In typical development, conventional metaphors are supposed to be stored as related senses within a single lexical entry, unlike homonyms, whose meanings are represented in separate entries. Autistic individuals often face challenges in understanding metaphors, raising the possibility that they process conventional metaphors more like homonyms—as unrelated meanings. In this study, we tested this hypothesis by comparing autistic and non-autistic adults on a lexical decision task involving both homonyms and conventional metaphors. We predicted that autistic participants would show inhibition effects (slower access) for both subordinate homonym meanings and metaphorical senses, while non-autistic participants would show inhibition only for homonyms. Our results partially confirmed these predictions. Non-autistic participants exhibited inhibition for both homonyms and conventional metaphors, suggesting that accessing metaphorical senses is more effortful than previously assumed. In autistic participants, metaphorical senses were even more difficult to access than subordinate homonym meanings and more difficult than for non-autistic participants. These findings indicate that autistic individuals experience particularly strong inhibition from the literal meaning when processing conventional metaphors, suggesting that these metaphorical senses may not be fully integrated as related senses in their mental lexicon.

Across psychiatry, neurodivergence is highly prevalent yet under-recognised. Psychiatric vulnerability, treatment response and prognosis are critically shaped by co-occurring neurodevelopmental conditions, including attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder, autism and tic disorder. Clinical recognition of neurodivergence and effective management can mitigate mental illness, prevent suicide and reduce societal costs. Services and training should adapt accordingly.

This article offers a DE SE THEORY of person indexicals, wherein first- and second-person indexical pronouns indicate REFERENCE DE SE (also called SELF-ASCRIPTION). Long observed for first-person pronouns (Castañeda 1977, Kaplan 1977, Perry 1979, inter alia), self-ascription is extended here to second person as well. The person feature of a pronoun specifies the speech-act roles that must be played by the self-ascribers: the speakers (uttering a first-person pronoun), the addressees (interpreting a second-person pronoun), or both (for first-person inclusive). Other agents who are not among the designated self-ascribers for a given pronoun interpret the pronoun indirectly by inferring the self-ascriber's interpretation, a process requiring THEORY OF MIND, that is, the cognitive ability to impute mental states to others (Premack & Woodruff 1978). This de se theory is supported by convergent evidence from multiple domains: (i) It explains a typological universal: first- and second-person plurals always allow associative semantics (‘speaker(s) plus others’, 'addressee(s) plus others') rather than requiring regular plural semantics ('speakers only', ‘addressees only‘) (Greenberg 1988, Noyer 1992, Cysouw 2003, Bobaljik 2008). (ii) It belongs to a family of approaches that solve the problem of the essential indexical (Perry 1979). (iii) It correctly predicts observed patterns of indexical pronoun production and comprehension by two populations lacking a fully developed theory of mind: typically developing children in the stage before theory of mind has developed, and children with autism. (iv) It correctly predicts the interpretation of second-person pronouns in utterances with multiple addressees.

Some individuals may compensate for their underlying social cognitive vulnerabilities, therefore exhibiting adaptive real-world social behavior through enhanced attentional mechanisms despite underlying social cognitive challenges. From a developmental psychopathology framework, adaptive behaviors vary dimensionally in the community and across development to promote compensation. Yet, compensation in the broader community of children without categorical clinical diagnoses has not yet been studied. Moreover, the extent to which compensation demonstrates stability versus change is unknown. This study examines childhood social compensation longitudinally in a community-ascertained sample (N = 315) of 7–17 year-old (M = 12.15, SD = 2.97) children (33% non-white, 44% female). Compared to children with equally poor emotion recognition but substantially more real-world social behavior challenges, high compensators demonstrated better attentional alerting (d = 0.81, p < 0.001) without the “cost” of internalizing symptoms. Results showed both stability and instability in compensation group membership over time, with the high compensation group more likely to have unstable classification relative to the no compensation group (OR = 0.26, p = 0.001). Taken together, this study clarifies the processes underlying social compensation in the community and suggests a developmental psychopathology perspective is valuable in understanding how compensation develops across the lifespan. Such work has the potential to inform practices and policies that support social adaptation and promote resilience.

