This paper analyzes two ideal-type signaling interactions that are fundamental to international relations: reassurance and coercive bargaining. In reassurance, states attempt to signal that their goals are compatible in order to avoid conflict, whereas in coercive bargaining, they attempt to inflate the incompatibility of their goals in order to increase their negotiating leverage over a disputed asset. This article conceptualizes these two types of signaling interaction and delineates semi-overlapping conditions under which each obtains. It then identifies three ways in which credible signaling occurs differently in reassurance versus coercive bargaining. First, the directional effects of power shifts are reversed in each interaction, generating incentives for rising states to misrepresent in reassurance but not in bargaining. Second, whereas signals that are costless to honest, high-resolve senders are widely available in bargaining, the most prominent reassurance signals are typically costly even to honest senders with benign intentions. Third, it is often difficult to infer which issue area motivates senders’ behaviors in reassurance, whereas in bargaining senders have incentives to reveal which issues they prioritize. In combination, these distinctions suggest that reassurance is systematically more difficult than signaling high resolve.

Protecting beneficiaries’ privacy in fundraising has become a common practice in real-world charitable campaigns. However, empirical research directly examining how such privacy protection influences individuals’ donation behavior remains unexplored. This research compares different face anonymization techniques (partial-face and full-face anonymization) with no anonymization on donation amount, and explores the mediating roles of empathy and credibility, as well as the moderating role of need for cognition (NFC). We conducted two studies and used ANOVA and bootstrap analysis to assess these effects. The results showed that partial-face anonymization leads to better donation amounts compared to full-face and no anonymization, with this effect mediated by empathy toward beneficiaries and the perceived credibility of nonprofit organizations. Additionally, the comparative effect of partial-face versus no anonymization is significant for donors with high NFC but not for those with low NFC. Our findings offer several implications for charitable platforms, nonprofit organizations, and beneficiaries.

Can international organizations (IOs) effectively shape attitudes held by individuals? Under what conditions does the public perceive information supplied by IOs as more trustworthy than information provided by other authorities? With the exponential growth of social network platforms, many IOs utilize them to engage individuals directly. Building on the growing literature on IOs’ engagement with the public, we examine if and under what conditions such effort is effective. We adopt insights from the literature on information source effect to theorize that the information disseminated by IOs is more effective than that by domestic health officials in shaping individuals’ attitudes when the IOs are portrayed as impartial and equipped with expertise in the relevant issue area. We test the hypotheses in the context of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the COVID-19-related measures. Our analysis of the survey experiment with a sample of 2865 Americans shows that political independents trust COVID-19-related information provided by the WHO more than information supplied by domestic public health officials, especially when the professional expertise the WHO staff commands is highlighted. In comparison, our analysis indicates that the information source effect is muted when information is delivered to individuals with strongly held existing attitudes, Democrats and Republicans in the case of COVID-19-related information in the United States.

In information environments characterized by institutional distrust, fragmentation and the widespread dissemination of conspiracies and disinformation, citizens perceive misinformation as a salient and threatening issue. Especially amidst disruptive events and crises, news users are likely to believe that information is inaccurate or deceptive. Using an original 19‐country comparative survey study across diverse regions in the world (N = 19,037), we find that news users are likely to regard information on the Russian war in Ukraine as false. They are more likely to attribute false information to deliberative deception than to a lack of access to the war area or inaccurate expert knowledge. Russian sources are substantially more likely to be blamed for falsehoods than Ukrainian or Western sources – but these attribution biases depend on a country's position on the war. Our findings reveal that people mostly believe that falsehoods are intended to deceive them, and selectively associate misinformation with the opposed camp.

Uncertain political boundaries and formal cooptation institutions often make NGOs in China self-censor on sensitive issues. A growing body of literature has focused on various strategies NGOs proactively adopt to circumvent formal restrictions and manage the risk of participation. However, a comparative case study from a four-month fieldwork in this paper reveals a previously neglected aspect of state-NGO interaction, i.e., how do NGOs perceive and process the information they get? We find that endorsement outside of the formal institution—a retired official in our case—is not perceived as credible because the retired official does not have to bear the consequence of miscalculation. On the contrary, endorsement from local supervision institution is perceived as credible. Paradoxically, the credibility comes from the institutional design that originally intends to make restriction and monitoring effective. Our study suggests that while NGOs have various ways to seek endorsement, not all of them are perceived as credible. State, as the creator of uncertainty in the first place, is also the ultimate solution for it.

