Despite general public support, efforts to build affordable housing often encounter stiff resistance due to “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) attitudes, which are often rooted in false or unsupported beliefs about affordable housing and its impacts on surrounding communities. Would correcting these misperceptions increase support for building affordable housing? To answer this question, we conducted a preregistered survey experiment measuring how support for affordable housing in the U.S. varies at different distances from where respondents live (one-eighth of a mile away, two miles away, or in their state). Our results indicate that correcting stereotypes about affordable housing and misperceptions about its effects increase support for affordable housing. Contrary to expectations, these effects are often larger for affordable housing near the respondent’s home (rather than at the state level), suggesting that debunking myths about affordable housing may help to counter NIMBY attitudes.

We introduce a novel scenario that embeds the Downs-Thomson paradox in the context of departure-time choice during the morning commute. Commuters, departing from a common origin and traveling to a common destination, must choose between a congestible mode (car, road) and a non-congestible mode (train, railway). Those choosing the road must also select their departure times independently and anonymously. This decision involves a trade-off between the cost of queuing at the bottleneck and the cost of schedule delay (i.e., deviation from the desired arrival time). We numerically derive a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium that characterizes both mode and departure-time choices. We then examine how improvements to either the road or the railway affect mean travel costs. Our laboratory experiment shows that, consistent with the paradox, improving the railway lowers mean travel cost; however, contrary to the paradox, improving the road also reduces mean travel cost. These findings suggest that the Downs-Thomson paradox may fail to emerge fully when commuters must coordinate multiple strategic dimensions under intertemporal congestion externalities.

Disadvantaged minority groups can gain support for their cause by convincing majority members of their experienced adversity. We theorize and empirically test the efficacy of different types of evidence, varying in character (statistical versus personal) and ambiguity (manifest versus ambiguous), vis-à-vis raising majority members’ awareness of ethnic minority discrimination. Reflecting the combination of these two dimensions, we develop four treatments based on real evidence/stories and test several pre-registered hypotheses regarding their efficacy in two survey-experimental studies conducted in Denmark. We find that manifest types of evidence – from an audit study and a personal story exhibiting explicit discrimination – are the most effective in raising majority members’ awareness of ethnic minority discrimination. Further, the effect of the personal story extends to increased support for anti-discrimination policies and higher donations to an immigrant NGO, highlighting how personal stories can increase majorities’ awareness of and willingness to act on the adversity experienced by minorities.

Misinformation has emerged as a key threat worldwide, with scholars frequently highlighting the role of partisan motivated reasoning in misinformation belief. Yet the mechanisms enabling the endorsement of misinformation may differ in contexts where other identities are salient. This study explores whether religion drives the endorsement of misinformation in India. Using original data, we first show that individuals with high levels of religiosity and religious polarization endorse significantly higher levels of misinformation. Next, to understand the causal mechanisms through which religion operates, we field an experiment where corrections rely on religious messaging, and/or manipulate perceptions of religious ingroup identity. We find that corrections including religious frames (1) reduce the endorsement of misinformation; (2) are sometimes more effective than standard corrections; and (3) work beyond the specific story corrected. These findings highlight the religious roots of belief formation and provide hope that social identities can be marshalled to counter misinformation.

We introduce the “Fork Game,” a graphical interface designed to elicit higher-order risk preferences. In this game, participants connect forked pipes to create a final structure. A ball is then dropped into the top opening of this structure and follows a downward path, randomly turning left or right at each forked joint. This construction is effectively isomorphic to the apportionment of binary-outcome lotteries, allowing participants to construct complex gambles. Furthermore, the game is easily comprehensible, highly modular, and provides a flexible means of assessing risk aversion, prudence, temperance, and even higher-order risk preferences.

We study experimentally contests in which players make investment decisions sequentially, and information on prior investments is revealed between stages. Using a between-subject design, we consider all possible sequences in contests of three players and test two major comparative statics of the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: The positive effect of the number of stages on aggregate investment and earlier-mover advantage. The former prediction is decidedly rejected, as we observe a reduction in aggregate investment when more sequential information disclosure stages are added to the contest. The evidence on earlier mover advantage is mixed but mostly does not support theory as well. Both predictions rely critically on large preemptive investment by first movers and accommodation by later movers, which does not materialize. Instead, later movers respond aggressively, and reciprocally, to first movers’ investments, while first movers learn to invest less to accommodate those responses.

Our study contributes to the literature on choice shifts in group decision-making by analyzing how the level of risk-taking within a group is influenced by its gender composition. In particular, we investigate experimentally whether group composition affects how preferences ‘shift’ when comparing individual and group choices. Consistent with hypotheses derived from previous literature, we show that male-dominated groups shift toward riskier decisions in a way that is not explained by any simple preference aggregation mechanism. We discuss potential channels for the observed pattern of choice shifts.