The goal of this article is to provide a balanced assessment of the significance autism has for the scientific study of language. While linguistic profiles in autism vary greatly, spanning from a total absence of functional language to verbal levels within the typical range, the entire autism spectrum is robustly characterized by lifelong disabilities in intersubjective communication and persistent difficulties in adopting the perspective of other people. In that sense, autism constitutes a unique profile in which linguistic competence is dissociated from communication skills. Somewhat paradoxically, autism is often mentioned to underscore the importance of mind reading for language use and of intersubjective communication for the emergence of language. Yet experimental studies on pragmatics in autism indicate that many pragmatic processes unfold without adopting one's conversational partner's perspective. Moreover, the patterns of language acquisition and learning in autism represent a strong challenge to the central role constructionist theories assign to socio-communicative skills. Data on autism thus force a reconsideration of the a priori conceptual boundaries on language learnability that shape the foundational debates between constructionist and nativist linguistic theories.

In his target article, ‘Autism, constructionism, and nativism’, Kissine (2021) argues that data from autism should be taken into consideration in the debate about L1 acquisition. This paper responds to Kissine's piece by pointing out several of its underlying assumptions and suggesting directions for future research on the topic. Traditional framings of autism as a deficit have recently been challenged in favor of an identity-based approach, the neurodiversity paradigm, which suggests that autistic speech should not be measured in terms of its resemblance to nonautistic speech and that literature on intercultural miscommunication may offer insights into autistic communication. There are some indications that distinct autistic discourse practices may be identifiable in communities of practice, and studies on autistic literacy could benefit from considering the theoretical perspectives found in literature on multimodality and translanguaging. Finally, research on language acquisition might be strengthened by the incorporation of holistic neurocognitive theories about autistic minds.

Despite policy calling for compulsory education in China, many children with autism are not in school. This article examines the establishment of autism-related non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in China to meet needs not being met by the state. We focus on the background and motivation in founding and running these NGOs, after first considering the broader context of state decentralization and NGOs roles in supplementing welfare needs in reforming societies, and the educational policy context of China. This study used mixed methods, including questionnaires with open-ended and limited choice questions, and follow-up discussion email. The goals of NGO leaders—more than 50% of whom are parents of children with autism—are to make up for where government implementation of educational policy is insufficient; help others and advocate for inclusion in society; and do meaningful work. Implications from these findings are discussed.

The constructionist approach argues that communication is central to language learning, language use, and language change. We argue that the approach provides a useful perspective on how autistic children learn language, as it anticipates variable outcomes and suggests testable predictions. First, a reduced ability and interest in tracking the attention and intentions of others should negatively impact early language development, and a wealth of evidence indicates that it does. Second, and less discussed until recently, a hyperfocus on specifics at the expense of generalizations, common among people on the spectrum, should also negatively impact language development, and recent evidence suggests this is also the case. Pace Kissine's 2021 target article, it is unsurprising that children can learn some second language from watching videos, and it is unclear how an appeal to ‘innate’ language-specific knowledge could explain the range of outcomes of individuals on the autism spectrum.

This article defends a new type of preferential hiring. Rather than compensating groups for past or present employment-related discrimination, it seeks to ensure that groups with disproportionate unemployment rates that are due significantly – but not necessarily wholly – to their members having relatively narrow competencies, such as autistic individuals and people with hearing loss, ADHD and lower education levels, are prioritized for jobs that match their abilities. After defending such competency-based preferential hiring based on its benefits for persons with narrower competencies and for societies more broadly, I address several criticisms, including concerns that this approach may be stigmatizing.

Transgender and gender diverse (TGD) people show different trajectories after gender transition. While some continue to transition, others detransition (DT), that is, stop or reverse the process. Both populations experience poor mental health, but no study has compared whether they have different psychological profiles and needs. This exploratory study compared TGD and DT participants in terms of psychopathological symptoms, personality variables, and the possible presence of eating disorders (ED) and autism spectrum disorders (ASD). A total of 29 TGD participants (M age = 28.28, 72.4% female at birth) and 21 DT participants (M age = 29.19, 66.7% female at birth) completed the Personality Assessment Inventory (PAI), the Sick-Control-One stone-Fat-Food (SCOFF), and the 10-item Autism Quotient (AQ-10). Of these, 28% screened positive for ED and 28% for ASD, and the percentage for ASD was higher in the DT group. TGD participants had elevated scores on borderline features and mania, whereas DT participants had elevated scores on anxiety-related disorders. The TGD group showed significantly higher scores on antisocial features, alcohol problems, and dominance, and significantly higher rates of self-harm; the DT group had significantly higher scores on phobias and significantly higher rates of social detachment. Both groups exhibited elevated scores on suicidal ideation, stress, and nonsupport. The results suggest that TGD and DT participants may have different psychological profiles, with TGD participants exhibiting more externalizing symptoms and DT participants reporting more neurodiversity and internalizing symptoms. The findings highlight common and distinct vulnerabilities and needs that should be considered in clinical practice.