To sustain a protracted war after losing foreign loans and reserves and being sanctioned by the Allies, Japan used its ‘internal financing mechanism’ to gobble up civilian capital through government bonds, unbacked paper currency and interest rate interventions. These tactics aggrandised the size of the monetary base and money supply in Japan’s home islands and colonies, but also created inflationary pressures. To minimise the risk of (hyper)inflation, the government encouraged civilians to save in order to enrich the capital of financial intermediaries who would then absorb the ever-increasing government bonds. The ideal failed as monetary expansion outstripped economic productivity, even though expansionary monetary policy had to be tolerable in order to supply sufficient credit for war production. Imperial Japan’s use of unsecured credit to finance the war, together with its loose exchange controls, led to the diversion of colonial hyperinflationary pressures to the home islands, multiplying the risk of implosion of the ‘internal financing mechanism’. Although draconian currency controls were subsequently introduced, they further disrupted the empire’s economic order, and eventually led to the collapse of the yen bloc.

The article investigates whether the Bank of Japan followed the so-called rules of the game under the classical gold standard. The article, by estimating a vector autoregressive model of monthly timeseries data for October 1897 to July 1914, finds that the Japanese central bank systematically raised the discount rate in response to a fall in the ratio of monetary gold to banknotes, a worsening of the trade balance, or a depreciation of the Japanese yen against the British pound. In contrast, the discount rate hardly responded to the Bank of England's Bank Rate, suggesting Japan's limited financial integration with Europe. The article argues that the Bank of Japan used the trade balance and the yen–sterling rate as the signals of a proximate or prospective movement in monetary gold. The findings, therefore, strongly suggest that the Bank of Japan sought to preserve gold convertibility as the primary objective of monetary policy. The Japanese central bank's rules-of-the-game-like behaviour challenges the semi-consensual view in the literature that violations of the rules were frequent and pervasive under the classical gold standard.

We experimentally test monetary policy decision making in a population of inexperienced central bankers. In our experiments, subjects repeatedly set the short-term interest rate for a computer economy with inflation as their target. A large majority of subjects learn to successfully control inflation by correctly putting higher weight on inflation than on the output gap. In fact, the behavior of these subjects meets a stability criterion. The subjects smooth the interest rate as the theoretical literature suggests they should in order to enhance stability of the uncertain system they face. Our study is the first to use Taylor-type rules as a framework to identify inflation weighting, stability, and interest-rate smoothing as behavioral outcomes when subjects try to achieve an inflation target.

In medieval Europe's coinage systems, introducing small-denomination coins was a significant challenge due to their higher relative production costs, often leading to shortages. To address this issue, economic theory suggests a standard formula: mint small coins as overvalued credit money on the government's account and convert them on demand at a pegged rate. This article explores the alternative methods adopted during different periods to mitigate this issue. In the early and high Middle Ages, mints employed a simple yet effective strategy: dividing larger coins into smaller units, bypassing the cost barrier. Our analysis of coin hoards from this era confirms the success of this method in preventing small change scarcity. Central and northern European minting authorities innovated with unifaced ‘hohlpfennigs’ in the late Middle Ages, utilizing cost-efficient technology. Our analysis demonstrates the absence of hohlpfennig shortages. It elucidates the economic and technological factors influencing this minting method and its eventual decline by the early sixteenth century. These historical insights underscore that small change production was primarily a supply-side challenge, offering valuable lessons for modern economic systems.

This research supports the singularity of the Spanish case. The lessons we can learn are a product of the short transition in the mid 1880s from a city-based monetary system (supported by private actors) to a central banking system in the absence of a developed banking system with a nationwide scope, unlike what occurred in the rest of Western Europe. Introducing market arbitrage, we provide novel evidence – using new data – of how price formation in city-based money markets was driven by more than one price. Furthermore, factors such as market conditions, political circumstances and the asymmetrical development of market potential in the Spanish economic geography also played an important role. We also show new empirical support that transaction cost reduction was not associated with improving efficiency during the 1875–85 period when city-based money markets were still operating. The inland payment system was struggling even before its takeover by the Bank of Spain.

The concept of monetary sovereignty employed by Modern Monetary Theory has been criticised on many fronts. One of the most important criticisms points out that Modern Monetary Theorists (MMTers) ignore or underestimate problems arising from external constraints. Another important (and complementary) criticism is that MMTers focus only on purely macroeconomic aspects and ignore political and geopolitical issues. In this paper, we discuss these important criticisms and we conclude that, although the MMT concept of monetary sovereignty is useful and can be considered an analytical advance, it is incomplete and biased because it minimises macroeconomic problems arising from external constraints and because it does not take into account international political factors.

