Urban–rural divides are large and growing in many national elections, but the sources of this widening divide are not well understood. Recent research has pointed to policy disagreement as one possible mechanism for this growing divide; if urban and rural residents hold increasingly dissimilar policy preferences, this disagreement could produce ever‐widening urban–rural electoral divides. We investigate this possibility by creating a synthesized dataset of nearly 1000 policy issue questions across 10 distinct Canadian national election studies conducted between 1993 and 2021 (N = 5.3 million), combined with a measure of the urban or rural character of every federal electoral district. This dataset allows us to measure urban–rural policy disagreement across a much larger range of policy issues and over a much longer time period than has previously been possible. We find strong evidence of urban–rural policy disagreement across a range of issues, and especially in areas of cultural policy, including questions relating to gun control, immigration and Indigenous affairs. We further find strong support for the ‘progressive cities’ hypothesis; in nearly all policy domains, urban residents support more left‐wing positions on policy issues than rural residents. However, we find no evidence these urban–rural policy divides have grown since the 1990s. Urban–rural policy disagreement, while large and meaningful, cannot explain the ever‐widening urban–rural political divide.

Global warming is not only a serious threat for humanity but increasingly structures political competition in Western Europe. The rise of green (niche) parties and public awareness of the issue pressure mainstream parties to emphasise climate protection. Yet, while scholars reflect on the factors influencing mainstream parties’ environmental agendas, we know little about what triggers climate standpoints and about the role public opinion plays in this process. This study measures the salience of climate protection in 292 election manifestos of mainstream parties in 10 Western European countries since the 1990s and estimates the impact of different factors on their climate agenda using OLS regressions. The findings suggest that green parties are not the driving factor, and that it is the public salience of environmental issues and pressure from the Fridays for Future movement influencing mainstream parties’ agendas. Accordingly, mainstream parties seem to be responsive to public opinion pressure adopting climate protection stances. The study further proposes a different measure of niche party success than that used in previous studies.

Almost all anti‐corruption drives contain an awareness raising element. However, recent research reveals that anti‐corruption awareness raising messages can backfire by triggering a sense that corruption is too big of a problem to tackle, thus encouraging resignation rather than resistance. We advance this literature by exploring another potential unintended impact. Corruption scandals have played a prominent role in the rise of many populist leaders, who claim to challenge ‘the corrupt status quo’. We test whether anti‐corruption messages that call attention to the problem unintentionally help to foster populist attitudes through an original survey experiment in Albania. Breaking new ground by testing messages based on descriptive (how the world is) and injunctive (how people want it to be) norms, we find that while the latter has no effect, exposure to the former – which is more common in contemporary anti‐corruption campaigns – is associated with greater agreement with populist sentiments and beliefs.

In liberal democracies, protest can serve as a trigger for necessary policy reforms, but it can also be used by a loud minority to advance political goals against the will of the majority. Focusing on such vocal protests in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic, we investigate the following question: How does the location of protest events affect the likelihood of political engagement with the protests in a multilevel system? Combining social movement literature with studies of issue attention and rhetorical responsiveness, we analyze how German members of parliaments’ (MPs) responses vary using their tweets from the onset of the pandemic to the German federal election in September 2021. Using quantitative text analysis, we measure rhetorical responsiveness to Covid-19 protests and apply multilevel regression analyses and difference-in-differences. We find that more protests lead to more attention; however, MPs respond most strongly to protests within the state they represent. Furthermore, politicians’ level within the German multilevel system affects their attention to these protests, with MPs elected at lower levels of an electoral system responding more to local protest events than MPs elected at higher levels. The results highlight the importance of the location of protests in attracting political attention.

