Building on the correspondence between finitely axiomatised theories in Łukasiewicz logic and rational polyhedra, we prove that the unification type of the fragment of Łukasiewicz logic with $n\geqslant 2$ variables is nullary. This solves a problem left open by V. Marra and L. Spada [Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 164 (2013), pp. 192–210]. Furthermore, we refine the study of unification with bounds on the number of variables. Our proposal distinguishes the number m of variables allowed in the problem and the number n in the solution. We prove that the unification type of Łukasiewicz logic for all $m,n \geqslant 2$ is nullary.

This article is a contribution to the “neostability” type of result for abstract elementary classes. Under certain set theoretic assumptions, we propose a definition and a characterization of NIP in AECs. The class of AECs with NIP properly contains the class of stable AECs.1 We show that for an AEC K and $\lambda \geq LS(K)$, $K_\lambda $ is NIP if and only if there is a notion of nonforking on it which we call a w*-good frame. On the other hand, the negation of NIP leads to being able to encode subsets.

We prove that the satisfaction relation $\mathcal {N}\models \varphi [\vec a]$ of first-order logic is not absolute between models of set theory having the structure $\mathcal {N}$ and the formulas $\varphi $ all in common. Two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers, for example, and the same standard model of arithmetic $\left \langle {\mathbb N},{+},{\cdot },0,1, <\right \rangle $, yet disagree on their theories of arithmetic truth; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same arithmetic truths, yet disagree on their truths-about-truth, at any desired level of the iterated truth-predicate hierarchy; two models of set theory can have the same natural numbers and the same reals, yet disagree on projective truth; two models of set theory can have the same $\left \langle {H}_{\omega _2},{\in }\right \rangle $ or the same rank-initial segment $\left \langle {V}_\delta ,{\in }\right \rangle $, yet disagree on which assertions are true in these structures.

On the basis of these mathematical results, we argue that a philosophical commitment to the determinateness of the theory of truth for a structure cannot be seen as a consequence solely of the determinateness of the structure in which that truth resides. The determinate nature of arithmetic truth, for example, is not a consequence of the determinate nature of the arithmetic structure ${\mathbb N}=\{\,{0,1,2,\ldots }\,\}$ itself, but rather, we argue, is an additional higher-order commitment requiring its own analysis and justification.

We show that the class of Krasner hyperfields is not elementary. To show this, we determine the rational rank of quotients of multiplicative groups in field extensions. We also discuss some related questions.

Gödel’s completeness theorem for classical first-order logic is one of the most basic theorems of logic. Central to any foundational course in logic, it connects the notion of valid formula, i.e., a formula satisfied in all models, to the notion of provable formula.

We survey a few standard formulations and proofs of the completeness theorem before focusing on the formal description of a slight modification of Henkin’s proof within intuitionistic second-order arithmetic.

It is usual, in the context of the completeness of intuitionistic logic with respect to various semantics, such as Kripke or Beth semantics, to follow the Curry–Howard correspondence and to interpret the proofs of completeness as programs which turn proofs of validity for these semantics into proofs of derivability.

We apply this approach to Henkin’s proof to phrase it as a program which transforms any proof of validity with respect to Tarski semantics into a proof of derivability.

By doing so, we hope to shed some “effective” light on the relation between Tarski semantics and syntax: proofs of validity are syntactic objects with which we can compute.

Working within the context of countable, superstable theories, we give many equivalents of a theory having NOTOP. In particular, NOTOP is equivalent to V-DI, the assertion that any type V-dominated by an independent triple is isolated over the triple. If T has NOTOP, then every model N is atomic over an independent tree of countable, elementary substructures, and hence is determined up to back-and-forth equivalence over such a tree. We also verify Shelah’s assertion from Chapter XII of [9] that NOTOP implies PMOP (without using NDOP).

We study universal-existential fragments of first-order theories of fields, in particular of function fields and of equicharacteristic henselian valued fields. For example, we discuss to what extent the theory of a field k determines the universal-existential theories of the rational function field over k and of the field of Laurent series over k, and we find various many-one reductions between such fragments.

Dedicated to the memory of Alexander Prestel (1941–2024)

We prove that the structure $(\mathbb {Z},<,+,R)$ is distal for all congruence-periodic sparse predicates $R\subseteq \mathbb {N}$. We do so by constructing a strong honest definition for every formula $\phi (x;y)$ with $\lvert {x}\rvert =1$, providing a rare example of concrete distal decompositions.

We show, assuming PD, that every complete finitely axiomatized second-order theory with a countable model is categorical, but that there is, assuming again PD, a complete recursively axiomatized second-order theory with a countable model which is non-categorical. We show that the existence of even very large (e.g., supercompact) cardinals does not imply the categoricity of all finitely axiomatizable complete second-order theories. More exactly, we show that a non-categorical complete finitely axiomatized second-order theory can always be obtained by (set) forcing. We also show that the categoricity of all finite complete second-order theories with a model of a certain singular cardinality $\kappa $ of uncountable cofinality can be forced over any model of set theory. Previously, Solovay had proved, assuming $V=L$, that every complete finitely axiomatized second-order theory (with or without a countable model) is categorical, and that in a generic extension of L there is a complete finitely axiomatized second-order theory with a countable model which is non-categorical.

