We aim at developing a systematic method of separating omniscience principles by constructing Kripke models for intuitionistic predicate logic $\mathbf {IQC}$ and first-order arithmetic $\mathbf {HA}$ from a Kripke model for intuitionistic propositional logic $\mathbf {IPC}$. To this end, we introduce the notion of an extended frame, and show that each IPC-Kripke model generates an extended frame. By using the extended frame generated by an IPC-Kripke model, we give a separation theorem of a schema from a set of schemata in $\mathbf {IQC}$ and a separation theorem of a sentence from a set of schemata in $\mathbf {HA}$. We see several examples which give us separations among omniscience principles.

We prove that the class of all the rings $\mathbb {Z}/m\mathbb {Z}$ for all $m>1$ is decidable. This gives a positive solution to a problem of Ax asked in his celebrated 1968 paper on the elementary theory of finite fields [1, Problem 5, p. 270]. In our proof, we reduce the problem to the decidability of the ring of adeles $\mathbb {A}_{\mathbb {Q}}$ of $\mathbb {Q}$.

This paper is devoted to the investigation of term-definable connexive implications in substructural logics with exchange and, on the semantical perspective, in sub-varieties of commutative residuated lattices (FL${}_{\scriptsize\mbox{e}}$-algebras). In particular, we inquire into sufficient and necessary conditions under which generalizations of the connexive implication-like operation defined in [6] for Heyting algebras still satisfy connexive theses. It will turn out that, in most cases, connexive principles are equivalent to the equational Glivenko property with respect to Boolean algebras. Furthermore, we provide some philosophical upshots like, e.g., a discussion on the relevance of the above operation in relationship with G. Polya’s logic of plausible inference, and some characterization results on weak and strong connexivity.

Two first-order logic theories are definitionally equivalent if and only if there is a bijection between their model classes that preserves isomorphisms and ultraproducts (Theorem 2). This is a variant of a prior theorem of van Benthem and Pearce. In Example 2, uncountably many pairs of definitionally inequivalent theories are given such that their model categories are concretely isomorphic via bijections that preserve ultraproducts in the model categories up to isomorphism. Based on these results, we settle several conjectures of Barrett, Glymour and Halvorson.

Logical frameworks that are sensitive to features of sentences’ subject-matter—like Berto’s topic-sensitive intentional modals (TSIMs)—demand a maximally faithful model of the topics of sentences. This is an especially difficult task in the case in which topics are assigned to intensional formulae. In two previous papers, a framework was developed whose model of intensional subject-matter could accommodate a wider range of intuitions about particular intensional conditionals. Although resolving a number of counterintuitive features, the work made an implicit assumption that the subject-matter of an intensional conditional is a function of the subject-matters of its subformulae. This assumption—which I will call a principle of topic sufficiency—runs counter to some natural intuitions concerning topic. In this paper, we will investigate topic sufficiency and offer a semantic account that is state-sensitive, providing an implementation through the introduction of topic-sensitive logics related to William Parry’s prototypical $\mathsf {PAI}$.

We generalize the notion of consequence relation standard in abstract treatments of logic to accommodate intuitions of relevance. The guiding idea follows the use criterion, according to which in order for some premises to have some conclusion(s) as consequence(s), the premises must each be used in some way to obtain the conclusion(s). This relevance intuition turns out to require not just a failure of monotonicity, but also a move to considering consequence relations as obtaining between multisets. We motivate and state basic definitions of relevant consequence relations, both in single conclusion (asymmetric) and multiple conclusion (symmetric) settings, as well as derivations and theories, guided by the use intuitions, and prove a number of results indicating that the definitions capture the desired results (at least in many cases).

The present note was prompted by Weber’s approach to proving Cantor’s theorem, i.e., the claim that the cardinality of the power set of a set is always greater than that of the set itself. While I do not contest that his proof succeeds, my point is that he neglects the possibility that by similar methods it can be shown also that no non-empty set satisfies Cantor’s theorem. In this paper unrestricted abstraction based on a cut free Gentzen type sequential calculus will be employed to prove both results. In view of the connection between Priest’s three-valued logic of paradox and cut free Gentzen calculi this, a fortiori, has an impact on any paraconsistent set theory built on Priest’s logic of paradox.