Political accountability requires that voters understand the distribution of policy outcome responsibility among their vote choice options. Research on partisan‐motivated reasoning suggests that voters do not meet this requirement. The problem is that voters condition their attributions of responsibility to the government on their party identification. Government identifiers credit the government for desirable outcomes and blame external forces such as the global economy for undesirable outcomes. This paper draws a more optimistic conclusion. It argues that focusing on the perceived responsibility of the government and external forces is not sufficient for understanding whether voters meet the responsibility attribution requirement. It is also necessary to compare the perceived responsibility of government parties to the perceived responsibility of opposition parties because those are the options that voters get to choose from. This party distribution of perceived responsibility is analyzed with original survey data from Denmark and the United Kingdom. The results demonstrate that while party identification does indeed condition voters’ responsibility attributions, both government identifiers and independents attribute systematically more responsibility to the government than to the opposition regardless of the desirability of the outcome. This suggests that voters tend to meet the responsibility attribution requirement of accountability despite the presence of partisan‐motivated reasoning.

In the context of an ever growing importance and usage of referendums around the globe, this article provides a comprehensive approach to analyse the determinants of participation in direct democratic votes. In the absence of conclusive empirical evidence about which factors drive direct democratic participation, studies tend to adopt election-specific findings and assume the determinants of electoral turnout to equally apply for referendums. Yet, a strict empirical test of these numerous determinants in a referendum context is still missing. By examining aspects stemming from both election-specific and referendum-specific contexts, this article aims to first test the applicability of common electoral theories of turnout for direct democratic participation and second to analyse the relevance of each factor when simultaneously examined with other contextual and individual factors. This holistic approach represents reality as adequate as possible, that is, to consider various factors that may simultaneously influence the individual decision to vote. Next to individual variables, the analysis particularly focuses on two contextual levels, the community a person lives in and factors linked to a given referendum. The discussion and joint analysis of competing factors addresses the problem of underspecified turnout models, which commonly prevents a detailed assessment of the relative importance of the determinants of turnout. The study uses registered data from the canton of Geneva, Switzerland, which provides official information about individual participation across 43 referendums in 45 communities. We match this individual data with referendum-related factors, such as campaign intensity and importance of the issues at stake, and community-level variables, such as wealth and urbanization. The results of our multilevel, cross-classified models show significant context-related effects, stemming mainly from the referendum and less from the community level. Still, the main driver of direct democratic participation is individual determinants, in particular citizens' past participation record.

The paper introduces a deep‐learning model fine‐tuned for detecting authoritarian discourse in political speeches. Set up as a regression problem with weak supervision logic, the model is trained for the task of classification of segments of text for being/not being associated with authoritarian discourse. Rather than trying to define what an authoritarian discourse is, the model builds on the assumption that authoritarian leaders inherently define it. In other words, authoritarian leaders talk like authoritarians. When combined with the discourse defined by democratic leaders, the model learns the instances that are more often associated with authoritarians on the one hand and democrats on the other. The paper discusses several evaluation tests using the model and advocates for its usefulness in a broad range of research problems. It presents a new methodology for studying latent political concepts and positions as an alternative to more traditional research strategies.

Affective polarization is increasingly evident around the world. This has been attributed in part to residential segregation by partisanship. The ‘Big Sort’ has meant that neighbourhoods in the United States, and elsewhere, have become more homogenous in terms of vote. Yet there is little systematic evidence on the relationship between homogenous partisan neighbourhoods and affective polarization. Does living among fellow partisans make people more negative towards the other side? In this Research Note, we use unique data from Britain to show that while people accurately recognize that their local area is more or less politically homogenous, neighbourhood political homogeneity is not correlated with any measure of affective polarization. These findings are robust to the type of political divide (partisanship or Brexit identity), the level of geography, length of residence and controls for ideology and social characteristics. We therefore suggest that while geographical sorting is an important phenomenon, it is unlikely to be a major cause of affective polarization.

