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The telegraph is often seen as one of the most important technological innovations that helped usher in an age of global financial integration during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. For the first time, information and capital no longer moved at electronic speeds, enabling unprecedented growth securities arbitrage across different markets, which brought prices into equilibrium. But this framework typically adopts both a technologically determinist understanding of the telegraph and uses only long-run, macroeconomic approaches to measure the financial effects of the telegraph. This chapter instead focuses on the practicalities of operationalizing the telegraph within the financial system. How was the telegraphic infrastructure that linked financial markets built, implemented, and maintained? By focusing on the telegraph’s infrastructural operation, this chapter argues that the telegraph integrated global financial markets in profoundly unequal ways. Moreover, it was through the seemingly small technicalities of telegraphic infrastructure – like the management of electric current, the maintenance of wires, the adoption of new telegraph apparatuses, and message delivery systems – that states, financial institutions, and firms sought to exert their power over the telegraph. The results of these conflicts over telegraphic infrastructure resulted in an unequal distribution of the telegraph’s financial benefits.
This chapter focuses on the promises and drawbacks of adapting constitutionalism to institutions designed to promote regional integration in the economic sphere. It argues that while constitutional mechanisms can enhance cooperation by locking in states’ commitments, the fact that regional organizations are tasked with specific policy ends creates a significant departure from the fundamental principles that constitutionalism is traditionally prized for advancing. The chapter develops this argument primarily with reference to the European Union, while noting the limits of generalizing from that case. It argues that the EU’s supranational legal order amplifies a logic germane to any constitutional system, but which has often been overlooked by political theorists. Alongside their better-know functions of facilitating democratic self-rule and safeguarding individual freedom, constitutional systems are also expected to enable the effective exercise of public power. Insofar as regional institutions are designed to help states govern more effectively, particularly in the economic domain, they advance this neglected but essential rationale of constitutional rule. The chapter situates this argument in the context of the burgeoning literature on the non-democratic uses of constitutionalism, showing that constitutional mechanisms can be configured to advance different ends, not all of them emancipatory.
This chapter explores the major auction landscapes before 1914 and also describes the defining elements of the fin-de-siècle European market: integration, free trade, and cosmopolitanism. Examining societies’ approaches to artwork acquisition unveils contradictions and frictions within a milieu united by an international collecting class. France contended with an international, yet conservative, nationalist art world, while Germany’s bourgeoisie tried to control the world of luxury and consumption. In contrast, Britain grappled with questions about free trade and the preservation of art that challenged its laissez-faire tradition. It is precisely these tensions, which directly reflect the challenges posed by the commercialisation of art, that provide a framework for analysing the impact of the war. By emphasising the shared features of an integrated trade sphere, this chapter paints a balanced portrayal of a European market, where art mirrored the complex integration of both socioeconomic and cultural frameworks.
Many global historians do not use quantitative evidence and are sceptical towards the systematic use of numerical data to uncover general patterns in history. Yet as global history concerns itself with questions about the rise and declines of global connectivity and the comparative development of societies across the world, there are clear benefits to quantification. This chapter first reviews the evidence on global trade volumes and commodity prices to suggest that the process of globalisation was already happening during the early modern period. Second, it shows that the most recent evidence and estimates of total economic output and real wages point to an early divergence in comparative incomes between Europe and Asia starting prior to the 1700s. It is shown that historical quantitative data are fraught with difficulties, but that the evidence is constantly being improved upon, leading to an increasingly accurate picture of global connections and comparative incomes in global history. Such quantitative global history complements rather than substitutes qualitative historical research as many historical developments are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify.
This article contributes to the growing historical literature on the ‘first globalization’ (1815–1913) and income inequality in countries that exported agricultural products. International market integration is expected to increase the demand for exports and therefore their prices. We estimate the effects of increased prices from international market integration on national welfare and income inequality between and within regions in three major exporters of agricultural products—British India, Colonial Indonesia, and the United States—using the prices of eleven key primary commodities. Market integration significantly increased aggregate welfare, but the gains were unevenly distributed. Producing regions gained up to nearly 6% of their GDP. Since the regions that made most welfare gains were also the poorest in their countries, market integration mitigated inequality between regions. Within the southern United States and Java, plantation owners obtained most gains, causing a substantial increase in inequality between persons.
We provide an introduction to the world economy. World population levels have risen drastically since 1800, in conjunction with (per capita) income levels. Economic leadership regularly shifts from one country to another. Rich countries are usually well connected in terms of international trade, contacts, investments, migration and capital flows. Historians have identified two big ‘waves’ of economic globalisation: at the end of the nineteenth century and after World War II. These episodes show decreases in international price gaps and increases in relative international trade- and capital flows. The ‘fragmentation’ process, in which different parts of goods are provided in different nations before they are combined in final goods, is a relatively new phenomenon. The most recent wave of globalisation is slowing down at the moment (slowbalisation), but it remains to be seen how much the backlash against globalisation will affect trade- and cross-border investment in the years to come.
