This chapter explores certain intellectual property (IP) rights arising in the context of professional tennis. It starts off with an overview of IP rights and their territorial scope. It goes on to show that IP rights are subject to a regime of ownership. The first relevant right is trademarks. The chapter explains its legal nature, and how trademark issues arise in professional tennis, particularly as regards traditional and non-traditional trademarks, colour marks, shape marks, sound marks, smell and taste marks and motion, gesture marks and holograms. The chapter then proceeds to explain the protection offered under each mark. It then goes on to explore designs, copyright and image rights/publicity rights, as well as patents and trade secrets in tennis. It explores the commercialisation of IP rights in tennis, including sponsorship agreements, licensing agreements, ambush marketing, endorsement contracts, merchandising agreements and broadcasting rights. It concludes by offering an analysis of enforcement of IP rights, contractual remedies and damages claims.

This chapter explores the connections between ‘queer’ theory, which emerged in the 1990s, and postmodernism. Postmodern literary practice, which glories in the ephemeral, the performative, and the fluid and the contradictory, aligns with the spirit of queer theory and its mission to liberate identities dismissed as marginal or non-normative. However, where late-twentieth-century queer writers exposed and challenged homophobic discourses that sought to demonise and deny queer desire (often in direct response to social circumstances, such as the effects of the decriminalisation of homosexuality in Britain in 1967 and the Aids epidemic in the 1980s), the Twenty-First Century has become distinguished by an increasing ‘homonormativity’. This does not mark the end of hostile queer-eradicating discourses, but means that these are at least challenged by an empowering counter-narrative. The chapter examines a wide range of postmodern writing, including work by Jeanette Winterson, Hanif Kureishi, and Alan Hollinghurst, Sarah Waters, and Paul Magrs.

This chapter seeks to strengthen the account of the Principle of Multispecies Legality offered in the previous chapter by responding to potential queries and concerns around the proposal’s structure, scope, and feasibility. The outlined concerns are as follows: that the PML is an attempt to redefine legal personhood; that a focus on interests is too inclusive, in that in opening the doors of legal inclusion to a relatively wide range of beings and entities it would put undesirable constraints on human activity; that a focus on interests is too limited in that it doesn’t capture the full scope of animals’ capabilities; that the PML will result in the equal treatment of humans and all other animals; that we shouldn’t base a being’s worth on their possession of a particular characteristic; and that the PML will be too unfeasible to implement.

The concluding chapter reiterates the goal of the book: to offer a solution to animals’ lack of legal inclusion by offering a new foundation of legal subjectivity. The Principle of Multispecies Legality provides such a foundation for animals and, indeed, all those beings and entities with interests. By contrast with the present paradigm of legal personhood, the PML is not premised on a vision of the ‘archetypal’ human which serves to exclude not only animals but also many vulnerable human groups. The PML is also an improvement over the rights of nature, in that it more straightforwardly recognises the interests and worth of individual animals and does not maintain the ontological barrier between humans and all other nature. Finally, we are reminded that making change takes a multispecies village: that the PML is only as good as those who are willing to implement it. In order to ensure real change for animals and other interested beings, we need to work to encourage greater respect for the non-human world.

The conclusion of historical and normative parts of the study is that the extension of human rights to companies in the A1P1 ECHR was not necessitated by a sui genesis European liberal conception of human rights. Rather it was the result of a political compromise manifested in a text that obscured the breadth of the legal, proprietary rights protected and the inclusion of private companies as subjects of the rights. The subsequent review of the Court’s jurisprudence on IPRs shows that, regrettably, the Court did not correct the text’s hidden deviation from the moral ideal of universal human rights which the ECHR sought to enforce. The conclusion canvasses three possible scenarios for the futureandoutlines how the Court could develop its jurisprudence to recalibrate the balance of protection of companies IPRs in line with international human rights.

Why have European banks embarked on a radical transformation in which they became deeply dependent on US financial markets, a relationship they are ill-equipped to manage and less likely to overcome? This chapter introduces and summarises the book. It outlines the debates about the Americanisation of global finance and presents the concept of extroverted financialisation to help explain US-led financialisation outside the US.

