In this paper, we develop a model economy to study how financial innovations affect financial access and inequality. Financial innovations alter distribution of costs. In this way, the measure of buyers is endogenous regarding the payment method. In studying financial innovations in an economy with limited commitment, it is possible to bridge two existing literatures. When comparing stationary equilibria, we find that the results depend on the scarcity of collateral. Moreover, the expected welfare and inequality are affected by consumers access to the form of payment systems.

The organisation and financing of services dominate long-term care policy and research. This article argues for reorientation towards the social determinants of long-term care and the inequalities they generate. Building on Dahlgren and Whitehead’s influential equivalent for health, the article offers a framework for understanding how inequalities in long-term care need, access and experience are shaped by social networks, living and working conditions, services and policies, social norms, and political, economic and environmental conditions. International evidence on inequalities in need, access and experience is reviewed, and new analysis is presented for England, based on analysis of the Health Survey for England and the Adult Social Care Survey. Socio-economic inequalities are associated with steep gradients in need. Combined with unequal access to formal services, this results in more unmet need among disadvantaged people and a greater weight of responsibility on their family and friends. The final section explores the implications of a social determinants’ perspective for long-term care: addressing ‘upstream’ drivers of need (including social protection, housing and neighbourhood regeneration); inclusion and empowerment agendas; and ensuring that services effectively compensate for, rather than re-enforce, inequalities.

Inequality is an inherent quality of society. This paper provides actuarial insights into the recognition, measurement, and consequences of inequality. Key underlying concepts are discussed, with an emphasis on the distinction between inequality of opportunity and inequality of outcome. To better design and maintain approaches and programmes that mitigate its adverse effects, it is important to understand its contributing causes. The paper outlines strategies for reflecting on and addressing inequality in actuarial practice. Actuaries are encouraged to work with policymakers, employers, providers, regulators, and individuals in the design and management of sustainable programmes to address some of the critical issues associated with inequality. These programmes can encourage more equal opportunities and protect against the adverse financial effects of outcomes.

To anticipate relationships between future climate change and societal violence, we need theory to establish causal links and case studies to estimate interactions between driving forces. Here, we couple evolutionary ecology with a machine-learning statistical approach to investigate the long-term effects of climate change, population growth, and inequality on intergroup conflict among farmers in the North American Southwest. Through field investigations, we generate a new archaeological dataset of farming settlements in the Bears Ears National Monument spanning 1,300 years (0 to AD 1300) to evaluate the direct and interactive effects of precipitation, temperature, climate shocks, demography, and wealth inequality on habitation site defensibility—our proxy for intergroup conflict. We find that conflict peaked during dry, warm intervals when population density and inequality were highest. Results support our theoretical predictions and suggest cascading effects, whereby xeric conditions favored population aggregation into an increasingly small, heterogenous area, which increased resource stress and inequality and promoted intergroup conflict over limited productive patches. This dynamic likely initiated feedback loops, whereby conflict exacerbated shortfalls and fostered mistrust, which drove further aggregation and competition. Results reveal complex interactions among socioclimatological conditions, all of which may have contributed to regional depopulation during the thirteenth century AD.

A large body of research shows that members of Congress disproportionately represent the interests of copartisans and affluent Americans. Is there also racial disparity in representation? I draw on three standards of political equality—proportionality, race-conscious egalitarianism, and pluralism—and assess the extent to which minority representation satisfies each. To do so, I match roll-call votes in the U.S. House of Representatives to survey data fielded prior to each vote (2006–2016) and use multilevel regression and poststratification to estimate racial subgroups’ opinions. I then examine how closely House members’ voting aligns with these opinions, focusing on districts where White and minority preferences differ. My analysis rules out “coincidental representation’ driven by similar opinions across groups and accounts for how much of each racial group’s national population resides in each district. Among districts where racial group opinions differ, I find strong support for the proportionality over the race-conscious egalitarian standard: Racial minority representation is substantially greater in majority–minority districts than in those that are not. However, I find strong evidence for the race-conscious egalitarian standard among Democratic legislators and moderate evidence for the pluralist standard among all legislators, as voting tends to align with racial minority opinion on explicitly race-targeted bills.

