Chapter 3 develops a theory of the domestic politics of intra-industry trade. It argues that changes in the nature of trade away from endowments-based trade to two-way trade within industries change the structure of preferences over trade policy and the way that actors mobilize politically in order to influence trade policy. This, in turn, affects trade policy outcomes and the ease with which trade agreements are concluded. First, I argue that the distributional effects of intra-industry trade drive a wedge through industry preferences over trade policy. As intra-industry trade increases, globalized firms support openness, and smaller, domestic-oriented firms within the same industry support protection. Second, these heterogeneous firm preferences change the ability of industries to overcome collective action problems and organize politically to influence trade policy. I argue that industry associations are hamstrung in their ability to lobby while individual firms have a greater incentive to lobby alone for their preferred policies. Third, exporters will overwhelm domestic-oriented firms in their ability to lobby, and as a result, tariffs will be lower in industries with higher intra-industry trade, though this may not be the case with non-tariff barriers to trade.

This short chapter asks what Paul might say if he were alive today. How might he rearticulate his message to the Galatians in ways that address our dangerously discordant world?

The chapter reproduces Gopalan’s speech delivered at the International Criminal Court’s 20th anniversary conference at The Hague in 2022, examining intersectional approaches to investigating and prosecuting sexual and gender-based crimes in international criminal law. Gopalan explains intersectionality as an analytical framework that reveals how multiple identities and systems of oppression shape international crimes. Through case studies including Korean "comfort women," Srebrenica’s Muslim women, and Tamil male survivors in Sri Lanka, she demonstrates how factors like gender, colonialism, class, ethnicity, and religion intersect to create distinct patterns of harm and victimisation. Gopalan argues that while gender analysis has advanced understanding of sexual violence, examining gender alone is insufficient. Her analysis reveals how intersectional approaches can uncover overlooked structural inequalities and make visible what might otherwise remain unseen, enabling more comprehensive and survivor-responsive justice processes. The speech argues for expanding investigative and prosecutorial frameworks beyond single-axis analysis to better serve the complex realities of survivors.

Chapter 7 focuses on the assassination of Mohamed Boudia, who died in a car explosion in a fancy Parisian neighbourhood on 28 June 1973. The chapter discusses the cables sent by French intelligence updating Club de Berne members and Mossad about the police investigation (despite widespread rumours that Mossad was likely behind these killings). Boudia, a top Black September terrorist, was in charge of various terrorist attacks and this chapter details what intelligence agencies knew about these attacks and Boudia’s involvement. At the time, he was preparing an attack against the Schönau transit camp near Vienna, where Jewish migrants stayed on their way to Israel from the Soviet Union. The chapter highlights how Mossad used Club de Berne intelligence for Operation Wrath of God. In particular, the Schönau investigation was used by Mossad as a pretext to gather information on Boudia. In particular, intelligence provided by the Swiss intelligence agency was very useful for Mossad to organise the killing mission against Boudia.

The book concludes by synthesizing the major findings and discussing the compelling questions it raises about future trade policy negotiations. This chapter focuses on the troubling implications of a lobbying landscape dominated by individual firms. It discusses the ways that intra-industry trade may increase societal inequality, as well as links between firm lobbying and the societal backlash to hyperglobalization. The chapter also provides policy recommendations and fruitful areas of future research based on the findings of this study.

Reinach believed that basic legal concepts exist, that their existence is independent of the positive law, and their existence is independent of moral obligation. In this idiosyncratic juxtaposition of positions, Reinach is joined by contemporary theorists drawing on evolutionary psychology and cognitive science in jurisprudence. But Reinach emphatically insisted that his claims were ontological, not psychological. This chapter explains why. For Reinach himself, the ontological status of legal concepts was one front in a broader debate over whether basic mathematical and logical concepts were true a priori or features of human psychology; a demonstrative project in the breadth of the a priori. But it is suggested that today’s theorists need not be as preoccupied with this distinction as Reinach was. Not only is the practical difference between ontological and evolutionary theories not as wide as Reinach seems to have assumed, but arguments for metaphysical reality in other domains are substantially less persuasive as applied to Reinach’s legal concepts.

The introduction provides an overview of the book, presents the core arguments, highlights the contribution to current literature, explains the book’s methods and sources, and outlines the structure of the book. The overarching argument of the book is that intelligence cooperation was so beneficial for all parties that European authorities therefore let Mossad carry out its operation and tolerated the use of its intelligence to kill Palestinians. Hence, the book demonstrates that the extensive advantages that European agencies gained through Club de Berne intelligence-sharing led them to turn a blind eye towards, or even tacitly support, Israeli covert actions on their respective territories.

Chapter 7 tests the four mechanisms of socialization derived from the qualitative data formally with original survey data from Cameroon. The analysis shows that, first, people raised in partisan households are much more likely to adopt partisan identities later in life than people raised in apolitical households. Second, party militants are more politically influential in their social networks than regular partisans or nonpartisans. Third, the partisan homogeneity of contemporary social networks is highly predictive of individual partisanship. Finally, because of the nature of politics in electoral autocracies, opposition partisans face higher levels of cross-partisan influence than ruling party partisans.