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In this series of short essays, stories, poems, and personal observations, Robert A. Burton, neurologist and writer, uses both fiction and nonfiction to explore many paradoxes and contradictions inherent in scientific inquiry. A novelist as well as author of On Being Certain and A Skeptic’s Guide to the Mind, Burton brings story to science and science to story.
Substantial advancement in the diagnosis and treatment of psychiatric disorders may come from assembling diverse data streams from clinical notes, neuroimaging, genetics, and real-time digital footprints from smartphones and wearable devices. This is called “deep phenotyping” and often involves machine learning. We argue that incidental findings arising in deep phenotyping research have certain special, morally and legally salient features: They are specific, actionable, numerous, and probabilistic. We consider ethical and legal implications of these features and propose a practical ethics strategy for managing them.
The massive increase in the use of English Medium Instruction (EMI) in universities around the world has been accompanied by an ever-growing body of publications. The majority focus on EMI policies, teacher identities, and teachers’ and students’ attitudes towards EMI, whilst there seems to be little research into pedagogical approaches to language and literacy support for students as well as into practices in EMI teacher education, areas that are fundamental to the successful delivery of EMI. Recommendations come predominantly from conceptual papers (e.g. Dafouz, 2018, 2021; Galloway & Rose, 2021; Lasagabaster, 2018), and it is noticeable that some of these papers, in line with other EMI publications, rarely draw on English for Academic Purposes (EAP), a field that offers a rich set of theories and practices relating to student support and teacher education that are based on a decades-old research history.
Pharmacological cognitive enhancement (PCE) refers to the use of pharmaceuticals to improve cognitive function when that use is not intended to prevent or treat disease. Those who favour a liberal approach to PCE trust users to make informed decisions about whether enhancing is in their best interest. The author argues that making informed decisions about PCE requires a nuanced risk-benefit analysis that is not accessible to many users. Presently, the PCE use of prescription medications such as methylphenidate and modafinil is widespread but most commonly happens without medical supervision. Direct and indirect barriers generate a situation where the risks and benefits of PCE are inequitably distributed; as a result, PCE is sometimes not in the user’s best interest. This is likely to also be the case for future pharmaceuticals. As a result, even if PCE pharmaceuticals were equitably distributed, its associated risks and benefits would not be. The article concludes with a discussion of the prospects of the clinical consultation on one hand, and e-health solutions on the other, in ameliorating the situation, arguing for cautious optimism.
The United States Department of Defense has, for at least 20 years, held the stated intention to enhance active military personnel (“warfighters”). This intention has become more acute in the face of dropping recruitment, an aging fighting force, and emerging strategic challenges. However, developing and testing enhancements is clouded by the ethically contested status of enhancements, the long history of abuse by military medical researchers, and new legislation in the guise of “health security” that has enabled the Department of Defense to apply medical interventions without appropriate oversight. This paper aims to reconcile existing legal and regulatory frameworks on military biomedical research with ethical concerns about military enhancements. In what follows, we first outline one justification for military enhancements. The authors then briefly address existing definitional issues over what constitutes enhancement before addressing existing research ethics regulations governing military biomedical research. Next, they argue that two common justifications for rapid military innovation in science and technology, including enhancement, fail. These justifications are (a) to satisfy a compelling military need and (b) strategic dominance. The authors then turn to an objection that turns on the idea that we need not have these justifications if warfighters are willing to adopt enhancement, and argue that laissez-faire approaches to enhancement fail in the context of the military due to pressing and historically significant concerns about coercion and exploitation. The paper concludes with what is referred to as the “least-worst” justification: Given the rise of untested enhancements in civilian and military life, we have good reason to validate potential enhancements even if they do not satisfy reasons (a) or (b) above.
People with dementia at times exhibit threatening and physically aggressive behavior toward care staff in residential aged care facilities (RACFs). Current clinical guidelines recommend judicious use of antipsychotic (AP) medications when there is an immediate risk of harm to care staff in RACFs and non-pharmacological interventions have failed to avert the threats. This article examines an account of how this recommendation can be ethically defensible: caregivers in RACFs may have a prima facie ethical justification, in certain cases, to use APs as an act of self-defense. The author examines whether such uses of APs meet the three commonly invoked conditions of ethically permissible acts of self-defense—namely, the conditions of liability, proportionality, and necessity—and argues that such conditions obtain only in a restricted range of cases. The liability constraint can be satisfied if residents are the only ones who are causally responsible for the threats they pose. Further, the condition of proportionality obtains if there is sufficient objective ground to demonstrate that the harm of using the medications does not outweigh the good to be secured. Lastly, the necessity condition obtains when the medications are used at their lowest effective dosage and caregivers in RACFs can reasonably assume that, for the purpose of averting threats posed by residents, the use of APs is the only available course of action. Not meeting any of these fairly stringent conditions renders uses of APs as acts of self-defense in RACFs morally impermissible actions.
A general obligation to make aggregate research results available to participants has been widely supported in the bioethics literature. However, dementia research presents several challenges to this perspective, particularly because of the fear associated with developing dementia. The authors argue that considerations of respect for persons, beneficence, and justice fail to justify an obligation to make aggregate research results available to participants in dementia research. Nevertheless, there are positive reasons in favor of making aggregate research results available; when the decision is made to do so, it is critical that a clear strategy for communicating results is developed, including what support will be provided to participants receiving aggregate research results.
In recent decades, scientists have begun to identify the brain processes and neurochemicals associated with the different stages of love, including the all-important stage of attachment. Experimental findings—readily seized upon by those bioethicists who want to urge that we sometimes have good reason pharmaceutically to enhance flagging relationships—are presented as demonstrating that attachment is regulated and strengthened by the neuropeptides oxytocin and vasopressin. I shall argue, however, that often what the experimental data in fact show is only that exogenous administration of such chemicals can control and intensify the trappings of attachment, not attachment itself. That this is sometimes overlooked by both scientists and ethicists, is due to attachment being miscategorised as a set of feelings or a drive, rather than as a disposition to think about, feel toward, and behave toward its object in certain distinctive ways.
Animal models have long been used to investigate human mental disorders, including depression, anxiety, and schizophrenia. This practice is usually justified in terms of the benefits (to humans) outweighing the costs (to the animals). The author argues on utility maximization grounds that we should phase out animal models in neuropsychiatric research. The leading theories of how human minds and behavior evolved invoke sociocultural factors whose relation to nonhuman minds, societies, and behavior has not been homologized. Thus, it is not at all clear that we are gaining the epistemic or clinical benefits we want from this animal-based research.
Postneoliberal regionalism in Latin America has failed to live up to the expectations of its proponents and analysts in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Several causes explain its disappointing result, but a relatively understudied cause may be found in the US policy of competitive liberalization. This policy not only aimed at securing US economic and trade interests but also served as a counterweight against emerging postneoliberalism and as a tool for reaffirming US hegemony. This article presents a case study of one example of competitive liberalization in action, the US-Peru FTA, in order to assess how the policy functioned and contributed to curbing the posthegemonic moment in Latin America. It observes a combination of coercion and the political influence of beneficiaries of free trade, and it considers how these dynamics worked to strengthen US influence, both in Peru and in the wider regional political economy.
In a recent article in this journal, Duijf claims to have proved that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation. His formalization mimics team reasoning but ignores its essential agency switch. The possibility of such a payoff transformation was never in doubt, does not imply that team reasoning can be viewed as a payoff transformation, and makes no sense in a game in which payoffs represent players’ utilities. A theorem is proved here that a simpler and more intuitive payoff transformation can mimic any theory that predicts what strategies players will choose in a well-defined game.