This chapter explores safeguarding as a duty on tennis sport governing bodies (SGBs) and tennis academies in respect of their athletes, whether junior or senior. The chapter considers safeguarding as a duty of care, the violation of which gives rise to tort-based liability. It looks at the various instruments and codes adopted by tennis SGBs, as well as by national tennis federations, including also their monitoring processes. The chapter explores how these processes are enforced with a view to limiting exposure to risks present or future. The chapter also considers health and safety as part of the duty of safeguarding and goes on to point out legal consequences for failure to meet safeguarding obligations.

In the last decade, the number of migrants within the African continent has increased significantly, which triggered many African states to adopt laws criminalizing illegal entry or working without a work permit. Further, the European Union has signed agreements with several African states to prevent migrants entering the EU, which resulted in many migrants are utilizing dangerous routes, being exposed to serious human rights violations, including enforced disappearances. The Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance prohibits expulsion of persons who can be in danger of being tortured or forcibly disappeared. However, many states lack these provisions within the domestic laws or do not implement them, leaving many migrants vulnerable to criminal gangs and state security abuses. However, the lack of political will, technical expertise, lack of legal structure and understanding of the crime of enforced disappearances all lead to the failure of the states to prevent enforced disappearances of the migrants on the continent.

Around the world, countries have set up climate institutions that putatively “depoliticize” climate policymaking, removing decisions from the realm of partisan politics or delegating decisions to technocratic bodies. Here, we offer an empirical reassessment of such apolitical institutions in the UK, Norway, Denmark, and Australia. We find that what seems in many cases like depoliticization – upon closer examination – proves anything but. Instead, we offer a reinterpretation of climate advisory institutions as the path-dependent product of distributive and partisan conflicts. New climate institutions did not emerge merely as a result of norms about public goods provision and efforts to reshape intertemporal policymaking incentives, to provide stability, or to solve the gap between current and future welfare needs. Instead, these institutions addressed core distributive conflicts over climate policy, the short- or medium-term political needs of incumbent governments, or both. In turn, we argue that this political context surrounding their creation has limited the degree to which they can stabilize policy over time or depoliticize climate policy debates.

This chapter considers the nature of constitutional “law” in the Supreme Court. In pursuing that inquiry, the chapter begins with the premise that the Constitution is law not because the Founding generation adopted it but because relevant constituencies in the United States today accept it as authoritative. Moreover, because the Constitution does not include all of the rules necessary for its own interpretation, many of the norms that mark the limits of permissible constitutional interpretation, including the doctrine of stare decisis, are similarly grounded in shared understandings and accepted practices among the justices and other officials, not written rules laid down by prior generations. The acceptance-grounded law that applies to the justices is enforceable through extra-judicial mechanisms that could potentially include defiance of Court decisions if they were widely perceived as overstepping the justices’ lawful authority. But we should recognize that the “law” that constrains the justices is different from more ordinary law. In a normative vein, this chapter describes adaptive judicial interpretations of a Constitution that was mostly written in the eighteenth century as a functional necessity. But it presents a more troubled assessment of developments in the current politically charged and divided era.

Joyce’s life spans a period when material conditions, political structures, and intellectual life throughout the world were profoundly shaped by the growth and decline of European empires and the flourishing of various nationalisms, both imperialist and anti-imperialist. When Joyce was born in 1882 the ‘scramble for Africa’ and the era that one influential historian has called the ‘age of empire’ had just begun. When he died in 1941 the world was engulfed in WWII, a conflict that would fundamentally alter the balance of global power, and the age of decolonization was under way. A good deal of influential Joyce scholarship has explored Joyce’s relation to this historical trajectory. Much of it has been informed by postcolonial studies, committed to examining the complex set of issues and questions we can group under the general headings of ‘colonialism’ and ‘nationalism’. Ireland’s double status as both centre and periphery, agent and victim of colonialism is important to any investigation of how Joyce’s works engage with such issues and questions.

The history of global climate governance can be seen as a series of politicization conflicts. Countries seek to either legitimize and strengthen hard-won global rules or reinterpret or replace them. This chapter focuses on one such conflict, whether to replace or protect the Kyoto Protocol. This conflict primarily pitted the United States against the EU, but each drew other countries into their side of the conflict. By focusing on one conflict, this chapter provides insights into how processes and strategies of politicization unfold in international politics. Countries employed a range of tools, rhetorical and behavioral, to question or support the Kyoto Protocol inside and outside the negotiation process. Several of these strategies are currently employed in relation to the Paris Agreement, marking another politicization conflict.