Many traditional subsistence groups have been described as ‘egalitarian societies’. Definitions of ‘egalitarianism’, especially beyond anthropology, have often emphasised equality in resource access, prestige or rank, alongside generalised preferences for fairness and equality. However, there are no human societies where equality is genuinely realised in all areas of life. Here we demonstrate, empirically, that nominally egalitarian societies are often unequal across seven important interconnected domains: embodied capital, social capital, leadership, gender, age/knowledge, material capital/land tenure, and reproduction. We also highlight evidence that individuals in nominally egalitarian societies do not unfailingly adhere to strong equality preferences. We propose a new operational framework for understanding egalitarianism in traditional subsistence groups, focussing on individual motivations, rather than equality. We redefine “egalitarianism” societies as those where socio-ecological circumstances enable most individuals to successfully secure their own resource access, status, and autonomy. We show how this emphasis on self-interest — particularly status concerns, resource access and autonomy — dispels naive enlightenment notions of the ‘noble savage’, and clarifies the plural processes (demand-sharing, risk-pooling, status-levelling, prosocial reputation-building, consensus-based collective decision-making, and residential mobility) by which relative equality is maintained. We finish with suggestions for better operationalizing egalitarianism in future research.

Political and economic elites often warn that taxes on the rich impair economic growth. Although such warnings have a long tradition in elite discourse, what the public believes about the effects of progressive taxation remains surprisingly understudied. This omission limits our understanding of a basic democratic mechanism, the congruence of elite and public opinion. To close this gap, we employ a conjoint experiment during the 2021 German national election on a representative quota sample. Participants compare policy packages that entail changes in income, inheritance, and corporate taxes and evaluate their impact on equality and growth. We find no evidence that the public believes that progressive taxes promote equality at the expense of growth. Instead, participants believe that progressive taxes are doubly beneficial, promoting both outcomes. Furthermore, such beliefs do not vary by ideology or economic status. Our findings suggest a more consensual view of progressive taxation that emphasizes positive synergies between economic growth and greater equality.

Scholars argue that while left partisan governments traditionally support stronger market regulation, this partisanship effect has started to vanish as left governments converge with the right in supporting deregulation, resulting in higher inequality. This paper argues that, instead of vanishing, the partisanship effect has intensified, but in a novel direction: left governments have become stronger defenders of market competition than other partisan governments. Furthermore, this new association between left partisanship and market competition has delivered new distributive gains for labor. I highlight the depressed interest rates across the rich world today in driving this outcome: low rates spark a rise in market concentration, which puts downward pressure on the labor share of income. By boosting market competition, left governments can counter this force and defend the labor share of income, thus revitalizing redistribution for a more difficult economic era. These claims are tested using data from 10 to 17 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (1995–2017).

Sludge is one of the most important yet underappreciated problems in modern society. Examples of sludge include unnecessarily complex paperwork requirements, hard-to-navigate documents and websites, long waiting time, and unfriendly or confusing staff interactions. However, little is known about whether some people are more vulnerable to and less accepting of some types of sludge than others. Drawing on data from a nationally representative survey with 1,591 participants from Ireland, we show that people report being particularly vulnerable to outdated websites with broken links, unfriendly staff interactions, complex documents laden with jargon, and hard-to-navigate websites. These are also the types of sludge that are least acceptable. Less vulnerability is reported to long waiting times and requirements about having to provide private information. We find only minor differences in sludge perceptions depending on whether the sludge emerges in the public or the private sector. Moreover, people with poor mental health report being more vulnerable to and less accepting of sludge. Self-reported administrative literacy is related to less reported vulnerability, and the tendency to procrastinate and a lack of time and mental energy predict more reported vulnerability to sludge. Administrative literacy and a lack of mental energy also predict acceptability of sludge.