In 2013, the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke established National Institutes of Health (NIH) StrokeNet to support multi-site clinical trials focused on stroke prevention, treatment, and recovery. The University of Cincinnati (UC) serves as the National Coordinating Center for StrokeNet. As part of the initiative, the UC StrokeNet Central IRB (SN-CIRB) was established at UC to serve as a single IRB to oversee StrokeNet trials. Since the SN-CIRB approved the first StrokeNet study in 2014, it has reviewed and approved 16 additional studies. Over this period, the UC Human Research Protection Program refined its review processes based on insights from earlier reviews. These improvements have improved efficiency while still ensuring the protection of study participants. The successful implementation and ongoing conduct of the SN-CIRB at UC demonstrate that an academic-based IRB can effectively serve as a Central IRB for a large clinical trial network.

Elite interviewing is a valuable tool that helps political scientists to understand decision making, trace political processes, and access insider knowledge. Yet despite its prevalence, we know surprisingly little about how elite interviews are conducted and reported in the discipline. This study addresses this gap by examining elite interviewing practices and transparency using an original dataset of articles published in 13 leading political science journals between 2000 and 2023. Drawing on article content and supplementary materials, I analyze trends in the use and quality of elite interviews, highlighting an increasing reliance on this method, particularly in comparative politics. Findings show promising improvements in reporting practices over time. Systematic reporting and the inclusion of online appendices significantly enhance transparency, offering detailed insights into ethical considerations, confidentiality, and data-sharing practices. This study underscores the evolving rigor in reporting elite interviewing, reflecting its enduring relevance and growing methodological sophistication in political science research.

Electoral integrity is increasingly being recognised as an important component of democracy, yet scholars still have limited understanding of the circumstances under which elections are most likely to be free, fair and genuine. This article posits that effective oversight institutions play a key role in scrutinising the electoral process and holding those with an interest in the electoral outcome to account. The main insight is that deficiencies in formal electoral management can be effectively compensated for via one or more other institutional checks: an active and independent judiciary; an active and independent media; and/or an active and independent civil society. Flawed elections are most likely to take place when all four checks on electoral conduct fail in key ways. These hypotheses are tested and supported on a cross‐national time‐series dataset of 1,047 national‐level elections held in 156 electoral regimes between 1990 and 2012.

We consider a normal operator $T$ on a Hilbert space $H$. Under various assumptions on the spectrum of $T$, we give bounds for the spectrum of $T+A$ where $A$ is $T$-bounded with relative bound less than 1 but we do not assume that $A$ is symmetric or normal. If the imaginary part of the spectrum of $T$ is bounded, then the spectrum of $T+A$ is contained in the region between two hyperbolas whose asymptotic slope depends on the $T$-bound of $A$. If the spectrum of $T$ is contained in a bisector, then the spectrum of $T+A$ is contained in the area between certain rotated hyperbolas. The case of infinitely many gaps in the spectrum of $T$ is studied. Moreover, we prove a stability result for the essential spectrum of $T+A$. If $A$ is even $p$-subordinate to $T$, then we obtain stronger results for the localisation of the spectrum of $T+A$.

The European Union (EU) has laboured hard to gain the right to make oral interventions in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in pursuit of a more active international role. At the same time, though, EU member-states continue to take the floor to make their own interventions, thus differentiating – but not necessarily distancing – their stance from the officially expressed EU position. In that respect, it is important to examine the drivers behind the differentiating activity of EU member-states and their engagement in UNGA deliberations. We identify structural, institutional, political and thematic drivers. They relate to resources, the EU system of external representation in the form of the EU rotating Council Presidency and the opportunities that it provides during each country's period in office, national political aspirations for greater influence, as well as issue-specific assertiveness. We operationalize and control for these drivers by looking at the size and economic resources of EU member-states, their individual statements while holding the EU rotating Council Presidency, their membership in the UN Security Council (UNSC) or candidacy for it, and the issue specificity of each UNGA Main Committee. Our analysis is based on a three-level longitudinal multilevel random intercept model and relies upon a new dataset that compiles the oral interventions made by representatives of EU member-states and by EU officials in UNGA through an automated content analysis of the verbatim records of the UNGA meetings from 1998 to 2017.