Why do some politicians face greater backlash for using insensitive language against identity groups while others do not? Existing explanations focus either on the content of speech or the context in which it occurs. In this article, we propose an integrated framework that considers both and test it using a preregistered conjoint survey on a national U.S. sample. Our findings provide partial support for our expectations. Subjects react most negatively to insensitive speech when the target belongs to their own identity group, when aggravating circumstances exist, and when politicians are of an opposing political party. Our article extends growing scholarship on speech scandals, which has largely explained the fates of politicians as a function of a small number of causative variables in isolation.

We conduct an economic experiment to examine the causal impact of social ties on the preference for competition. Participants decide whether to engage in a competition or not. Across four treatments, potential competitors vary based on their relationship with the decision-maker: whether they had a conversation with the decision-maker prior to the competition, whether they are expected to chat after the competition, or both, or neither. We find that the process of chatting increases social closeness. This increase in social closeness tends to reduce the preference for competition when participants are expected to meet again after the competition. However, it does not change the likelihood of opting for competition if there is no prospect of further interaction. Through this experiment, we thus uncover previously unknown implications of managerial practices, such as team-building exercises and remote work options, that influence the formation of social ties.

Efficient coordination is a major source of efficiency gains. We study in an experimental coordination game with 727 children and teenagers, aged 9 to 18 years, the strategies played in pre-adulthood. In our one-shot, experimental coordination game, we vary the incentives for reaching the more efficient equilibrium and the number of subjects within a group. Looking at strategy choices dependent on age, we do not find robust age effects in the aggregate. Yet, we see that smaller group sizes and larger incentives increase the likelihood of choosing the efficient strategy. The larger strategic uncertainty in larger groups is obviously harmful for overall efficiency. Regarding incentives, we find that increasing the profits in the efficient equilibrium seems to work better than providing a cushion in case of miscoordination. Beliefs play an important role as well, as subjects are more likely to play the efficient strategy when they expect others to do so as well. Our results are robust to controlling for individual risk-, time-, and social preferences.

This study investigates the integration of literal completions of idiomatic multiword expressions (MWEs) into two linguistic contexts: one promoting a literal interpretation and the other a figurative one, requiring reinterpretation to align with figurative bias. Sixteen Italian idioms were distributed in two groups by their Potential Idiomatic Ambiguity (PIA) score, an index of literal plausibility, decomposability and transparency. Using experimental dialogues, the study tested whether high-PIA idioms receive higher acceptability ratings across both contexts than low-PIA idioms. Eighty-four Italian-speaking participants rated idiom literal completions within literal and figurative contexts. Results show that literal completions of high-PIA idioms integrate better across contexts, while those of low-PIA idioms receive lower ratings and have longer combined reading and rating times. This supports hybrid models of idiom processing, emphasizing the role of idiomatic features and context in balancing figurative and compositional interpretations. This study also marks an initial effort to experimentally trace systematicity within idiomatic wordplay, challenging the idea that it lacks relevance for linguistic research while outlining limitations and directions for future work.

Although much has been written on legislative reciprocity, rarely have scholars had an opportunity to leverage a randomly assigned asset to assess whether and how legislators reciprocate when their colleagues assist them. Using the lottery that allows Canadian Members of Parliament (MPs) to propose bills or motions, we examine whether MPs’ priority numbers affect their proclivity to second motions made by other MPs, which would be expected if MPs sought to build support for their own proposals by supporting proposals by others. Although MPs almost always make a proposal if their priority number allows them to do so, we find a weak relationship between MPs’ priority numbers and their probability of seconding others’ proposals. Moreover, when we look at successive parliaments, we see only faint indications that those who, by chance, won the right to propose in the previous session (and who therefore were eligible to attract seconds) are more likely to second others’ proposals in the current session. Although subject to a fair amount of statistical uncertainty that will gradually dissipate as future parliaments are examined, this pattern of evidence currently suggests that correlated seconding behavior among legislators is more the product of homophily than reciprocity.

This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that recommend collusive pricing strategies. Utilizing a laboratory experiment, we find that sellers condition their prices on the recommendation of the algorithms. The algorithm with a soft punishment strategy lowers market prices and has a pro-competitive effect. The algorithm that recommends a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy increases the range of market outcomes, including more collusive ones.

We provide the first large-scale statistical investigation of the role of the saliency of (dis)honesty on future behavior in a multi-wave experiment with 1,260 subjects. In the first wave, we vary the saliency of subjects’ past dishonesty and explore the impact on behavior in tasks that include the scope to lie. In the second wave, we vary the degree of competitiveness in one of our core tasks. In a real effort task with individual incentives, being asked to recall experiences that involve honesty, or dishonesty reduces dishonesty in the task. This effect persists, albeit with a smaller effect size, when we purposefully introduce competitive incentives to this task in wave 2. On the other hand, in a competitive environment in which subjects could earn more by lying to their counterparts, inducing them to think more about (dis)honesty pushes them toward becoming more dishonest.