Wheat market integration between the US and the UK before the “first era of globalization” (in the second half of the nineteenth century) was frequently interrupted by policy and “exogenous” events such as wars. This paper adds Canada to this story by looking at trade and price data, as well as contemporary debates. This allows us to triangulate the role of policy and wars, since Canada as a small open economy was part of the British Empire. We find that, despite its privileged access to British markets, Canada faced similar barriers to the US, suggesting that membership of the British Empire provided only a modest benefit to trade. We also describe the limitations she faced accessing the US market, in particular after American independence.
Trade law and competition law have grown up in their separate silos. This means that restraints by the states and restraints by private parties are treated in separate boxes, and with few exceptions, they have been treated so through the years. Yet, some of the worst restraints that do some of the greatest damage are best characterized by the synergy between the two. These trade-and-competition, or hybrid public/private, restraints fall under the radar screen, and defendants in litigation play one set of laws off against the other, hiding behind limits and immunities. This is the Blind Spot of the Article’s title – the space between the silos. This Article unearths the Blind Spot, gives examples of what we know and what we need to know, and proposes a methodology to illuminate and eliminate the Blind Spot.
Success in marriage markets has lasting impacts on women's wellbeing. By arranging marriages, parents exert financial and social powers to influence spouse characteristics and ensure optimal marriages. While arranging marriages is a major focus of parental investment, marriage decisions are also a source of conflict between parents and daughters in which parents often have more power. The process of market integration may alter parental investment strategies, however, increasing children's bargaining power and reducing parents’ influence over children's marriage decisions. We use data from a market integrating region of Bangladesh to (a) describe temporal changes in marriage types, (b) identify which women enter arranged marriages and (c) determine how market integration affects patterns of arranged marriage. Most women's marriages were arranged, with love marriages more recent. We found few predictors of who entered arranged vs. love marriages, and family-level market integration did not predict marriage type at the individual level. However, based on descriptive findings, and findings relating women's and fathers’ education to groom characteristics, we argue that at the society-level market integration has opened a novel path in which daughters use their own status, gained via parental investments, to facilitate good marriages under conditions of reduced parental assistance or control.
An understanding of how the money market developed is vital because money serves as the blood of an economy. From 1800 to 1937, the Chinese money market transitioned from a highly fragmented bimetallic system to a gradually integrated silver yuan system in tandem with a silver-backed fiduciary paper-money system until a fiat money system was established. As a consequence, the economy became increasingly monetized as the growth rate of the money supply gradually surpassed the overall economic growth rate without evident inflation pressure on general price trends. This development resulted both from the efforts of governments and private institutions in response to various types of shock separately and from the outcomes of competition and co-operation between the two stakeholders over time.
American pro-market conservatives often oppose use of federal authority to rein in anti-competitive behavior by market actors. Competitive barriers, whether created by local jurisdictions or the absence of national competitive rules, go unaddressed. In international comparison, especially considering the European Union's use of central authority for market openness, this is quite puzzling. Based on interviews and archival research, I trace inattention to market barriers to contradictions within Hayek's neoliberalism and an enthusiastic reception within the American academy of one possible interpretation of those writings. This conception of markets—competitive federalism—diffused into the conservative law and economics movements, think tanks, and eventually mainstream conservative politics. It permitted conservatism to align a strong pro-market rhetoric with demands for states’ rights and federal retrenchment, albeit side-stepping many significant issues in economic theory and policy. Thus, conservatives pursue spending and tax cuts, deregulation and decentralization, often to the detriment of market openness.
This chapter considers to what extent ‘geography’, broadly conceived, mattered for economic growth across the globe. First, it sets out the pattern of comparative aggregate growth between 1700 and 1870 and documents the east to west shift in the global distribution of economic activity. The next section surveys the comparative evidence on key first nature (or physical) geography characteristics that are potentially critical for long run economic development. This is followed by a discussion of second nature geography (the ’geography of interactions between economic agents’) and a quantitative assessment of the extent to which first nature characteristics, second nature geographical forces and institutional quality can account for income differentials across a sample of major economies in America, Asia, and Europe. Finally, a case study on shifting comparative advantage in the textile industry illustrates the outcomes of technical change within a changing global economic geography. The chapter concludes that changes in trade costs, agglomeration economies and differential access to markets with associated productivity gains probably played a major role in moving the economic centre of gravity. The West became absolutely and relatively richer than the East, not only because of better institutions but also because of more favourable geographies.
