How does majority party security shape reciprocal bipartisan collaboration and influence legislative success? US state legislatures vary widely in the stability of majority control, offering a valuable opportunity to examine how party security conditions the incentives for cross-party collaboration. Insecure majorities may foster reciprocity as both a behavioral norm and a strategic path to legislative advancement, while long-term one-party control can diminish the returns to bipartisan engagement. I develop a theory of selective reciprocity, arguing that majority security fundamentally restructures how legislators engage in and benefit from bipartisan collaboration. Drawing on data from 401,720 bills introduced across 43 state legislatures between 2009 and 2018, I construct novel measures of bipartisan collaboration to evaluate reciprocity. I find that minority party legislators build reputational capital by consistently cosponsoring majority party bills – but their efforts yield few legislative gains in secure majority chambers. Instead, majority legislators selectively reciprocate only on minority party initiatives unlikely to pass, preserving the appearance of cooperation while protecting their policy agenda. By contrast, in insecure chambers, bipartisan cooperation is more likely to produce substantive outcomes. Reciprocity endures but is constrained – selective in form, asymmetric in effect, and structured by the institutional advantages of majority control. These findings raise broader concerns about the marginalization of minority party legislators and the limits of representation under conditions of majority security.

Muslim Americans are running for and being elected to political office at record levels. Despite this trend, the literature on minority candidate emergence has yet to examine which district factors affect the likelihood of Muslim Americans running and winning their races. What district characteristics influence the emergence of Muslim American candidates, and how do voters respond when they appear on the ballot? Through examining state legislative candidates, I find that Muslim Americans are less likely to emerge in districts with a high white population share and that lean conservative. Overall, Muslim American candidates are less likely to win compared to non-Muslim Americans. However, Muslim Americans are far more likely to emerge as candidates and win in districts with a high Muslim population share. These results demonstrate that Muslim American candidates face supply-side barriers to running and electoral penalties that can be alleviated by high Muslim population shares in districts.

Asian Americans are the fastest growing racial group in the US electorate, yet they are significantly under-represented in political office. How do predominantly immigrant groups like Asian Americans close this representation gap? We build on existing theories of minority representation and immigrant assimilation by highlighting the importance of a group’s political incorporation into American society. We argue that the representation of minority immigrant groups in political office requires social integration and the acquisition of civic resources, processes that can take considerable time. Using new data on Asian American state legislators spanning half a century, we find that immigration in prior decades is associated with greater political representation, while contemporaneous population size has either no independent impact or a negative one. Other indicators of immigrant social integration, including citizenship status, language ability, education, and income, also predict the likelihood of co-racial representation in political office. Our results suggest political representation gaps of immigrant groups narrow over time, though this may be a non-linear process. Our findings also imply that the least integrated members of immigrant groups are the most likely to be affected by representational deficits.

The literature on representation has shown that those who reflect the characteristics, traits, and/or experiences of a group (descriptive representation) are more likely to represent that group’s interests (substantive representation). In this paper, we argue that questions about representation should be considered with regard to generational identity. Drawing upon research that shows the importance of the Millennial Generation identity for understanding Millennials’ attitudes and policy preferences, we look at whether this identity matters for the legislative representation of group interests by examining bill sponsorship activity in 31 state legislatures. Our results tentatively support the expectation that the Millennial generation identity conditions the sponsorship of Millennial interest bills. Millennial legislators are more likely than non-Millennial legislators to sponsor bills that disproportionately impact their group members. This result is observed among both Democrat and Republican legislators, but at different magnitudes and for different issue priorities. These findings suggest that the Millennial generation identity is a meaningful determinant of legislative behavior, even when examined alongside partisanship.

We evaluate three measures of state legislative professionalism: Squire’s (1992) index that measures professionalism relative to the US House, Bowen and Greene’s (2014b) two-dimensional scaling, and legislative operating expenditures per member, an older measure that remains in occasional use. Replications of 18 recent articles show that these three measures regularly produce significantly different estimates of the effect of professionalism, particularly in longitudinal analysis; when they do, the choice of measure often affects whether other central variables retain a significant relationship with the dependent variable. These divergent results appear to reflect differences among these measures in terms of missingness, vulnerability to outliers, measurement of session length, and whether to benchmark to the US House. Researchers seeking a general indicator of professionalism should consider these differences when choosing an appropriate measure.

Since 2017, Republican lawmakers in a growing number of US states have formed ideological intraparty organizations, modeled after the US House Freedom Caucus, that seek to move state policy further rightward. What explains the appearance of these state freedom caucuses, and what kinds of lawmakers are more likely to join them? We show that the creation of these caucuses was initially motivated by concerns that state-level legislative Republican parties are too ideologically heterogeneous but has since been driven by conservative entrepreneurs seeking to spread freedom caucuses nationally. We also provide evidence that conservative legislators are more likely to join a new state freedom caucus, as one would expect, but also that, in a few states, lawmakers who are more electorally vulnerable lawmakers or lack internal influence have also been more likely to join. These findings underscore how state-level ideological caucuses can appeal to members’ multiple goals and serve as instruments of vertical polarization in a federal system.