Let $\mathsf {KP}$ denote Kripke–Platek Set Theory and let $\mathsf {M}$ be the weak set theory obtained from $\mathsf {ZF}$ by removing the collection scheme, restricting separation to $\Delta _0$-formulae and adding an axiom asserting that every set is contained in a transitive set ($\mathsf {TCo}$). A result due to Kaufmann [9] shows that every countable model, $\mathcal {M}$, of $\mathsf {KP}+\Pi _n\textsf {-Collection}$ has a proper $\Sigma _{n+1}$-elementary end extension. We show that for all $n \geq 1$, there exists an $L_\alpha $ (where $L_\alpha $ is the $\alpha ^{\textrm {th}}$ approximation of the constructible universe L) that satisfies $\textsf {Separation}$, $\textsf {Powerset}$ and $\Pi _n\textsf {-Collection}$, but that has no $\Sigma _{n+1}$-elementary end extension satisfying either $\Pi _n\textsf {-Collection}$ or $\Pi _{n+3}\textsf {-Foundation}$. Thus showing that there are limits to the amount of the theory of $\mathcal {M}$ that can be transferred to the end extensions that are guaranteed by Kaufmann’s theorem. Using admissible covers and the Barwise Compactness theorem, we show that if $\mathcal {M}$ is a countable model $\mathsf {KP}+\Pi _n\textsf {-Collection}+\Sigma _{n+1}\textsf {-Foundation}$ and T is a recursive theory that holds in $\mathcal {M}$, then there exists a proper $\Sigma _n$-elementary end extension of $\mathcal {M}$ that satisfies T. We use this result to show that the theory $\mathsf {M}+\Pi _n\textsf {-Collection}+\Pi _{n+1}\textsf {-Foundation}$ proves $\Sigma _{n+1}\textsf {-Separation}$.

We expand the study of generic stability in three different directions. Generic stability is best understood as a property of types in $NIP$ theories in classical logic. In this article, we make attempts to generalize our understanding to Keisler measures instead of types, arbitrary theories instead of $NIP$ theories, and continuous logic instead of classical logic. For this purpose, we study randomization of first-order structures/theories and modes of convergence of types/measures.

Let $\mathcal {M}=(M,<,+, \dots )$ be a weakly o-minimal non-valuational structure expanding an ordered group. We show that the full first-order theory $\operatorname {\mathrm {Th}}(\mathcal {M})$ has definable Skolem functions if and only if isolated types in $S_{n}^{\mathcal M}(A)$ are dense for each $ A\subseteq M $ and $ n\in \mathbb {N} $. Using this, we prove that no strictly weakly o-minimal non-valuational expansion of an ordered group has definable Skolem functions, thereby answering Conjecture 1.7 of Eleftheriou et al. (On definable Skolem functions in weakly o-minimal non-valuational structures. J. Symb. Logic, vol. 82 (2017), no. 4).

We study mixed identities for oligomorphic automorphism groups of countable relational structures. Our main result gives sufficient conditions for such a group to not admit a mixed identity without particular constants. We study numerous examples and prove in many cases that there cannot be a non-singular mixed identity.

We study the Lyndon interpolation property (LIP) and the uniform LIP (ULIP) for extensions of $\mathbf {S4}$ and intermediate propositional logics. We prove that among the 18 consistent normal modal logics of finite height extending $\mathbf {S4}$ known to have CIP, 11 logics have LIP and 7 logics do not. We also prove that for intermediate propositional logics, the Craig interpolation property, LIP, and ULIP are equivalent.

For each $n\geq 1$, let $FT_n$ be the free tree monoid of rank n and $E_n$ the full extensive transformation monoid over the finite chain $\{1, 2, \ldots , n\}$. It is shown that the monoids $FT_n$ and $E_{n+1}$ satisfy the same identities. Therefore, $FT_n$ is finitely based if and only if $n\leq 3$.

Answering a question of Kaye, we show that the compositional truth theory with the full collection scheme is conservative over Peano Arithmetic. We demonstrate it by showing that countable models of compositional truth which satisfy the internal induction or collection axioms can be end-extended to models of the respective theory.

This paper shows how to set up Fine’s “theory-application” type semantics so as to model the use-unrestricted “Official” consequence relation for a range of relevant logics. The frame condition matching the axiom $(((A \to A) \land (B \to B)) \to C) \to C$—the characteristic axiom of the very first axiomatization of the relevant logic E—is shown forth. It is also shown how to model propositional constants within the semantic framework. Whereas the related Routley–Meyer type frame semantics fails to be strongly complete with regards to certain contractionless logics such as B, the current paper shows that Fine’s weak soundness and completeness result can be extended to a strong one also for logics like B.

We study infinite groups interpretable in power bounded T-convex, V-minimal or p-adically closed fields. We show that if G is an interpretable definably semisimple group (i.e., has no definable infinite normal abelian subgroups) then, up to a finite index subgroup, it is definably isogenous to a group $G_1\times G_2$, where $G_1$ is a K-linear group and $G_2$ is a $\mathbf {k}$-linear group. The analysis is carried out by studying the interaction of G with four distinguished sorts: the valued field K, the residue field $\mathbf {k}$, the value group $\Gamma $, and the closed $0$-balls $K/\mathcal {O}$.

We investigate the primitive recursive content of linear orders. We prove that the punctual degrees of rigid linear orders, the order of the integers $\mathbb {Z}$, and the order of the rationals $\mathbb {Q}$ embed the diamond (preserving supremum and infimum). In the cases of rigid orders and the order $\mathbb {Z}$, we further extend the result to embed the atomless Boolean algebra; we leave the case of $\mathbb {Q}$ as an open problem. We also show that our results for the rigid orders, in fact, work for orders having a computable infinite invariant rigid sub-order.