In the majority of the cases examined, workers and communities sought to address their grievances through a range of host-country state institutions alongside their claims to transnational NJMs. Chapter 6 explores the conflicting roles of the state in enabling and constraining the ability of NJMs to support community struggles for redress. Non-judicial mechanisms sometimes enlisted useful support from various state agencies, drawing on the distinctive functional capacities and sources of legitimacy that state agencies possess. However, other state agencies also, at times in the same case, attempted to block or at least significantly impede NJM efforts to influence redress processes and outcomes. The chapter shows that because state actors often hold highly ambiguous roles as enablers as well as regulators of business-related human rights violations, opportunities for transnational NJMs to actively collaborate with national governments in addressing grievance claims were usually limited; instead, the ability of NJMs to support human rights redress often depended on indirect or unintended effects of their interactions with the state. Consequently, it was not primarily via efforts to actively collaborate with governments that transnational NJMs contributed to redress, but rather through shifting power balances among competing coalitions of actors engaged with grievance struggles, inside as well as outside the state.

In the Feyerabend lectures on Natural Law, Kant addresses the topic of freedom of religion and thought in his commentary on the title "The Right Regarding Religion and the Church” of Achenwall’s Natural Law. Kant goes beyond the discussion proposed by the jurist and introduces two central ideas to his conception of Enlightenment, which will be developed in “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”: the idea of self-legislation of the people and the distinction between private and public uses of reason. In this paper, I will first compare Kant’s and Achenwall’s views on freedom of religion and conscience and then show how the idea of self-legislation leads Kant to establish clear limits to the sovereign regarding matters of religion. Then, I will argue that the development of Kant’s idea of public use of reason results from the historical debate about the meaning of the concept of Enlightenment that took place between 1783 and 1784, especially regarding Ernst Klein’s assertions on freedom of opinion and freedom of the press.

This chapter asks where Kant stands on one of the most famous contentions of ancient ethics: the so-called Unity of the Virtues, the claim that a person who has one of the virtues must have all of them. The twentieth-century revival of virtue ethics was partly prompted by explorations of this proposal – its centrality to ancient theories and its presumed implausibility for philosophers today. Kant announces that he rejects three ancient premises about virtue, the first of which is “there is only one virtue and one vice”. The chapter argues that he thereby rejects the Unity of the Virtues, as the Stoics conceive of it. For Kant, virtue-singular is prior to virtues-plural, but it is not one. The virtues-plural are not parts of virtue; the latter is not a whole in the way the Stoics take it to be. Nevertheless, Kant shares more with the ancients than with twentieth-century philosophers writing on the topic. He endorses the premise that virtue-singular is prior to the virtues-plural.

Chapter 2 frames the book, drawing on structuration theory and ontological security studies to provide its theoretical underpinnings. This chapter begins by exploring the claims of positive influences of different tools found in the transitional justice project on ensuring non-recurrence of conflict. It proposes that while both scholars and practitioners remain unsure of what ‘works’ for a meaningful ‘Never Again’, they remain faithful that something does and that some transitional justice is better than none. The chapter then delineates some common threads based on these multiple promises of non-recurrence to reflect on the characteristics of transitional justice as a structure. Finally, the chapter theoretically complicates the existing position of non-recurrence in transitional justice scholarship by asking questions about temporality, security, and the purpose of transitional justice as a global project. In doing so, it provides a new outlook on the ontological security/transitional justice nexus and discusses where non-recurrence fits within it.

The conclusion sums up the historical legacy and implications of the landscape of genius. It begins with the landscape photographer and environmental activist Ansel Adams, who, like John Muir, became strongly associated with Yosemite and with the National Parks in general. Adams, through his photography and environmental advocacy, helped to translate the landscape of genius into the twentieth century, associating nature as wilderness with high culture and the fine arts. Those associations promoted both American nationalism and a specifically White, elite middle-class version of environmentalism. The conclusion then explores the wider implications of this “environmentalism of genius” for the environmental movement and popular conception of nature today. It argues for the dissociation of nature from genius as part of a larger reimagination of “nature,” in order to diversify the environmental movement and promote more socially just and ecologically effective approaches to environmental issues.