This study explores the gender wage gap in Türkiye between 2013 and 2022 using a novel 10-year panel dataset constructed with administrative data compiled for the first time in Türkiye, which includes approximately 14 million full-year workers in 360 subgroups by demographic, sectoral, and occupational factors. The analysis examines the long-term effects of demographic factors, such as age, education, and marital status, as well as the work-related factors, including occupation and employment sector, on the gender wage gap. The findings reveal that men working full-time in formal employment earn 10.1% more than women in Türkiye, and the study shows evidence of how the gender wage gap varies across different demographic groups. The results obtained emphasise the significant roles of marital status, occupation, age, and sector in explaining the wage differential, while education is shown not have a meaningful long-term impact on the wage gap. Moreover, contrary to expectations, the study confirms that occupational experience, the aging labour force, and increased female labour force participation contribute to the widening of the gender wage gap. These findings underline the need for targeted economic and social policies to address gender-based wage differences in a country where the labour force participation of women has traditionally been outstandingly low. This study aims to contribute to the literature by providing a comprehensive analysis of a large-scale dataset that offers new insights into gender wage differences.

When individuals are confronted with information about why and where gender quotas should apply, does it affect their attitudes? A growing literature argues that information affects opinions on gender equality, but so far there is more consensus on who supports such policies than on what type of information convinces those on the fence. Using a survey experiment fielded among Norwegian citizens and elected representatives, we examine the potential of new rationales and different areas of application to find out what makes (some) people more supportive of gender quotas. Overall, we find that citizens are more affected by moral arguments than elected representatives. Among citizens, we find that emphasizing women's distinct insights boosts support among those with less fixed opinions, and that a talent framing hinting at women as an untapped resource might cause the opposite reaction. Representatives are affected by information about where gender quotas apply, as they are particularly sensitive to information on gender quotas in politics. Quite unexpectedly, we find that those on the right are more supportive of gender quotas in the leadership of religious institutions than elsewhere, and that this seems to be driven at least partly by scepticism against migrants.

In research on public economics, climate politics and the welfare state, voters' informational and cognitive biases are commonly understood as impeding future‐oriented policy‐making, by incentivizing policymakers to trade off long‐term investments against short‐term consumption when facing competitive elections or liquidity constraints. Yet, the assumptions about how policymakers perceive these alleged trade‐offs have not yet been verified. This study reports results from a survey of Swedish local government politicians, centring around experiments about environmental‐friendly public investments. We find that most politicians perceive that electoral competition stimulates rather than impedes investments. Politicians are, however, less supportive of investments if these need to be financed through absolute losses rather than gains foregone, which illustrates the relevance of endowment effects in long‐term governance. We furthermore show that our micro‐level observations are consistent with macro‐level investment expenditure patterns. These findings demonstrate that accounting for policymakers' own perceptions is important for advancing our understanding of future‐oriented policy‐making.

Hyderabad, the fourth-most populous city in India, accounts for the majority of people living with human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) (PLWH) in Telangana, likely comprised of two populations with a disproportionately high national HIV prevalence: gay, bisexual, and other men who have sex with men (MSM) and those who engage in sex work (SW). Research has shown that engaging in SW increases vulnerability to HIV transmission risk for both women and MSM, but less is known about contributors to non-optimal (ART) adherence. We analyzed data from 45 MSM and 49 women living with HIV who were enrolled in the first year of data collection from an mHealth education study in Hyderabad. Modified Poisson regression was used to measure factors associated with ART adherence measured with a visual analogue scale (VAS) (model 1) and pill count (model 2). Less than half (40.9%) reported ever engaging in SW, including 13 women and 25 MSM. The prevalence of non-optimal ART adherence was 14.9% with VAS and 42.4% with pill count. Engaging in SW was not associated with non-optimal ART adherence. Differences in non-optimal ART adherence measured by VAS and pill count suggest that future studies should utilize both methods to better distinguish the measures.