This chapter describes broad regional and temporal trends in the evolution of international trade and international factor flows between 1700 and 1870, including key differences in trade costs across space and time. We find trade links in western Europe and the European colonies of North America intensified at the same time these regions experienced the initial Industrial Revolution and the spread of industrialization, which led to sustained economic growth. At the same time, global differences in specialization and income emerged. To understand the contribution of global market forces as well as colonialism to these differences, the chapter lays out theoretical reasons for links between trade and economic growth and examines related historical arguments and evidence. We conclude that trade contributed to global divergence, but the magnitude and mechanisms through which trade affected global welfare lies not so much in the direct impact of trade and specialization as in multiplier effects emerging from the interactions of trade with other factors that affect economic development.
Acting on socially learned information involves risk, especially when the consequences imply certain costs with uncertain benefits. Current evolutionary theories argue that decision-makers evaluate and respond to this information based on context cues, such as prestige (the prestige bias model) and/or incentives (the risk and incentives model). We tested the roles of each in explaining trust using a preregistered vignette-based study involving advice about livestock among Maasai pastoralists. In exploratory analyses, we also investigated how the relevance of each might be influenced by recent cultural and economic changes, such as market integration and shifting cultural values. Our confirmatory analysis failed to support the prestige bias model, and partially supported the risk and incentives model. Exploratory analyses suggested that regional acculturation varied strongly between northern vs. southern areas, divided by a small mountain. Consistent with the idea that trust varies with socially transmitted values and regional differences in market integration, people living near densely populated towns in the southern region were more likely to trust socially learned information about livestock. Higher trust among market-integrated participants might reflect a coordination solution in a region where traditional pastoralism is beset with novel conflicts of interest.
Pre-industrial money supply typically consisted of multiple, often foreign currencies. Standard economic theory implies that this entails welfare loss due to transaction costs imposed by currency exchange. Through a study of novel data on Finnish nineteenth-century parish-level currency conditions, we show that individual currencies had principal areas of circulation, with extensive co-circulation restricted to the boundary regions in between. We show that trade networks, defined here through the regional co-movement of grain prices, proved crucial in determining the currency used. Market institutions and standard price mechanisms had an apparent role in the spread of different currencies and in determining the dominant currency in a given region. Our findings provide a caveat for the widely held assumption that associates multi-currency systems with negative trade externalities.
Cattle are costly to transport, which could lead to segmented regional cattle markets. The cointegration of cattle prices over regions has been of research interest for decades. This article investigates price cointegration between regional cattle markets in the United States and proposes a simple procedure for incorporating a flexible transition function into an economic indicator–controlled smooth transition autoregressive (ECON-STAR) model to evaluate market dynamics. The empirical results show that these markets have been highly integrated when excess supply exists, but when cattle inventories decrease, the market pattern becomes very regionally segmented.
This article studies the financial market integration in the 1670s by examining the effectiveness of triangular exchange arbitrage. The results suggest that international credit markets based on bills of exchange in northwestern Europe were well integrated and responded to exchange-rate differences quickly. The speed of adjustment, ranging between one and three weeks, accorded with the speed of communication, but the transaction cost associated with exchange arbitrage was much lower than that of shipping bullion. Although warfare had a disruptive effect on exchange arbitrage by increasing transaction cost, markets were resilient in remaining efficient.
We propose the concept of the “Fish Revolution” to demarcate the dramatic increase in North Atlantic fisheries after AD 1500, which led to a 15-fold increase of cod (Gadus morhua) catch volumes and likely a tripling of fish protein to the European market. We consider three key questions: (1) What were the environmental parameters of the Fish Revolution? (2) What were the globalising effects of the Fish Revolution? (3) What were the consequences of the Fish Revolution for fishing communities? While these questions would have been considered unknowable a decade or two ago, methodological developments in marine environmental history and historical ecology have moved information about both supply and demand into the realm of the discernible. Although much research remains to be done, we conclude that this was a major event in the history of resource extraction from the sea, mediated by forces of climate change and globalisation, and is likely to provide a fruitful agenda for future multidisciplinary research.
Recently, new research has challenged the traditional narrative; Spain did not suffer from a ruler that threatened his subjects’ property with excessive taxes and forced loans. Instead, Spanish economic development was held back by decentralised and non-predatory governance, unable to solve the coordination problems blocking the way to more integrated markets. Through the analysis of the governance and loan portfolios of an ecclesiastical order, this paper examines the extent to which mortgage credit markets were fragmented in early modern Spain. This order not only collected resources that it subsequently lent but also pooled them. Indeed, it developed into a nationally integrated organisation able to offer everything from small loans to farmers to substantial amounts to the king and the Madrid elite.
Several studies indicate an integrated global market for salmon. However, there is increasing evidence of market segmentation for various seafood species. A disease crisis in Chile that reduced production by two-thirds provides a strong market shock that can shed light on how strongly integrated the salmon market is. Our results indicate that Chilean producers changed the product mix and export markets as a result of the disease shock. Yet, the relative prices remained constant, indicating a high degree of market integration. Moreover, Chilean prices are endogenous to the Norwegian price, indicating that prices are determined at the global market.