Organized, competitive wholesale power markets emerged in the U.S. during the 1990s, driven by technological change and regulatory restructuring. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTOs) manage these markets while governing a congestible transmission network whose physical coupling creates ill-defined property rights and persistent coordination problems. The growth of new generations, storage, and digital technologies further strains RTO governance by increasing heterogeneity in participants and business models. Integrating Elinor Ostrom’s common-pool resource (CPR) framework with James Buchanan’s theory of clubs, this paper analyses how RTOs govern reliability through rule-defined exclusion. The analysis argues that reliability is a CPR, but that RTOs formalize a scalable, club-like exclusion regime as a governance institution. Because transmission systems are non-replicable, governance institutions and polycentric oversight must substitute for competitive discipline. Institutional reforms that make boundary rules adaptive and participation more inclusive are essential to preserve reliability while enabling innovation and long-run efficiency.

Examining religion and state arrangements in the United States, this study investigates under what conditions religious law, rooted in state establishment, declines in democracies. We argue that when (1) state founders or political elites intentionally refrain from embedding religious arrangements within state institutions, (2) the state apparatus enforces a constitutionalized and explicit prohibition against government-sanctioned religion, and (3) legal justifications shift from religious to secular rationale to maintain their justifiable constitutionality, then reliance on religious law within the state diminishes. However, due to institutional path dependence, laws initially rooted in religious arrangements/traditions may persist but are increasingly framed in secular terms, aligning with the broader secularization of modern Western societies, regardless of the extent of separation between religion and state. Hence, the religious influence and objectives of these laws endure despite the secular disguise.

Recent government interventions support the objectives of collective markets through public policy rather than relying on traditional strategic cooperation between non-state actors. We ask when and how left-wing governments intervene in collectively-governed markets. We develop a novel theoretical framework at the intersection of public policy and comparative political economy. We build on public policy scholarship to mobilize a typology of policy instruments available to governments to shore up collective markets, including regulation (sticks), subsidies (carrots), and information (sermons). We embed this hierarchical classification in a political economy framework to outline under which conditions we expect policymakers to opt for different instruments. We illustrate the usefulness of this approach through a case study of least likely policy areas – labor market and training policy – nested within a least likely case – Germany.

To what extent do ministries dominate a particular policy domain? The policy dictator model and many principle‐agent models of governmental control that followed suit assume that governments create ministries with clear and exclusive policy responsibilities. We test this assertion using data from parliamentary bills from Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands. For each bill, we observe its substantial policy content and the responsible ministry. The data show that bills on similar issues regularly are drafted by different ministries in parliamentary democracies. About 40 per cent of policy issues cannot be ascribed to one dominant ministry. The regularities elucidate that ministerial division of labour within governments is considerably more complex than commonly assumed. The variegated level of ministerial dominance across policy domains calls for a new research agenda on how governments assign responsibility for legislative action in parliamentary democracies.

This article presents a study of how institutional constraints affect legislative activism and how legislative activism in turn affects policy change through an analysis of the European Union's legislative process. The argument revolves around the key role of the European Commission in advancing policy change, and emphasises that the Commission can successfully push for increased policy change by increasing its legislative activity when the institutional opportunity space widens. Using a novel panel dataset covering eight policy sectors from the period 1984–2012, the article shows that the number of legislative proposals significantly affects the extent of regulatory reform in the EU. The rise in the number of legislative proposals, in turn, is affected by the extent of gridlock between the EU's legislative bodies. These findings show that the Commission steps up its legislative activity when the institutional opportunity space allows for greater policy change.

Much recent research on coalitions and policy‐making in parliamentary democracies requires high‐quality data on the strength of legislative institutions. In this article, I introduce a new index of committee policing strength which improves on existing measures in important ways. I specify key index parameters using a binary rooted tree model and engage human coders to score formal rules. I obtain a novel time series of committee policing strength in 17 western and eastern European democracies since 1945. I validate the new estimates through convergent validation and discuss ways in which the new index contributes to future work.

This article asks: Is sector still a useful concept for social science research on nonprofit organizations and related fields, such as social entrepreneurship? We answer that it is relevant to practitioners for whom sector boundaries remain an important orienting feature of their organizational worldviews. This observation is at odds with the recent scholarship on “blurring” sector boundaries, much of which suggests that sector is increasingly an outdated concept. Data from one uniquely blended space—the fair trade industry—coupled with insights from Scott’s (Institutions and organizations: ideas, interests, and identities, 2014) theory about the three pillars of institutions suggest that sector remains meaningful despite developments that appear to render it obsolete.

As countries around the world went into lockdown, we turned to 32 leading scholars working on different aspects of democracy and asked them what they think about how the COVID-19 pandemic has impacted democracy. In this article, we synthesize the reflections of these scholars and present five key insights about the prospects and challenges of enacting democracy both during and after the pandemic: (1) COVID-19 has had corrosive effects on already endangered democratic institutions, (2) COVID-19 has revealed alternative possibilities for democratic politics in the state of emergency, (3) COVID-19 has amplified the inequalities and injustices within democracies, (4) COVID-19 has demonstrated the need for institutional infrastructure for prolonged solidarity, and (5) COVID-19 has highlighted the predominance of the nation-state and its limitations. Collectively, these insights open up important normative and practical questions about what democracy should look like in the face of an emergency and what we might expect it to achieve under such circumstances.

