The paper posits a link between the Standard Babylonian Version of Nergal and Ereškigal and the Jacob Cycle in Genesis (Gen 25-35), one anchored by the former story’s cosmic stairway and the stairway with its top in heaven appearing to Jacob in his famous dream. It is argued that the proper understanding of the motive for that specific parallel opens the door to a considerably broader one, which offers important insight on the two traditions. This broader parallel informs on different aspects of Nergal and Ereškigal, including theological and historical issues that appear to stand behind that story. Such contact, it is suggested, challenges established Assyriological thinking about the place of comparative perspectives in the study of Mesopotamian literature.

The interest that a ragpicker takes in rubbish and detritus, as described by Baudelaire and further developed by Benjamin (1999: 350), is not dissimilar to the archaeologist's concern with the remnants, the things left behind, abandoned. When filling the silences of the colonial archive, the archaeologist collects and catalogues everything that has been cast off, everything broken and discarded. Going through these jumbled leftovers, both archaeologists and ragpickers experience a deep intimacy with the objects they encounter: glass beads from a woven bracelet, a shell celt, textile remains of a hat, a ceramic cooking pot, a flint sceptre, an ivory brush handle, a wooden spoon, a bone needle, an iron sword, a rattle. In this way, archaeologists and ragpickers gather and collect other people's experience of textures, shapes, sounds, fear, traumas, joy, sadness and hopes.

Jade has been long recognized by archaeologists as an important trade item among ancient Mesoamerican cultures, particularly for ancient Olmec and Maya cultures. Unfortunately, the precocious development of Olmec society led many early archaeologists to overemphasize Olmec influence on the Maya during the Formative period (ca. 1000–400 BC). This is particularly noteworthy in the attribution of tri-lobed jade “spoon” pendants to the Olmec despite the lack of archaeological evidence. Using a recently discovered tri-lobed jade “spoon” pendant from the site of Ka'kabish, Belize, and dated to the Middle Formative period (ca. 800–600 BC), this article argues that such pieces should not be unquestionably attributed to the Olmec. This argument is supported by correlation with similar objects from other secure archaeological contexts at Maya sites dating to the Middle Formative period. This article contends that using the ethnonym Olmec to describe these objects creates an a priori assumption that these objects originated in the Olmec region and were merely repurposed by the Maya and argues for a reinterpretation of the origin and meaning for these objects.

This article examines the “East” as a performance practice in late Soviet culture through the case study of Yalla, arguably the most popular Central Asian band of the 1970s and 1980s and a hit performer across the entire socialist bloc and the Global South. It argues, first, that Yalla’s performance of the East changed over time, from the band’s origins in the Beatlemania of the early 1970s to the perestroika moment of nascent marketization; and, second, that the East functioned as an ambiguous category that evoked multiple resonances to multiple audiences and lent itself to a range of different political projects. Roosien concludes that Yalla’s performance of the East cannot be fully understood outside the material circumstances in which the band worked and the political world in which they functioned.

In a well-known essay, Thomas Pogge argues that Kant’s political philosophy is not comprehensive in Rawls’ sense, since it is independent of his moral philosophy. However, Pogge understands Kant’s comprehensive liberalism as the view that his moral philosophy entails his political philosophy. I question whether this is the best way to understand comprehensive liberalism, in Kant or in general. I argue that Kant’s comprehensive moral philosophy is not an independent argument for the moral truth of liberal ideals, but a liberal way of justifying an independent commitment to politically liberal values, given that we all have values that are not political.