Social media often follow a visual logic found to increase engagement, as images are more likely to attract attention, presenting information on a holistic-associative basis. For a political entity like the EU, social media are a promising route to overcome the remoteness to its citizens, identified as one of the crucial challenges to its public legitimacy. Against this broader background, our study analyses the influence of 10 years of EU visual social media communication on user engagement as an indicator of successfully creating visibility in a crucial communication space. For this purpose, we conducted an image-type analysis, combining quantitative and qualitative features of visual analysis: First, a subsample of posts was inductively analysed to identify recurring image types and subsequently used to implement a manual quantitative visual content analysis. Building on the results, we drew on a machine learning approach, allowing us to analyse over 40,000 posts, including more than 20,000 pictures. Our results emphasise the crucial influence of social media affordances in explaining user engagement with EU visual social media communication. Implications are discussed with reference to the ongoing discussion about the EU’s democratic deficit.

It is well established that attitudes towards immigration are linked to policy preferences and voting behaviour. However, we lack insights on the relevance of the other side of the migration coin: emigration. This is especially pertinent in the European Union (EU), which guarantees free movement of persons and where large-scale mobility gained momentum following the Eastern enlargement (East to West) and the euro crisis (South to North). Drawing on a 2021 survey conducted in nine peripheral EU countries, this study investigates whether concerns about emigration shape electoral behaviour. Findings indicate that such concerns reduce support for governing parties, but only among individuals with high levels of political trust, highlighting trust as a key moderating factor. At the country level, concerns about emigration favour radical-right parties, though not exclusively. In fact, the politicization of emigration can potentially benefit (or disadvantage) a range of parties depending on national political conditions.

Telemedicine is increasingly playing a vital role in European health systems, offering great potential for improving healthcare access and outcomes. Funded between September 2022 and December 2024, the Joint Action ‘Strengthening eHealth including telemedicine and remote monitoring for health care systems for CANcer prevention and care’ (eCAN JA) provided evidence-base for person-centred implementation of telemedicine services among cancer patients in the European Union (EU). Through a mixed-method approach, this foresight study gathered insights from key decision-makers in 14 EU Member States and eight cancer patient associations via two surveys and a joint workshop, conducted within the Sustainability Work Package (WP4) of the eCAN JA. Our results show that EU Member States and cancer patients view telemedicine as a useful and complementary tool, however, not as a replacement for in-person services for cancer care. The policy recommendations from our study can be summarised as follows: (i) develop legal frameworks to complement in-person care with telemedicine; (ii) improve digital literacy and information technology infrastructure while ensuring privacy and health equity; and (iii) engage patients in the co-design of telemedicine services. Implementing these recommendations will enhance the integration of telemedicine into cancer care in Europe.

Housing issues are a growing global concern and a key topic on the European policy agenda. Across EU, challenges such as immigration, economic stagnation, inequality, and ageing populations exacerbate housing provision issues. This growing concern demands effective solutions, guided by research, data-driven insights, and comparative analysis. This study overviews and compares housing provision in the EU countries. Using OECD and Eurostat data from 2010 to 2021, we examine governments’ roles in housing provision and assess availability, affordability, and adequacy, while exploring their interrelationships. Through hierarchical cluster analysis and cartographic visualization, we identify clusters of countries with similar housing characteristics. The findings reveal significant variation, with some countries struggling with availability, others with affordability or adequacy. Our results highlight a clear divide in housing challenges between Eastern, Western, Southern, and Northern Europe, largely aligning with welfare state regimes.

As data are becoming increasingly important resources for municipal administrations in the context of urban development, formalization of urban data governance (DG) is considered a prerequisite to systematic municipal data practice for the common good. Unlike for larger cities, it is unclear how common such formalized DG is in rural districts and small towns. We therefore mapped the current status quo in small municipalities in Germany as a case exemplifying the broader phenomenon. We systematically searched online for policy documents on DG in all metropolitan regions, all rural districts, and a quota sample of nearly a sixth of all German small towns. We then performed content analysis of the identified documents along predefined categories of urban development. Results show that hardly any small towns dispose of relevant policy documents. Rural districts are somewhat more active in formally defining DG. Identified policy documents tend to address mostly economic activities, social infrastructure, and demography, whereas Housing and Urban design and public space are among the least mentioned categories of urban development.