When it comes to the impact of institutions such as electoral systems, parliamentary or presidential systems and executive–legislature relations, political science has predominately been preoccupied with their political effects, such as whether they lead to two-party or multi-party systems and whether stable governments result. What has been less discussed and researched are the policy implications of different electoral systems. Do they lead to more economic growth? Does Proportional Representation lead to higher budget deficits? Do majoritarian systems lead to more or less political violence? The shortage of research analysing these questions is surprising. This article critically outlines the research to date, summarises the main results and points to methodological problems in the literature before it outlines a framework for future research analysing how the choice of electoral system affects policy output. The main recommendation is that, before trying to connect policy outputs to broad labels such as ‘Proportional Representation’, which can cover significantly different systems, one should investigate the connection of policy outputs to intervening variables such as the effective number of parties and the mean duration of cabinets.

The scope, complexity, and interconnectedness of modern society should prompt us to develop dynamic understandings of democratic modes of inclusion and exclusion. In particular, democratic theory is becoming more attentive to the mismatch between those who make decisions and those who are affected by them as well as to the need to account for the voice of the latter. In this article I build on James Bohman’s understanding of democracy as a rule by multiple dêmoi to develop a framework for studying and evaluating modes of democratic inclusion that are based on being affected. To develop this framework I turn to law and public administration and examine the democratic properties of different institutions and procedures that give a voice to those who are affected by a decision.

Over the last three decades, European Union regulation of the internal market has become highly pervasive, affecting practically all domains of European citizens' lives. Many studies have focused on understanding the process and causes of regulatory change, but with limited attempts to analyse the more general sources of regulatory reform. This article focuses on the determinants of stability and change in EU regulation. An original dataset of 169 pieces of legislation (regulations, directives and decisions) across eight different sectors is developed and the dynamics of regulatory reform in the EU are analysed. Using time‐series analysis of count data, evidence is found that the number of winning coalitions in the Council and the size of EU membership have a significant impact on regulatory reform in the EU. By contrast, the ideological composition of the EU's legislative bodies is not systematically related to regulatory reform.

A strong link between citizen preferences and public policy is one of the key goals and criteria of democratic governance. Yet, our knowledge about the extent to which public policies on specific issues are in line with citizen preferences in Europe is limited. This article reports on the first study of the link between public opinion and public policy that covers a large and diverse sample of concrete public policy issues in 31 European democracies. The findings demonstrate a strong positive relationship and a substantial degree of congruence between public opinion and the state of public policy. Also examined is whether political institutions, including electoral systems and the horizontal and vertical division of powers, influence the opinion‐policy link. The evidence for such effects is very limited, which suggests that the same institutions might affect policy representation in countervailing ways through different mechanisms.

The COVID-19 crisis and countries’ reactions led to analyses about how governance systems influenced the management of the pandemic and how COVID-19 influenced businesses. The concept of institutional resilience transcends these directions of research, but we know little about what it means and how to measure it. This paper proposes an innovative framework to conceptualize and assess institutional resilience based on three organisational traits: preparedness, agility and robustness. This approach provides the opportunity to sequence actions before, during and after the pandemic. This framework will be applied through various cases studies in Europe in the contributions to this symposium.

Social accountability institutions are at the forefront of democratic reformers’ efforts to improve well‐being by harnessing the power of citizen participation. This article builds on recent research identifying a positive relationship between participatory budgeting (PB) and well‐being. The article is the first large‐N study to identify relationships between specific rules of PB programme design and well‐being. A unique dataset of 114 Brazilian municipalities with PB programmes from 2009 to 2016 is constructed to evaluate whether internal mechanisms within PB explain variation in local infant mortality rates – an outcome associated with wellbeing. Hypotheses are tested that correspond to citizen participation, the scope of deliberation and embeddedness within local institutions. It is found that PB programmes are associated with lower infant mortality rates when they broaden participation, expand deliberation and embed the new institutions in ongoing policy‐making venues. The results offer a framework for designing PB programmes and other social accountability institutions to maximise impact.

To explore the transatlantic emigration of the ‘comparative method’(s) is to recover the range of European work – in institutional history, comparative legislation, and the theory of the State – that scholars in the nascent American science of politics drew on in the late nineteenth century. Their nascent science was, however, not merely derivative, and in the changing practices of comparative study from the mid-1880s through 1900 a distinctive American ‘political science’ began to emerge.

This article offers an institutionalist assessment of the more recent chapters of political opposition in Erdoğan’s Turkey. There is good reason to suppose that the institutional features of a given regime can explain the performance of opposition parties to a significant extent. That said, the case of Turkey provides impressive evidence that there are striking limits to institutionalizing political predominance, to undermining political oppositions by institutional means, and to explaining the performance of opposition parties with the prevailing institutional resources and constraints. Specifically, attempts at institutionalizing a predominant power status carry particular risks of generating inverse effects, including increased political vulnerability. However, there are no automatic effects. Rather, as the Turkish experience suggests, reasonably vigorous actors to become politically relevant must seize the particular (if usually limited) opportunities arising from advanced institutional autocratization.

Political science has embraced institutional analysis to the degree that it has become a truism to say that we are ‘all institutionalists now’. Yet, despite this turn towards institutional analysis, most studies have focussed on the political as opposed to the policy implications of institutions. As a result, the direct and indirect effects of institutions on concrete policy output have received scarce attention. This article outlines the developments to date and presents the overall findings of the articles in this volume.