize such perceptual divides to be negatively associated with emotional acceptance and positively associated with cognitive reappraisal—two key emotion regulation strategies. I test these hypotheses in the specific context of reasoning about facts related to immigration politics in Denmark using a mix of experimental and cross-sectional survey data from three nationally representative samples of the Danish voter population (total N = 4186). In the specific context of the present study, the results do not support the often-assumed idea that motivated political reasoning is driven by efforts to regulate emotions. These findings raise important questions about the conditions under which emotion regulation might play a role in motivated political reasoning.

This paper studies public opinion towards the introduction of a universal basic income in the case of Germany. Using novel data from a vignette survey experiment conducted in the summer of 2022, we analyse to what extent variations in the policy design characteristics of a hypothetical basic income scheme affect levels of support. We find that support for basic income strongly depends on these characteristics, with support being highest for schemes that are relatively generous, paid to citizens and long-term residents, paid to individuals rather than households, unconditional and financed with taxing the rich. In a further step, we explore interaction effects between vignette dimensions and respondent characteristics, finding significant heterogenous treatment effects in the cases of income, age and ideology.

In this article, we show that the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a pro-democratic reaction from citizens in liberal democracies, which we term the “rally for democracy.” Unlike the conventional “rally ‘round the flag” effect that boosts government popularity, this involves citizens rallying behind democracy as an international ideal. It includes expressing stronger proximity to democratic powers, stronger approval for democratic leaders abroad, and greater aversion to authoritarian regimes. Through a survey quasi-experiment conducted in six countries between February and May of 2022, we provide evidence that the “rally for democracy” emerged immediately following Russia’s invasion. Exploring this observation further via analysis of data from 55 countries between 2014 and 2023, we find this to be the intensification of a longer-term trend in response to the rise of authoritarian great powers. A new cleavage exists in geopolitical loyalties, based on the degree to which citizens feel attachment to democracy, and this divide runs both between and within countries.

Does democratic satisfaction drive voter turnout, or does voting increase satisfaction with democracy? This paper explores the satisfaction-participation nexus in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), where democratic dissatisfaction is prominent. It tests preregistered hypotheses using a five-wave panel survey from the Czech 2023 presidential election and a pooled dataset from five CEE countries. Unlike previous studies from Western Europe, it finds evidence for both mechanisms: pre-election satisfaction correlates with participation, but, simultaneously, voters experience a stronger election-related increase in satisfaction than abstainers. Further analyses reveal that the strong increases in satisfaction are driven by election winners and begin already during the election campaign. Our findings highlight the specificities of the satisfaction-participation link and elections’ legitimizing effects in newer democracies.

In recent decades, activists and leaders of government and nongovernment organizations have increasingly and explicitly called for greater attention to human dignity in their efforts to promote pro-social relations. In this study, we investigate whether appeals to this core human value actually influence how individuals act with regard to those who might be otherwise ignored or neglected. Using the digital advertising platform on Facebook, we randomly assign ads to over 90,000 adult American users to estimate the effects of dignity appeals on their likelihood of engaging with content concerning people facing homelessness or incarceration. Consistent with preregistered hypotheses and specifications, we find that adding dignity appeals increases the likelihood of positive reactions to such ads, but only when the vulnerable are considered less “blameworthy” for their situation.

Extensive research showcases that authoritarian propaganda can cultivate support and deter protest during “normal” times. This study examines authoritarian propaganda’s efficacy during crises and policy changes when the regime needs it most. We posit that various propaganda strategies, including “hard” and “soft” rhetoric, have significant limitations during crises. Hard propaganda’s heavy-handed slogans could signal regime strength but may also legitimize “rightful resistance” against local authorities, limiting its protest-deterrence effects. Soft propaganda may lose persuasiveness due to presenting contradictory arguments during policy changes. We leverage the turbulent period of China’s COVID policy reversal to conduct an original survey experiment in December 2022. Our findings reveal that pro-reopening hard propaganda weakens its protest-deterrence effects by reinforcing belief in protest righteousness. Moreover, inconsistent soft propaganda lowers public evaluations of China’s COVID response, diminishing its persuasive effects. Our study highlights significant limitations of authoritarian propaganda during crises and policy changes.

