Spatial inequalities in human capital are reshaping the politics of high-income democracies. However, comparative research on the political consequences of spatial inequality is constrained by a lack of data that is geographically detailed and cross-nationally comparable. This letter introduces the Regional Human Capital Database (RHCD), an open-access dataset covering 60,000 units in twenty wealthy democracies from the 1980s onward. The RHCD offers disaggregated data on educational attainment, demographics, urban structure, and voting, enabling analysis of within-region variation with unprecedented precision. We explain the construction of the dataset, including extensive checks to ensure reliability and validity. Our analysis demonstrates its value by showing growing urban–rural divides in educational attainment across countries with differing institutions and links between human capital and populist-right voting even within economically dynamic cities. The RHCD advances comparative research on the spatial dimensions of political change, offering a vital resource for scholars across political science and beyond.

Populism has become generally equated with far-right politics in public discourse. Beyond this association being widely problematised in much of the literature on populism, in this theoretical intervention, we argue that the populist label is ill-fitting for far-right politics for three reasons. First, any antagonism of ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’ is only secondary, at best, for the far right. Second, while populism constructs an anti-elitist crisis of the system, the far right constructs a crisis in the system, seeking to (re-)entrench elite rule and systems of oppression. Third, populism transgresses hegemonic political norms by making a novel political subject visible, whereas the far right attempts to extend the privilege of its already privileged voting base. As such, we argue that we should abandon the ‘populist’ signifier to refer to reactionary politics and instead rely on more precise, but also more stigmatising signifiers such as far/radical/extreme right for projects of reactionary people-building. Whereas populism builds a coalition through equivalential links between the demands of ‘the people’, such demands are of little concern for reactionary elites. Instead, ‘the people’ are constructed to lend legitimacy to their elitist project. While there are clear risks in attempting to reclaim the concept considering its quasi-hegemonic misuse, we argue that the emancipatory potential of populism makes it worthy of serious investigation in our demophobic and authoritarian times.

This paper critically examines the concept of populism, challenging the predominant ideological definition by highlighting the importance of political relations between populist actors and elites. It argues that populism should be conceptualized as a political phenomenon characterized by conflict with dominant elites, rather than solely as a set of ideas centered on ‘the people’ and ‘elites’. Through a comparative analysis of four politicians – Tony Blair, Emmanuel Macron, Jeremy Corbyn, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon – the study demonstrates that although some actors utilize populist rhetoric, their tendency to generate conflict with elites distinguishes populist actors from other uses of populist ideas. The cases empirically demonstrate that ‘softer’ cases of populism indeed do not contain conflict and, thus, according to my approach, are not really populist. Thus, I demonstrate the inclination of ideational definitions to overstretch the concept of populism.

This is a commentary on von Bogdandy’s article ‘On the Meaning and Promise of European Society’. It attempts to outline what an account of European society might look like if it were formulated from a more straightforward Hegelian perspective.

This article introduces theories of populism and empty signifiers to Canadian Indigenous studies. Canadian populist politics may serve to marginalize Indigenous actors and lead them to feel misrepresented within related social movements. These movements commonly develop empty signifiers, which are vague terms that mean different things to different political actors, but help to unite a “people.” Indigenous resistance movements can make strategic use of empty signifiers to build populist or non-populist social movements that challenge colonial institutions. I argue that any such movement would require careful strategizing between Indigenous and other social movements to ensure that Indigenous priorities are not marginalized.

There is an emerging consensus that conspiracy theories are dangerous. They can fuel extremism, undermine democratic institutions, and be mobilized in the disinformation operations of adversary states. That framing fits comfortably within well-understood practices of elite securitization, which have recently framed conspiracy theories as a threat to national security. This article explores the securitization of conspiracy theory during the COVID-19 pandemic when misinformation proliferated, and elites identified the threat of an ‘infodemic’. While conspiracy theories were securitized by elites alongside the virus, conspiracy theories identified those same elites as the real peril. We argue that this dynamic can be best understood through the concept of counter-securitization, which shows how an initial securitization process can be resisted by reframing its progenitors as the actual threat. We illustrate this argument through a case study on the United Kingdom, where there was palpable resistance to lockdowns and vaccine mandates. We suggest that the securitization dynamic identified here reflects a wider relationship between elite and popular securitization that has been under examined in the securitization literature, despite recent efforts to theorize the main characteristics of populist securitizations.