In a series of academic publications, Edward Nelson has contended that from the 1950s until the late 1970s, UK policymakers failed to recognise the primacy of monetary policy in controlling inflation. He argues that the highwater mark of monetary policy neglect occurred in the 1970s. This thesis has been rejected by Duncan Needham who has explored several experiments with monetary policy from the late 1960s and challenged the assertion that the authorities neglected monetary policy during the 1970s. Drawing on evidence from the archives and other sources, this article documents how the UK authorities wrestled with monetary policy following the 1967 devaluation of sterling. Excessive broad money growth during the early 1970s was followed by the highest level of peacetime inflation by 1975. The article shows that despite the experiments with monetary policy, a nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the mindset of policymakers during the first half of the 1970s. In the second half of the 1970s there was a change in emphasis and monetary policy became more prominent in economic policymaking, particularly when money supply targets were introduced. Despite this, the nonmonetary view of inflation dominated the decision processes of policymakers during the 1970s.

In this paper I examine the effect of introducing an account-based central bank digital currency (CBDC) on liquidity insurance and monetary policy implementation. An asset-exchange model is constructed with idiosyncratic liquidity risk, in which one type of agents require currency and/or CBDC to consume while the other type of agents can use any assets to trade. There arises a liquidity insurance to distribute assets efficiently by type. Since central bank reserve accounts are accessible by the public directly, the large excess reserves (LER) in a floor system can make it difficult to separate the types under private information. Therefore, raising the interest on reserves in the floor system can reduce the aggregate liquidity excessively, and the equilibrium allocation with the LER can be suboptimal.

We consider the debut of a new monetary instrument, central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Drawing on examples from monetary history, we argue that a successful monetary transformation must combine microeconomic efficiency with macroeconomic credibility. A paradoxical feature of these transformations is that success in the micro dimension can encourage macro failure. Overcoming this paradox may require politically uncomfortable compromises. We propose that such compromises will be necessary for the success of CBDCs.

The recent surge in inflation has led to an increase in research by academic economists into various aspects of central banking: in particular, central bank communication and trust in central banks. In addition, the move towards introducing Central Bank Digital Currency has increased the need for research in this area. This Special Issue of the National Institute Economic Review brings together some of this recent research and includes contributions from academic and policy-oriented researchers and leading experts on these recent developments in central banking research.

Post the great financial crisis (GFC) of 2008–2009, there has been a surge in the macroeconomics literature on aggregate uncertainty. Although the recent literature has recognized the adverse real effects of global uncertainty shocks in emerging market economies (EMEs), the role of monetary policy in offsetting these adverse effects and their link with the exchange rates is not explored in the literature. We find that the currently followed interest rate rules (IRRs) under a flexible inflation-targeting regime are ineffective in stabilizing the domestic economy during periods of high global uncertainty in the EMEs. Using a small open economy new Keynesian DSGE model with Epstein–Zin preferences and second-moment demand shocks, we compare and propose alternate monetary policy rules that significantly reduce welfare losses. We find that the best monetary policy rule in terms of welfare depends on the nature of shock that is, first-moment or second-moment shock.

Stock market bubbles arise as a joint monetary and financial phenomenon. We assess the potential of monetary policy in mitigating the onset of bubbles by means of a Markov-switching Bayesian Vector Autoregression model estimated on US 1960–2019 data. Bubbles are detected and dated from the regime-specific interplay among asset prices, fundamental values, and monetary policy shocks. We rationalize the empirical evidence with an Overlapping Generations model, able to generate a bubbly scenario with shifts in monetary policy, and where agents form beliefs over transition dynamics. By matching the VAR impulse responses, we find that procyclicality and financial instability align with high equity premia and the presence of asset price bubbles. Monetary policy tightening, by increasing real rates, is ineffective in deflating bubble episodes.

A key insight from Adam Smith is that economists should base their conclusions about a monetary institution or policy on a careful study of the history of that institution or policy, a study that includes the experiences of other countries. To illustrate Smith’s reliance on financial history we cover five current monetary problems that have close analogies with problems that Smith discussed: (1) inflation, (2) banking panics, (3) public debt, (4) usury laws, (5) central bank digital currencies.