In March 2020, nine EU heads of state co-signed a letter demanding a coordinated response to the pandemic and the adoption of common debt. Recent literature has shown the relevance of the European Council in the response to the pandemic, as well as the rising importance of interstate coalitions in EU policymaking. Yet, empirical understanding of these coalitions is limited, and the literature largely assumes their constitution along ‘structuralist’ logics (e.g., ‘debtors’ vs. ‘creditors’). The emergence of a ‘solidarity coalition’ proposing the ‘coronabond’ is puzzling for its contrast with the euro crisis. The aim of this paper is to explain how these countries coalesced and to understand how that relates and informs a shift in the imperatives of ‘responsible government’ in the EU. Tracing the negotiation of the letter, through interviews and discourse analysis, the paper makes a critical contribution to our understanding of the evolution in EU economic governance.

Financial bailouts for ailing Eurozone countries face deep and widespread opposition among voters in donor countries, casting major doubts over the political feasibility of further assistance efforts. What is the nature of the opposition and under what conditions can governments obtain broader political support for funding such large‐scale, international transfers? This question is addressed by distinguishing theoretically between ‘fundamental’ and ‘contingent’ attitudes. Whereas the former entail complete rejection or embrace of a policy, the latter depend on the specific features of the policy and could shift if those features are altered. Combining unique data from an original survey in Germany – the largest donor country – together with an experiment that varies salient policy dimensions, the analysis indicates that less than a quarter of the public exhibits fundamental opposition to the bailouts. Testing a set of theories on contingent attitudes, particular sensitivity is found to the burden‐sharing and cost dimensions of the bailouts. The results imply that the choice of specific features of a rescue package has important consequences for building domestic support for international assistance efforts.

The European Union has become an important leader in international environmental affairs – particularly through the negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) with favourable terms. In this article, EU environmental leadership is studied from a new perspective, focusing on the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. Specifically, it investigates whether the EU is also capable of motivating third states to join its preferred MEAs. It is argued that third states join the EU's preferred MEAs to signal their compliance with EU environmental standards in an effort to become eligible for various rewards that the EU could potentially offer, including a credible membership perspective, access to its lucrative markets, and aid and assistance. The argument is tested by examining the ratification behaviour of 25 non‐EU Member States with regard to all 21 MEAs negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The results provide robust support for the theory that EU rewards motivate third states to ratify these treaties. The results withstand a number of statistical tests, even when alternative explanatory factors such as trade intensities, transnational communication and geographic proximity are controlled for. The study is the first large‐scale demonstration of the EU's external influence at the ratification stage of environmental regime formation. By identifying three different channels of EU influence, the research permits a more refined understanding of the EU's role as a promoter of environmental protection standards.

What explains the variation in institutional adaptation of national parliaments to European integration? Whereas the existing literature has mainly focused on domestic conditions, this article explains institutional adaptation to integration by focusing on inter‐parliamentary diffusion. The argument draws on ‘learning’ mechanisms of diffusion on the demand side and on ‘emulation’ mechanisms on the supply side. Parliamentary demand for external inspiration is related to uncertainty about functional oversight institutions, and the selection of sources to perceptions of similarity and success. Demand arises in new European Union member parliaments and young democracies that then turn towards culturally alike countries and old democracies. Using spatial econometrics, support is demonstrated for the argument in the article while ruling out alternative diffusion mechanisms such as spatial proximity and learning from Scandinavian frontrunners once links along cultural similarity and democratic experience are controlled for. The results underline the limits of the ‘isolated polity’ approach in the comparative study of institutions in Europe's closely integrated political system, while also showing that, even in this favourable environment, diffusion pathways are contingent on the mechanisms generating demand among policy makers and shaping their selection of sources for external information.

