The procedure for a preliminary ruling is central in the ‘complete system of remedies’ offered by the Union to its citizens. Since Article 263 TFEU grants only a very reduced standing to ‘non-privileged applicants’, Article 267 TFEU became the main gate for individuals to bring their claims against the EU before the European Court of Justice. Yet, claims for breaches of fundamental rights by the Union are not at all common in the procedure for a preliminary ruling. This chapter investigates the (real) use and (realistic) potential of Article 267 TFEU as a means for the protection of fundamental rights against breaches by the EU institutions. The chapter maps all instances in which individuals used the procedure for a preliminary ruling to bring a claim against the Union for breaches of their fundamental rights since the coming into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. Using this mapping exercise, the chapter identifies how individuals raise this type of claims in the procedure, discusses the accessibility of the procedure for individual applicants, and assesses the shortcomings of the procedure as a means to redress breaches of fundamental rights by the Union. It argues that these shortcomings have to do with the structure and design of the procedure itself.

This chapter examines distributive justice (DJ) within the realm of international intellectual property (IP) laws, focusing on the digital era. It highlights DJ as a critical lens for understanding global IP laws, particularly where technology significantly influences the processes of creation. It also emphasizes the importance of global equity in achieving access to IP rights, within a comprehensive understanding of their scope. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals focus on the context of peace, prosperity, and equality, though not explicitly centered on IP rights. Consequently, there is a need to redefine IP rights not only to address legal uncertainties but also to foster global equality. Moreover, the chapter delves into the roles of international entities like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in managing challenges where global DJ and IP intersect. It highlights the importance of digital tools (e.g., blockchain) for authenticating original authors. The chapter asserts that proficient and reliable international organizations like WIPO are best suited to address these challenges. Furthermore, the chapter underscores the significance of an unbiased global investment system for promoting universal progress and equity. Ultimately, it explores how WIPO’s tools, such as WIPO Re:Search and WIPO Proof, exemplify DJ in the international IP framework.

The risks emanating from algorithmic rule by law lie at the intersection of two regulatory domains: regulation pertaining to the rule of law’s protection (the EU’s rule of law agenda), and regulation pertaining to the protection of individuals against the risks of algorithmic systems (the EU’s digital agenda). Each of these domains consists of a broad range of legislation, including not only primary and secondary EU law, but also soft law. In what follows, I confine my investigation to those areas of legislation that are most relevant for the identified concerns. After addressing the EU’s competences to take legal action in this field (Section 5.1), I respectively examine safeguards provided by regulation pertaining to the rule of law (Section 5.2), to personal data (Section 5.3) and to algorithmic systems (Section 5.4), before concluding (Section 5.5).

This chapter reviews available economic theories and empirical evidence about the potential roles intellectual property (IP) rights play in generating or reducing economic inequality, emphasizing international data. Basic evidence demonstrates the simultaneous growth in internal income inequality across countries and increasing IP protection in the prior 25 years. It is tempting to assign causality from IP to inequality but doing so confidently is challenging and has not yet been accomplished systematically. Through encouraging technology diffusion, global IP reforms likely contribute to convergence in average incomes between advanced economies and select emerging and developing countries.

As other chapters in this volume show, the EU remedies system is difficult to employ when it comes to EU fundamental right violations. When discussing (im)possibilities of procedural rules and how these encourage or discourage litigation, socio-legal scholars have referred to the concept of legal opportunity structures. In relation to this concept, the EU is a system with closed procedural legal opportunities: rules on directly accessing the CJEU severely limit the possibilities to pursue strategic litigation. At the same time, the EU has opened up legal opportunities as well, by bringing litigants a new catalogue of rights to invoke. In the context of fundamental rights accountability, strategic litigation is used extensively. This begs the question: how are actors (NGOs, lawyers, individuals) making use of the (partially) closed EU system and what lessons can be drawn therefrom? This chapter delves into several cases of mobilisation of the EU remedies system and describes the way in which the actors involved worked with or around EU legal opportunity structures, both inside and outside the context of formal legal procedures. The lessons drawn from these actions can inform future action in this field.

This chapter examines if the systems of evidence in annulment, failure to act proceedings, and actions for damages, are designed to support private parties’ access to and participation in actions brought directly before the EU courts. Against the backdrop of evidence theory and the so-called procedural abilities doctrine, this chapter argues that, in the context of direct actions, the principle of effective judicial protection receives a restrictive reading. As a result, the requirements that private parties must meet to launch those actions do not, in practice, give way to broad procedural abilities and an unhindered access to the Union courts. These requirements thus seem designed to uphold a (strong) presumption of lawfulness of the EU legislature’s normative action, seeking to preserve the stability and coherence of EU law, rather than to ensure an effective access to, and exercise of the legal remedies included in the EU Treaties’ system of procedures.

Women do not receive their fair share when it comes to patenting and are far less likely to own patents. This disparity is due in part to the inherent biases in science, technology, and the patent system and in part to the high costs of the patent application process. This chapter therefore proposes an unconventional new regime of unregistered patent rights to relieve women and other disadvantaged inventors of such costs and biases and thereby increase their access to patent protections. To explain the proposal, this chapter details the challenges facing women and other disadvantaged inventors in applying for patents as well as the fact that other intellectual property regimes, such as copyright and trademark, allow such unregistered rights. The chapter also addresses a number of objections that the proposal would inevitably raise. In particular, it shows that, because the proposed unregistered patent system would grant rights for only three years and protect only against direct and knowing copying, these rights would be unlikely to deter incremental or complementary innovation. Such rights would also be fully subject to invalidation under a preponderance of the evidence standard.