Chapter 3 develops a theory of the domestic politics of intra-industry trade. It argues that changes in the nature of trade away from endowments-based trade to two-way trade within industries change the structure of preferences over trade policy and the way that actors mobilize politically in order to influence trade policy. This, in turn, affects trade policy outcomes and the ease with which trade agreements are concluded. First, I argue that the distributional effects of intra-industry trade drive a wedge through industry preferences over trade policy. As intra-industry trade increases, globalized firms support openness, and smaller, domestic-oriented firms within the same industry support protection. Second, these heterogeneous firm preferences change the ability of industries to overcome collective action problems and organize politically to influence trade policy. I argue that industry associations are hamstrung in their ability to lobby while individual firms have a greater incentive to lobby alone for their preferred policies. Third, exporters will overwhelm domestic-oriented firms in their ability to lobby, and as a result, tariffs will be lower in industries with higher intra-industry trade, though this may not be the case with non-tariff barriers to trade.

This chapter assesses the effects of intra-industry trade on lobbying in the EU. It includes the results of analysis of an original dataset of EU-based lobbying over several trade agreements. First, the chapter briefly discusses the nature of trade policy in the EU, and then surveys the literature on the politics of trade in Europe, with a focus on the state of our knowledge about the character of political coalitions and the involvement of industry associations and individual firms in the trade policymaking process. Second, the chapter discusses the role of intra-industry trade in the EU and presents an argument about the way that IIT has eroded the ability of European industry associations to lobby jointly over trade policy. Third, the chapter introduces the dataset used to assess the argument and discusses the quantitative analysis and results. The results support the theory developed in this book and demonstrate that IIT affects societal coalitions across diverse institutional contexts.

The book opens with some compelling examples of puzzling episodes in recent trade policy negotiations. I question why Americans were largely unaware of TTIP, while the TPP became a lightning rod for controversy and went down in flames on day one of the Trump presidency. I also discuss the dramatic rise in firm-level lobbying over these and other trade agreements, despite the IPE literature’s longstanding assumption that firms primarily engage in trade politics collectively via industry associations or class-based coalitions. Then I briefly introduce my theoretical story, which makes sense of these and other puzzles. I discuss the state of our understanding of trade politics in developed democracies before presenting the plan of the book to follow.

Just as we would be remiss to skip past a discussion of the role of entrepreneurs in innovation, we would be remiss to skip over the role of the state. In this chapter, we move through three starkly different visions of what role government ought to play in bringing about innovation in the economy. The first paper discussed, by Acemoglu & Robinson, suggests that the state actually plays a key role in creating the institutions that make innovation worthwhile. The second reading, a set of chapters from a book by Mazzucato, argues that this institution-oriented view is too limited, provides evidence of how ‘entrepreneurial states’ can also work to develop innovations, and suggests that this implies a state that is much more active in investing in and directing innovation. The third reading turns up this argument further, arguing that the urgency of the global climate crisis and the vast economic reorganization that it demands means that the state should not just be more active in investing and directing: the crisis, it argues, can only be solved by a complete socialization of the economy, by the state actively managing innovation and production.

It would be remiss to have a discussion of innovation without addressing the role that entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship can play in it. To begin that discussion, we turn first to Schumpeter’s early work and its enthusiastic (almost theatrical) celebration of the entrepreneur and Baumol’s historical analysis of what it is about our current economic system that leads entrepreneurship to take particularly productive forms and not the unproductive and destructive forms that might have dominated earlier epochs. Then, we problematize. With Gans et al., we explore what conditions might contribute to entrepreneurship spurring Schumpeter’s gale of Creative Destruction and think about why any rational entrepreneur would even attempt to do so. To close the chapter, Nightingale & Coad lay bare the counterintuitive argument that entrepreneurs, for all the bravado and cultural celebration, typically really don’t do that much. Much of what most people believe to be true about entrepreneurs, it turns out, is just a result of survivorship biases and other methodological problems.