The Nordic countries have often been portrayed as pioneers of human rights and international law. However, few are aware that court-protected human rights played an almost negligible role in post-Second World War Scandinavia. Instead, scepticism towards natural law thrived, and minimalist procedural democracy alongside legal positivism positioned ‘the people’ as represented in parliament at the apex of the democratic hierarchy. Therefore, while the desire to impose judicial limits on parliamentary majorities after the Second World War came to dominate most international constitutional discourse as a combination of judicial review and rights, the Nordics cultivated a form of political and even anti-constitutionalist position long before the term gained popularity elsewhere. This article presents the untold story of how and why the Nordics became a symbol of procedural democracy and majoritarianism, making it challenging for the region to embrace a European constitutional order in full. It also argues that by having few judicial safeguards in place nationally, the Nordic countries are badly positioned in the event of a populist or illiberal takeover. The article warns that a procedural and anti-constitutional democracy model, still strongly hailed in the Nordic countries and increasingly prominent in recent constitutional literature, may legitimate illiberal leaders around the globe with its strong link between the idea of unconstrained power of the majority and the right to rule. It may also, in a European context, significantly obstruct the European Court of Justice’s efforts to flesh out a stronger European constitutional democracy.

This article examines far-right nature by showing how contemporary movements weave ecological and public-health discourses into forms of political storytelling with broad public appeal. Focusing on cases from Europe and the United States, it traces how Rassemblement National’s eco-populism, the agrarian ultranationalism of Călin Georgescu, and Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s “Make America Healthy Again” coalition channels public concern over climate and health crises into exclusionary narratives. The rhetoric of far-right nature can be difficult to identify and critique, in part because its ostensible concern with well-being and the environment often distances it from culturally dominant images of classical fascism. Nevertheless, the article demonstrates resonances between contemporary far-right nature and the biopolitical and organicist imaginaries of interwar fascist movements. Combining approaches from the environmental humanities with scholarship on fascism and the far right, the article argues that a public-facing environmental humanities must attend not only to imagination and storytelling but also to the political work environmental narratives perform within reactionary and exclusionary projects.

A growing number of governments are seeking to return control from supranational authorities to the state. Many of them wish to do so without sacrificing the benefits of deep international cooperation. But this desire to increase national control while maintaining cooperation – which we term ‘sovereigntist internationalism’ – is often frustrated in practice. We argue that this is due to a ‘trust paradox’ these governments face when their ideological commitments push them towards trust-based institutional arrangements while simultaneously rendering them less trusting and less trustworthy. We illustrate our argument with a case study of the Brexit negotiations during Theresa May’s premiership from 2016 to 2019. Drawing on elite interviews, we show how the UK government sought to transpose existing forms of economic cooperation into looser institutional arrangements but failed to convince the European Commission that enough trust could be generated to make the continuation of deep cooperation viable without strong control mechanisms. Our argument advances debates in International Relations (IR) by, first, explaining governments’ sometimes contradictory preferences for institutional designs; second, showing that different actors need different levels of trust to achieve similar levels of cooperation; and, third, improving our understanding of how populist actors view international institutions.

The label ‘populist’ has been used in recent years by scholars and journalists to describe judicial behavior in a diverse set of countries. Yet judicial populism has to date not been the subject of comparative scholarly inquiry. This symposium aims to launch just such a comparative analysis, bringing together work by scholars with diverse disciplinary and geographic expertise to grapple critically with the phenomenon of judicial populism. In this introductory article, symposium organizers Lisa Hilbink and Yasser Kureshi distill and synthesize the findings and arguments from the four individual articles in the symposium to address three main questions: (1) What is judicial populism? (2) Where does judicial populism come from? and (3) Do populist courts benefit or undermine democracy? They discuss how the contributions to the symposium speak to each of these questions, in turn, generating a scholarly discussion, across disciplines and contexts, with which others can engage moving forward. To this end, they cap the introduction with some suggestions for future research.

This article explores possible connections between health crises, economic policy choices, and the rise of populist movements, drawing on evidence from the interwar period. It considers how differing policy responses to the Great Depression may have been associated with contrasting trajectories in both public health and political developments. In Germany, the adoption of austerity measures in the early 1930s appears to have coincided with worsening economic conditions, declining health indicators, and growing electoral support for far-right movements. By contrast, expansionary initiatives introduced under the New Deal in the U.S. were likely accompanied by strengthened social protections, improvements in health outcomes, and what some observers have interpreted as a mitigation of pressures toward political radicalisation. Taken together, these historical experiences offer insights into contemporary developments, where perceived inadequacies in responding to intertwined health and economic crises could potentially contribute to eroding institutional trust and increasing receptiveness to populist narratives.