Legislative staffers are an invisible force in legislative bodies that provide every imaginable service. It is doubtful that modern legislatures could operate without them. Prior studies of Congressional staffers have found evidence that staffers not only aid but also exert an independent influence on the policy-making process through network effects. In this article, I test if this extends to state legislative staffers using novel data from shared staffer networks in Arizona, Indiana, and New Mexico. I argue that, compared to their Congressional counterparts, state legislative staffers are more akin to ‘clerks’ than ‘political professionals’ and this limits their ability to independently influence policymaking at the state level.

Legislators must decide when, if ever, to cosponsor legislation. Scholars have shown legislators strategically time their positions on salient issues of national importance, but we know little about the timing of position-taking for routine bills or what this activity looks like in state legislatures. We argue that legislators’ cosponsorship decision-making depends on the type of legislation and the partisan dynamics among the current cosponsors. Members treat everyday legislation as generalized position-taking motivated by reelection, yet for key legislation, legislators are policy-oriented. With a new dataset of over 73,000 bills introduced in both chambers of the Texas state legislature in the 75th to 86th regular sessions (1997–2020), we use pooled Cox proportional hazard models to evaluate the dynamics of when legislators legislate, comparing all bills introduced with a subset of key bills. The results show that legislators time their cosponsorship activity in response to electoral vulnerability, partisanship, and the dynamics of the chamber in which they serve.

Evidence suggests that well-funded, professional legislatures more effectively provide constituents with their preferred policies and may improve social welfare. Yet, legislative resources across state legislatures have stagnated or dwindled at least in part due to public antagonism toward increasing representatives’ salaries. We argue that one reason voters oppose legislative resources, like salary and staff, is that they are unaware of the potential benefits. Employing a pre-registered survey experiment with a pre–post design, we find that subjects respond positively to potential social welfare benefits of professionalization, increasing support for greater resources. We also find that individuals identifying with the legislative majority party respond positively to potential responsiveness benefits and that out-partisans do not respond negatively to potential responsiveness costs. In a separate survey of political elites, we find similar patterns. These results suggest that a key barrier to increasing legislative professionalism – anticipated public backlash – may not be insurmountable. The findings also highlight a challenge of institutional choice: beliefs that representatives are unresponsive or ineffective lead to governing institutions that may ensure these outcomes.

A growing literature has revealed a notable electoral advantage for congressional and gubernatorial candidates with deep local roots in their home districts or states. However, there is a dearth of research on the presence and impact of local roots in state legislative races. In this paper, we close that gap by demonstrating the consistent and significant electoral impacts that state legislators’ local roots have on their reelection efforts. We use data capturing a representative cross-section of state legislative incumbents (N = ~5,000) and calculate a novel index measuring the depth of their local roots modeled after Hunt’s (2022, Home Field Advantage: Roots, Reelection, and Representation in the Modern Congress) measure for the US House. We present evidence that state legislators with deep local roots in the districts they represent run unopposed in their general elections nearly twice as often as incumbents with no such roots. Of those who do attract challengers in their reelection efforts, deeply rooted incumbents enjoy an average of three extra percentage points of vote share. Our results have important implications for candidate emergence in state legislative elections during a time when so many are uncontested. They also demonstrate the limits of electoral nationalization for understanding state politics.

It is widely thought that lobbyists exert influence over legislators’ policy positions and, as a result, over policy outcomes. One mechanism of influence is the provision of policy expertise. Yet, there is little credible empirical evidence that lobbyists’ expertise influences legislative outcomes. Across four experiments fielded with three lobbyists in two state legislatures that examine two public measures of legislators’ positions, we find no evidence that lobbyists’ expertise influences legislators’ policy positions. We do find, in contrast, that the same policy expertise treatment is influential when provided by a legislative staffer. We conclude that policy information can influence legislators’ positions, but that legislators are cautious when that information is provided by lobbyists.

State governments are tasked with making important policy decisions in the United States. How do state legislators use their public communications—particularly social media—to engage with policy debates? Due to previous data limitations, we lack systematic information about whether and how state legislators publicly discuss policy and how this behavior varies across contexts. Using Twitter data and state-of-the-art topic modeling techniques, we introduce a method to study state legislator policy priorities and apply the method to 15 US states in 2018. We show that we are able to accurately capture the policy issues discussed by state legislators with substantially more accuracy than existing methods. We then present initial findings that validate the method and speak to debates in the literature. The paper concludes by discussing promising avenues for future state politics research using this new approach.