Inequality is a central explanation of political distrust in democracies, but has so far rarely been considered a cause of (dis‐)trust towards supranational governance. Moreover, while political scientists have extensively engaged with income inequality, other salient forms of inequality, such as the regional wealth distribution, have been sidelined. These issues point to a more general shortcoming in the literature. Determinants of trust in national and European institutions are often theorized independently, even though empirical studies have demonstrated large interdependence in citizens’ evaluations of national and supranational governance levels. In this paper, we argue that inequality has two salient dimensions: (1) income inequality and (2) regional inequality. Both dimensions are important antecedent causes of European Union (EU) trust, the effects of which are mediated by evaluations of national institutions. On the micro‐level, we suggest that inequality decreases a person's trust in national institutions and thereby diminishes the positive effect of national trust on EU trust. On the macro‐level, inequality decreases country averages of trust in national institutions. This, however, informs an individual's trust in the EU positively, compensating for the seemingly untrustworthiness of national institutions. Finally, we propose that residing in an economically declining region can depress institutional trust. We find empirical support for our arguments by analysing regional temporal change over four waves of the European Social Survey 2010–2016 with a sample of 209 regions nested in 24 EU member states. We show that changes in a member state's regional inequality have similarly strong effects on trust as changes in the Gini coefficient of income inequality. Applying causal mediation techniques, we can show that the effects of inequality on EU trust are largely mediated through citizens’ evaluations of national institutions. In contrast, residing in an economically declining region directly depresses EU trust, with economically lagging areas turning their back on European governance and resorting to the national level instead. Our findings highlight the relevance of regional inequality for refining our understanding of citizens’ support for Europe's multi‐level governance system and the advantages of causal modelling for the analysis of political preferences in a multi‐level governance system.

Fiscal discipline, the sustainable balancing of government outlays with revenues, is one of the most extensively theorized and empirically investigated objects of inquiry in political economy. Yet, studies covering European Union (EU) countries have mostly ignored the oversight of national budgets via the EU excessive deficit procedure. I explain why this surveillance engenders lower deficits and investigate its effects across all EU member countries. Results indicate that the impact of surveillance during budget drafting offsets that of a two‐year shortening of expected government duration, the addition of one party to a government coalition when debt is high, or a leftward shift in government ideology when the risk of replacement is low. Moreover, estimates from exact matching on treatment histories indicate that these effects peak after four to five years. These findings have important normative implications for democratic policy‐making in European countries and the fledgling EU‐wide fiscal policy.

This research note investigates whether external military crises, short of war, in the neighbourhood of the European Union (EU) affects attitudes toward the EU. Specifically, I explore whether the Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 fostered higher levels of trust in the EU and support for deeper integration among European citizens. Methodologically, I exploit the coincidental timing of the Russian annexation of Crimea on 18 March, 2014 with the fieldwork of the Eurobarometer survey (81.2) conducted in the spring of that year. The quasi‐experimental evidence establishes that European citizens who were surveyed after the Russian annexation became more trusting of the EU and presented a greater willingness for further European integration, particularly so among EU‐15 members. Moreover, the treatment effects were strongly moderated by individuals’ education levels, with the intervention exerting its greatest effect among the higher educated.

This article analyses whether and how fairness considerations affect citizens’ support of European Union (EU) policies and integration. While past literature has revealed that perceptions of procedural and substantive fairness impact on public opinion at the level of the nation state, we know less about the fairness‐support nexus when it comes to international cooperation. We here make use of the case of differentiated integration (DI) to experimentally dissect normative and utility‐oriented considerations in the evaluation of EU policies. DI as an instrument to overcome heterogeneity‐induced gridlock has been linked to both autonomy and dominance, and it can generate winners and losers in the EU. Our experiments reveal that citizens largely support DI. However, they are opposed to forms of DI which impose negative externalities on a subgroup of EU member states. This holds irrespective of the affectedness of citizens’ own member states. We take these findings as a first experimental confirmation that citizens, indeed, care about the fairness of the EU and its policies.

In the last decade, the idea of total defence – a whole-of-society approach integrating civilian and military capabilities – has gained renewed prominence in Europe, including within the European Union (EU). Concurrently, the concept of strategic autonomy – the EU’s ability to act independently – has emerged as a central feature in its security policy, driving ambitions for ‘a quantum leap forward on security and defence’.1 Despite significant conceptual overlaps, the relationship between total defence and strategic autonomy remains underexplored. Drawing on discursive institutionalism and the ideational power framework, this article examines EU security discourses from 2010 to 2024, analysing how strategic autonomy has shaped the development of European total defence. The study considers three dimensions of ideational power – through, over, and in – showing that while the idea of total defence predates strategic autonomy, the latter has certainly elevated the idea of European total defence and enhanced collective capability building, especially through entwining civilian and military domains, and yet has constrained the establishment of a unified military defence. The findings underscore the long-term discursive evolution underpinning the EU’s security strategy and its ongoing efforts to consolidate a European total defence framework, now more tangible than ever.