Authoritarian incumbents routinely use democratic emulation as a strategy to extend their tenure in power. Yet, there is also evidence that multiparty competition makes electoral authoritarianism more vulnerable to failure. Proceeding from the assumption that the outcomes of authoritarian electoral openings are inherently uncertain, it is argued in this article that the institutionalisation of elections determines whether electoral authoritarianism promotes stability or vulnerability. By ‘institutionalisation’, it is meant the ability of authoritarian regimes to reduce uncertainty over outcomes as they regularly hold multiparty elections. Using discrete‐time event‐history models for competing risks, the effects of sequences of multiparty elections on patterns of regime survival and failure in 262 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010 are assessed, conditioned on their degree of competitiveness. The findings suggest that the institutionalisation of electoral uncertainty enhances authoritarian regime survival. However, for competitive electoral authoritarian regimes this entails substantial risk. The first three elections substantially increase the probability of democratisation, with the danger subsequently diminishing. This suggests that convoking multiparty competition is a risky game with potentially high rewards for autocrats who manage to institutionalise elections. Yet, only a small number of authoritarian regimes survive as competitive beyond the first few elections, suggesting that truly competitive authoritarianism is hard to institutionalise. The study thus finds that the question of whether elections are dangerous or stabilising for authoritarianism is dependent on differences between the ability of competitive and hegemonic forms of electoral authoritarianism to reduce electoral uncertainty.

Partisan‐based affective polarization has been posited as a key explanation for citizens' tolerance towards democratic backsliding, with voters more likely to overlook democratic violations conducted by in‐party candidates. Our study theorizes and empirically explores the reverse perspective on this relationship: focusing on the role of the opposition, we submit that backsliding may crystallize an affective dislike among opposition supporters towards the governing party and its supporters that stems from a regime divide over democracy itself. To probe the plausibility of this argument, we leverage original survey data collected in Hungary, where democratic backsliding under the Fidesz government has resulted in an extensive remodelling of the political system since 2010. Our results point to a government–opposition divide in partisan affect and show how liberal democratic attitudes, especially among opposition party supporters, play into this dynamic. We suggest that where backsliding persists over a longer period, this process can shift even multi‐party systems towards increasing bipolarity along what we term a ‘democratic divide’. Ultimately, our study proposes a novel lens on the dynamics of democratic backsliding by suggesting that affective polarization may play a positive role in backsliding contexts by uniting the opposition around the defence of democracy. Our findings point to a number of future research avenues to further analyse the interactive relationship between democratic backsliding and affective polarization.

Few political parties are willing to lead the public debate on how the European Union should develop and parties rarely publicly discuss issues on the EU agenda. This is probably one of the most important democratic problems in the contemporary EU. When and why parties are willing (or not willing) to discuss European cooperation is therefore an essential issue in which political science should engage. Previous research has shown that parties that are internally divided on EU issues downplay these issues in order to avoid internal disputes. At the same time, parties that have severe intraparty conflicts over the issue are unable to contain the debate. Thus, parties that are unified in their position on EU issues and parties that are heavily split speak about the EU, but others do not. Also, earlier research has shown that political parties downplay issues in response to internal divisions among their supporters. It is argued in this article that the focus should not be solely on intraparty conflict or whether or not a party's voters are hesitant or disunited, but rather on how these factors interact in order to better understand how parties act strategically regarding EU issues. Using a new dataset that relies on quantitative content analysis of quality newspapers during the national election campaigns in the period 1983–2010 in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden, it is found that parties that have a high degree of internal dissent on European issues, while at the same time having an equally divided electorate, are the parties that are most present in the public debate. Hence, it is the interaction between these two important factors that explains much of the variation in the amount of attention paid to European issues in national election campaigns.