Will voters punish incumbents for psychological distress associated with public policy during external shocks? This study examines this question in the empirical context of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in India, utilizing three novel cross-sectional surveys conducted in the first three weeks of June 2020, immediately after the national lockdown policy was officially revoked. We find that propensity to vote for the nationally incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (if hypothetical elections were held on the day of the survey) was negatively correlated with mental stress from routine disruptions in mobility (Week 1); worsening mental health (Week 2); and emotion-focused coping (Week 3). We show that these effects are strongest in BJP-ruled states. We argue that psychological distress shaped political attitudes in the midst of the pandemic and this effect was conditional on the source of distress and moderated by governmental clarity of responsibility.

Databases of baby names are commonly available and have often been used to assess people’s reactions to events such as wars or diplomatic crises. Changes in the frequency of several candidate names are usually investigated around the event of interest. This approach misses key information simply because not all information-carrying names have been thought about. More fundamentally, whether exogenous shocks can significantly alter population-level naming preferences remains elusive. We present here a method to systematically study variations in name popularity during an event of interest and quantify its “total” effect on naming patterns. Using a nationwide database of first name frequencies since 1900, we apply the method to France during the First World War. We find several dozen first names the popularity of which was modified by the War. While we find macro-level traces of individual-level phenomena, in particular increased naming for kin, specific first names also provide key insights into the civilian population’s changing attitude – e.g., widespread pessimism in 1917. Using an individual-level database of ∼9.5 million individuals enables us to track such changes in morale month after month. The aggregate effect of the war on naming patterns was maximal and large early in the conflict, then gradually declined: the return of naming preferences to their prewar state illustrates and quantifies how the “banality of war” installed.

This study uses panel data to examine the relationships among citizen attitudes related to Quebec independence. It has long been established that support for sovereignty is correlated to expectations about the economic and linguistic consequences of independence. Proponents of Quebec sovereignty tend to believe it will enhance the economy and preserve the French language, while opponents anticipate adverse effects on both fronts. We investigate whether economic and linguistic expectations drive preferences about independence, or whether preferences shape expectations. The analyses rely on Canadian Election Study panel surveys from 2004 to 2011 and employ cross-lagged models. Findings show that economic and linguistic expectations do affect support for sovereignty to some degree. However, the influence of sovereignty support on expectations is much more pronounced.

Courts in new democracies sometimes encounter challenges in gaining public trust, even after achieving judicial independence. This study examines how judicial communication can help build trust in the judiciary. Specifically, I address two questions regarding judicial communication: first, what motivates judges to engage in communication, and second, how this communication influences the public’s trust in the judiciary. I argue that members of a judiciary engage in communication to protect the judiciary’s reputation and that this communication fosters the public’s trust in the judiciary. This is because improved communication enhances the public’s understanding of the courts. To test my theoretical argument, I analyze a unique judicial reform in Taiwan, where a public-oriented communication strategy using social media was introduced. Using in-depth interviews with members of the judiciary and a difference-in-differences design, I find that, first, judges seek to protect judicial reputation by adopting a communication strategy characterized by information clarity and accessibility. Second, individuals more likely to be exposed to this communication, particularly frequent digital users, demonstrate increased judicial trust. My findings have implications for how courts in new democracies can use communication strategies to bolster judicial trust.

Despite growing interest in the political consequences of the urban–rural divide, we know little about whether urban and rural populations differ in the policy problems they view as most important. This study explores urban–rural differences in policy priorities over an extended period (1939–2020), using data from 850 U.S. surveys. The analysis reveals modest but persistent gaps between urban and rural residents in several key policy areas. However, while urban–rural differences remain stable across diverse economic and political contexts, partisan affiliation significantly outweighs place-based identities in shaping these priorities. The findings suggest that despite geographic distinctions, urban and rural populations predominantly rely on partisan cues when forming policy agendas, which contributes to a nuanced understanding of political representation.

For decades, the business community has been viewed as a core constituency of the Republican Party. However, several factors, such as corporate prioritization of social values, changes in trade policy, and anti-business sentiment among Republican rank-and-file, suggest a coalitional shift is underway. Scholars have debated whether this shift is an illusion or is real. At the core of this debate is how businesses navigate two forms of organizational conflict: a) stakeholder cross-pressure and b) policy cross-pressure. To measure cross-pressure, we conduct an original survey of elite business leaders. Our evidence suggests a widespread view that companies are increasingly aligned with the Democrats, including in alignment on core policy priorities. When companies are cross-pressured, leaders perceive the company as leaning toward the Democrats. The potential decoupling of business from the Republican coalition represents one of the most significant changes in American politics in decades.