Recent international jurisprudence reveals a tendency to constrain the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles (NM) in two principal respects. First, in relation to entitlement, courts have progressively limited the role of natural prolongation, treating it as subordinate to, or loosely applying it alongside, the distance criterion. This interpretation narrows the conditions under which a State may establish rights beyond 200 NM, thereby constraining the substantive scope of entitlement envisaged by Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the practice of the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Second, regarding delimitation, judicial bodies have relied on the notion of a single continental shelf to extend the same equitable boundary line used within 200 NM seaward, effectively subordinating the outer shelf to the inner shelf. These developments restrict both the legal and spatial reach of outer continental shelf claims, reshaping the interpretation of the continental shelf beyond 200 NM in ways that appear increasingly difficult to reconcile with the natural prolongation-based framework established under Article 76 UNCLOS.

One of the goals of this paper is to define the most important concepts for the comparative study of the constitutional risk management of the V4 countries. For this purpose, first, it considers the theoretical difficulties of conceptualising emergencies, especially focussing on what kind of response can be given to the widespread view that considers emergencies as a kind of legal “black hole” due to their unpredictability. Then a general definition of “emergency” is discussed which is broad and flexible enough to serve as a basis not only for a comparative study but also for the constitutional discourse of emergencies. Constitutional crisis management as a core concept for such an undertaking is also canvassed. After defining the basic concepts essential for evaluation and comparison, the article outlines the general types of emergency regulatory regimes. The development of effective regulatory systems for emergencies also has to face certain problems that every constitutional polity must solve. Finally, the paper summarises assessment criteria necessary for the evaluation and a comparison of the emergency constitutions of different countries.

What is it for something to be sacred? What is the ethical significance of the sacred? These questions have been mostly overlooked in contemporary academic philosophy. In this paper, I will develop an account of what the sacred is and then argue that it has significant implications for several ethical issues, viz., happiness, meaningfulness, virtue, identity, and political morality.

The Tunisian–Libyan Maluf Slam Collaborative was a multinational group of musicians, poets, artists, educators, journalists, and stakeholders that created a series of music concerts featuring Tunisian and Libyan maluf in July 2019. Maluf is considered cultural heritage across eastern Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya and manifests with great variety between and inside each nation-state. Sourced from ethnography in Libya (2014) and Tunisia (2018–2019), this article documents the collaborative’s work, queries the dynamics of transnational traditions, and analyses musical modes and histories of Sufism in order to explain similarities and differences within performances of maluf today.

The discontinuous Petrov–Galerkin (DPG) method is a Petrov–Galerkin finite element method with test functions designed for obtaining stability. These test functions are computable locally, element by element, and are motivated by optimal test functions which attain the supremum in an inf-sup condition. A profound consequence of the use of nearly optimal test functions is that the DPG method can inherit the stability of the (undiscretized) variational formulation, be it coercive or not. This paper combines a presentation of the fundamentals of the DPG ideas with a review of the ongoing research on theory and applications of the DPG methodology. The scope of the presented theory is restricted to linear problems on Hilbert spaces, but pointers to extensions are provided. Multiple viewpoints to the basic theory are provided. They show that the DPG method is equivalent to a method which minimizes a residual in a dual norm, as well as to a mixed method where one solution component is an approximate error representation function. Being a residual minimization method, the DPG method yields Hermitian positive definite stiffness matrix systems even for non-self-adjoint boundary value problems. Having a built-in error representation, the method has the out-of-the-box feature that it can immediately be used in automatic adaptive algorithms. Contrary to standard Galerkin methods, which are uninformed about test and trial norms, the DPG method must be equipped with a concrete test norm which enters the computations. Of particular interest are variational formulations in which one can tailor the norm to obtain robust stability. Key techniques to rigorously prove convergence of DPG schemes, including construction of Fortin operators, which in the DPG case can be done element by element, are discussed in detail. Pointers to open frontiers are presented.

In his theory of action, Suárez defends a voluntarist position. He claims that we are free agents because our will is a two-way power: it can always accept or reject the action-guiding judgement that is presented by the intellect. But why is the will not obliged to accept this judgement? The paper discusses this question by relating Suárez’s theory of the will to his theory of causation. It first examines his arguments against intellectual determinism, paying particular attention to his claim that the intellect is not an efficient cause: it cannot act upon the will and force it to accept a judgement. The paper then analyses Suárez’s account of the relevant cause by focusing on the goal of an action. The goal acts as a final cause, and if the goal is not perfectly good, it does not fully attract the will; consequently, the will can reject it. The paper spells out the functioning of the final cause as a form of normative attraction and argues that the issue of normativity is at the centre of Suárez’s theory of the will: we are free because our will can resist normative attraction.