This paper examines whether changes in US presidential administration and central bank turnover during the period 1976–2016 caused regime shifts in Taylor rule deviations. Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to construct the welfare-maximizing policy rule and deviations from the optimal rule, we find evidence that politics indeed play a key role in explaining these deviations. In addition to politics, unemployment rates and the interest rate spread significantly account for regime shifts in Taylor rule deviations.

Our study of the day-to-day management of monetary policy in the Netherlands between 1925 and 1936 reveals that policy leaders and central bankers were both willing and able to deviate from the monetary policy paths set by other countries, all while remaining firmly within the gold bloc. The Netherlands wielded an independent monetary policy while remaining on gold thanks to its central bank's plentiful gold reserves. Central bankers quelled any speculation against the guilder by exploiting their domestic policy influence and international reputation to restrict capital mobility. However, maintaining pre-war parity until the collapse of the gold standard in September 1936 came at a cost. Our international comparisons and counterfactual analysis suggest that Dutch officials would have avoided a deepening of the Great Depression by leaving gold alongside the UK in 1931.

This article analyses the 1783 proposal to issue readymade notes to the Bank of England's private banking customers. Prior to 1783, I argue that there were two broad categories under which the Bank issued its notes into circulation: (1) notes which were issued to government in relation to the Bank's role as facilitator of the fiscal revenues of state, and (2) notes which were issued to its private banking customers. The readymade note was a form of paper money which the Bank had previously been issuing only to government and, unlike the notes which the Bank originally issued to its private banking customers, was made out in advance of its being issued into circulation. I argue that the transformation suggested in the 1783 proposal was made possible by the unique relationship which the Bank had always had with the government, and I will make three observations based on identifying how this transformation took place.

Credit restrictions were used as a monetary policy instrument in the Netherlands from the 1960s to the early 1990s. Since these restrictions were aimed at containing money rather than credit growth, their focus was on net credit creation by the financial sector. We document the rationale of these credit restrictions and how their implementation evolved in line with the evolution of the financial system. We study the impact on the balance sheet structure of banks and other financial institutions. We find that banks mainly responded to credit restrictions by making adjustments to the liability side of their balance sheets, particularly by increasing the proportion of long-term funding. Responses on the asset side were limited, while part of the banking sector even increased lending after the adoption of a restriction. These results suggest that banks and financial institutions responded by switching to long-term funding to meet the restriction and shield their lending business. Arguably, the credit restrictions were therefore still effective in reaching their main goal. Indeed, we do find evidence of a significant effect of credit restrictions on inflation.

This article examines the aftermath of the 1897 Riksbank Act in Swedish banking. The act placed banks with unlimited liability and those with limited liability on equal footing, removing the note-issuing privileges of the former. We consider whether changes in risk preferences occurred subsequent to the act, or whether extended liability was a sufficient deterrent. We conclude that when legal differences were removed, lower transaction costs for unlimited liability banks (ULBs) spurred aggressive competition, reflected in narrower interest spreads relative to limited liability banks (LLBs). ULBs also took on greater leverage and held less liquidity, which supports the Coasean interpretation that the shareholder liability regime mattered little. After 1897, ULB shareholders continued to receive higher dividends, enjoyed substantially superior returns on equity, and maintained an array of corporate governance controls to shield themselves against their additional risk.

From 1716 to 1718, Sweden experienced a shock of liquidity when the absolutist regime of Charles XII issued large amounts of fiat coins (mynttecken) in order to finance the Great Northern War. After the death of the king in November 1718, the new parliamentary regime decided to partially default on the coins. In international literature, this episode is largely unknown, and in Swedish historiography, scholars have often claimed that the country's currency collapsed in hyperinflation. We assess the performance of the new coins by studying how prices of commodities in various geographic locations developed. We also study bookkeeping practices in order to see how accountants treated the new coins. Our results show that there was a complex relationship between prices and liquidity. Prices of products in high demand by the military increased more than other prices. Accountants did not treat mynttecken and other currencies differently in 1718. It was only after the death of the king that accountants started to differentiate between different types of coins. The value of the fiat coins was linked to the actions and the legitimacy of the royal regime, which is in line with the State theory of money.

We make a distinction between centralized, decentralized, and distributed payment mechanisms. A centralized payment mechanism processes a transaction using a trusted third party. A decentralized payment mechanism processes a transaction between the parties to the transaction. A distributed payment mechanism relies on the network of users to process a transaction on a shared ledger. We maintain that bitcoin is neither a centralized nor a decentralized payment mechanism. It is, instead, a distributed payment mechanism. We then consider decentralized and centralized aspects of the broader bitcoin payment space.