In numerous climate litigation cases before national courts, plaintiffs have referred to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and/or the Paris Agreement to support their claims. So far, no systematic appraisal has been conducted on how national courts have responded to such references to international climate law and the extent to which they have engaged with it. This article examines 148 cases in which plaintiffs refer to international climate law, mapping and analyzing judgments of national courts that either avoid, align with, or contest this legal framework. The findings indicate that invoking international climate law is not an easy path to success, as courts often have opted to avoid engagement with claims based on international climate law. Yet, in several landmark cases, courts have aligned with international climate law, contributing to the advancement of the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), founded in Paris in 1946 by a group of antifascist lawyers, has long been dismissed as a Soviet front organization. Yet, this characterization overlooks its complex and multifaceted history. This paper reassesses IADL’s first thirty years, exploring its origins, internal debates, and cross-border engagement. Drawing on archival records, this article argues that—despite a period of Communist influence—the IADL contributed to international legal and political discourse by advancing an original approach defined here as radical legal internationalism. Through this framework, IADL lawyers questioned Cold War ideological boundaries and brought into dialogue Communist, progressive, New Left, decolonial, and liberal rights traditions. The article also uncovers the IADL’s significant role in promoting international law and human rights through trial observation, UN advocacy, and missions of inquiry. In challenging the dominant account of the Left’s delayed and uneasy embrace of human rights, this article calls for a broader understanding of Cold War-era legal internationalism and highlights an alternative tradition of legal activism.

At least some people want to be loved simply for being the particular individuals they are, as distinct from any properties they might possess. However, the most prominent theories in contemporary philosophical work on love are framed so as to exclude that possibility. In this article, I argue that Christians have the resources to say that one can be loved for oneself if they appeal to the love God has for his creatures in making them from nothing. This article comprises four sections. In the first two sections, I introduce and characterize the desire to be loved for oneself, distinguishing the relevant desideratum from other, similar phenomena. In the third section, I note that the appraisal and bestowal views exclude the possibility that one could be loved for oneself in the relevant sense and note some other possible, initial objections. Finally, in the fourth section, I attempt to show one way in which God can be said to love his creatures in creating them – despite the fact that they do not exist before their own creation. I do so by attempting to show that, plausibly, there is a sense in which, if God engages in the creative act for its own sake and the creature itself is that act seen under a certain aspect, God can plausibly be said to create the creature for its own sake – and so, plausibly, to create it in love.