This chapter situates three Latinx literary organizations – CantoMundo, Letras Latinas, and Undocupoets – in a trajectory of institution building dedicated to the support and development of Latinx poetry and poetics. Moving through organizational origins, concrete support strategies, founding members, and institutional alliances, the chapter maps out the practical as well as philosophical outcomes of developing Latinx poetry and poetics as a diverse, multiform set of voices. Coinciding with greater recognition of Latinx poets in terms of fellowship support, book prizes, and publication numbers, CantoMundo, Letras Latinas, and Undocupoets, as well as organizations that have built alongside and with them, have decisively shaped twenty-first-century Latinx poetry and given it many possible routes for future development.

This penultimate chapter turns to MacCormick’s institutional theory of law. This theory sought to answer questions about how law existed and how it was knowable. This chapter reads over four decades of this theory with character, doing so in two parts. In the first part, it explores the sense in which the very substance of the theory can be understood relationally, i.e., as underpinned by sensitivity to the dangers of domination, and a commitment to respect, decency, considerateness, and civility. The second part reads the institutional theory of law as a relational act in another sense, i.e., as mediating across what are otherwise often divisions or separations, such as between philosophy and sociology, or scholarship about law and the practice of law. The chapter tracks various changes in how MacCormick theorised law institutionally, from his early interest in law as institutional fact, to his later law as institutional normative order.

This chapter motivates the book’s central questions: Why is incumbency an electoral blessing for politicians in some countries but an electoral curse in others? Why does incumbency bias emerge? What are the consequences of incumbency bias for democracy? The chapter then presents the book’s bounded accountability theory in brief: incumbency bias emerges and varies because democratic institutions generate a mismatch between citizens’ expectations of incumbent performance and incumbents’ capacity to deliver. The chapter clarifies how this argument builds and expands upon prior work on incumbency bias in Latin America and the US, and how it draws theoretical insights from theoretical and empirical work on electoral accountability. The chapter also distils contrasting predictions between bounded accountability and theories that stress corruption and clientelism as the drivers of incumbency advantage and disadvantage. The chapter closes by describing the case selection and outlining its nested-multilevel research design that combines cross-country and within-country comparisons and employs tools of causal inference to examine incumbency bias in Argentina, Brazil and Chile.

The League of Nations was the first permanent international organisation with a general mandate. Its establishment is widely regarded as having had a significant, if elusive, impact upon international law, which became centred on international institutions. These three aspects of the League – its permanence, the generality of its mandate, and the ’institutional turn’ it brought to international law – lie at the heart of the assumed significance of the League for contemporary international lawyers. They are regarded as the League’s principal innovations and central components of its legacy, often without much interrogation and rarely subject to sustained analysis. This chapter offers analysis and interrogation to nuance claims about the League’s innovations. It presents the League as an institution whose grand designs often failed, but which innovated quietly and gradually. Above all, it shifts the focus away from the perceived ’breakthrough’ of 1919, and highlights the evolutionary nature of the League, which adapted throughout its life.

For more than seven and a half decades, India has enjoyed the moniker of “world’s largest democracy.” In addition to this distinction, the country is the most enduring democracy in the developing world. India adopted universal suffrage in 1947, despite an extremely low per capita income. Since then, the country has sustained its commitment to democratic governance despite poverty, inequality, unprecedented diversity, and sprawling geography (Varshney 2013). This makes India both an important outlier as well as an exemplar for poor, multiethnic democracies the world over (Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011).

Constitutions are important because they set the rules of the political game. As a result, they determine the relevant players, their strategies, and their payoffs. Amendments emerge when the constitutional rules prevent a wide variety of actors (determined by the amendment rules of the constitution) from achieving their goals. This institutional approach in democratic countries (where the rule of law prevails) contradicts arguments that it is culture or nonwritten rules (constitutional moments) that regulates the emergence of amendments or that judicial interpretations supersede constitutional amendments (unconstitutional constitutional amendments).