Thomas Schelling’s 1966 classic, Arms and Influence, became one of the major strategic works of the Cold War, and it remains the clearest argument for the implicit logic of American and Russian coercive forms of diplomacy. Schelling is incisive about the credibility of deterrence, but the credibility of leadership is reduced to the Cold War assumption that power is decisive. While the rise of China and Putin’s invasion of Ukraine have rekindled interest in Schelling’s approach, the diffusion of agency and the interrelationship of issues in the current multinodal era have undermined the efficacy of hegemonic coercion. Rather than restoring Cold War bipolarity, the rise of China has created an asymmetric parity with the United States in which overlapping interdependencies inhibit the formation of camps. In the new era, the pursuit of strategic advantage by any state, large or small, must aim at securing its multidimensional welfare in a complex and unpredictable environment. The global powers are not hegemonic contenders, but rather the largest powers in a multinodal matrix of autonomous states in which each confronts uncertainty. A strategy based on coercion is likely to be less effective against its targets and more costly in its collateral effects. In a post-hegemonic era, Schelling’s premise that arms are the primary path to influence must be reexamined.

The quality of research across psychology needs improvement. Ample evidence has indicated that publication bias, specifically making publication decisions based on a study’s results, has led to a distorted literature (e.g., high rates of false positives). Registered Reports, which can now be submitted to Development and Psychopathology, are a recent publication format designed to combat publication bias and problematic research practices. The format represents a shift from a system in which publication decisions are based on the nature of the findings, to one that is based on the quality of the study conceptualization and design. In this invited Views article, we introduce the Registered Reports format to Development and Psychopathology by arguing that they can and should be used in developmental psychopathology research. We first describe what Registered Reports are and why they are useful. We then review 10 commonly expressed concerns about publishing Registered Reports – including that they are not appropriate for studies using preexisting data, that they do not allow for exploratory analyses, and that they take too long to publish – explaining why these concerns are unwarranted. We hope that this article will allay concerns about publishing Registered Reports, and that readers will submit them to Development and Psychopathology.

Alliance formation typically entails some risk of abandonment, wherein an ally may not honor its obligations in the future. When potential security partners’ preferences are misaligned, this risk looms large, discouraging mutually beneficial investment in an alliance. How can a prospective ally credibly reassure an uncertain patron that their preferences align, to mitigate abandonment risks and elicit a security commitment? We show formally that pre-alliance bargaining with third parties is one way to do so. When the patron holds abandonment concerns, the prospective ally can reassure the patron by making greater concessions to the patron’s existing allies, but more hard-line demands of its rivals. This finding implies that the prospect of an alliance can alternately promote conflict with a prospective patron’s enemies and forestall conflict with its friends. Indeed, we show that incentives for pre-alliance reassurance can result in war, even with perfect asset divisibility, no commitment problems, and complete information among the belligerents. The results are illustrated by China’s intervention in the Korean War and Australia’s post-World War II rapprochement with Japan, which were motivated largely to foster security cooperation with the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively.

Credibility and intent are important but imprecise legal categories that need to be assessed in criminal trials as neither common nor civil legal systems provide decision-makers with clear rules on how to evaluate them in practice. In this article, drawing on ethnographic data from trials and deliberations in Italian courts and prosecution offices, we discuss the emotive-cognitive dynamics at play in judges’ and prosecutors’ evaluations of credibility and intent, focusing on cases of murder, intimate partner violence and rape. Using sociological concepts of epistemic emotions, empathy, frame and legal encoding, we show that legal professionals use different reflexive practices to either avoid settling on feelings of certainty or overcome doubts when evaluating credibility and intent. Empathy emerges as a multifaceted tool that can either generate certainty or be used deliberately to instigate or overcome doubts. We contribute to the growing body of literature addressing the emotional dynamics of legal decision-making.

Central banks are increasingly communicating their economic outlook in an effort to manage the public and financial market participants’ expectations. We provide original causal evidence that the information communicated and the assumptions underlying a central bank’s projection can matter for expectation formation and aggregate stability. Using a between-subject design, we systematically vary the central bank’s projected forecasts in an experimental macroeconomy where subjects are incentivized to forecast the output gap and inflation. Without projections, subjects exhibit a wide range of heuristics, with the modal heuristic involving a significant backward-looking component. Ex-Ante Rational dual projections of the output gap and inflation significantly reduce the number of subjects’ using backward-looking heuristics and nudge expectations in the direction of the rational expectations equilibrium. Ex-Ante Rational interest rate projections are cognitively challenging to employ and have limited effects on the distribution of heuristics. Adaptive dual projections generate unintended inflation volatility by inducing boundedly-rational forecasters to employ the projection and model-consistent forecasters to utilize the projection as a proxy for aggregate expectations. All projections reduce output gap disagreement but increase inflation disagreement. Central bank credibility is significantly diminished when the central bank makes larger forecast errors when communicating a relatively more complex projection. Our findings suggest that inflation-targeting central banks should strategically ignore agents’ irrationalities when constructing their projections and communicate easy-to-process information.