Traditionally, the formulae in modal logic express properties of possible worlds. Prior introduced “egocentric” logics that capture properties of agents rather than of possible worlds. In such a setting, the article proposes the modality “know how to tell apart” and gives a complete logical system describing the interplay between this modality and the knowledge modality. An important contribution of this work is a new matrix-based technique for proving completeness theorems in an egocentric setting.

The uncountability of $\mathbb {R}$ is one of its most basic properties, known far outside of mathematics. Cantor’s 1874 proof of the uncountability of $\mathbb {R}$ even appears in the very first paper on set theory, i.e., a historical milestone. In this paper, we study the uncountability of ${\mathbb R}$ in Kohlenbach’s higher-order Reverse Mathematics (RM for short), in the guise of the following principle:

$$\begin{align*}\mathit{for \ a \ countable \ set } \ A\subset \mathbb{R}, \mathit{\ there \ exists } \ y\in \mathbb{R}\setminus A. \end{align*}$$

An important conceptual observation is that the usual definition of countable set—based on injections or bijections to ${\mathbb N}$—does not seem suitable for the RM-study of mainstream mathematics; we also propose a suitable (equivalent over strong systems) alternative definition of countable set, namely union over ${\mathbb N}$ of finite sets; the latter is known from the literature and closer to how countable sets occur ‘in the wild’. We identify a considerable number of theorems that are equivalent to the centred theorem based on our alternative definition. Perhaps surprisingly, our equivalent theorems involve most basic properties of the Riemann integral, regulated or bounded variation functions, Blumberg’s theorem, and Volterra’s early work circa 1881. Our equivalences are also robust, promoting the uncountability of ${\mathbb R}$ to the status of ‘big’ system in RM.

This paper proves the finite axiomatizability of transitive modal logics of finite depth and finite width w.r.t. proper-successor-equivalence. The frame condition of the latter requires, in a rooted transitive frame, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points with different sets of proper successors. The result generalizes Rybakov’s result of the finite axiomatizability of extensions of $\mathbf {S4}$ of finite depth and finite width.

In their logical analysis of theorems about disjoint rays in graphs, Barnes, Shore, and the author (hereafter BGS) introduced a weak choice scheme in second-order arithmetic, called the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of finite choice (hereafter finite choice). This is a special case of the $\Sigma ^1_1$ axiom of choice ($\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$) introduced by Kreisel. BGS showed that $\Sigma ^1_1\text {-}\mathsf {AC}_0$ suffices for proving many of the aforementioned theorems in graph theory. While it is not known if these implications reverse, BGS also showed that those theorems imply finite choice (in some cases, with additional induction assumptions). This motivated us to study the proof-theoretic strength of finite choice. Using a variant of Steel forcing with tagged trees, we show that finite choice is not provable from the $\Delta ^1_1$-comprehension scheme (even over $\omega $-models). We also show that finite choice is a consequence of the arithmetic Bolzano–Weierstrass theorem (introduced by Friedman and studied by Conidis), assuming $\Sigma ^1_1$-induction. Our results were used by BGS to show that several theorems in graph theory cannot be proved using $\Delta ^1_1$-comprehension. Our results also strengthen results of Conidis.

It is widely thought that chance should be understood in reductionist terms: claims about chance should be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated. There are many possible reductionist theories of chance, differing as to which possible pattern of events they take to be chance-making. It is also widely taken to be a norm of rationality that credence should defer to chance: special cases aside, rationality requires that one’s credence function, when conditionalized on the chance-making facts, should coincide with the objective chance function. It is a shortcoming of a theory of chance if it implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable. The primary goal of this paper is to show, on the basis of considerations concerning computability and inductive learning, that this shortcoming is more common than one would have hoped.

In this note we study a counterpart in predicate logic of the notion of logical friendliness, introduced into propositional logic in [15]. The result is a new consequence relation for predicate languages with equality using first-order models. While compactness, interpolation and axiomatizability fail dramatically, several other properties are preserved from the propositional case. Divergence is diminished when the language does not contain equality with its standard interpretation.

The paper investigates from a proof-theoretic perspective various non-contractive logical systems, which circumvent logical and semantic paradoxes. Until recently, such systems only displayed additive quantifiers (Grišin and Cantini). Systems with multiplicative quantifiers were proposed in the 2010s (Zardini), but they turned out to be inconsistent with the naive rules for truth or comprehension. We start by presenting a first-order system for disquotational truth with additive quantifiers and compare it with Grišin set theory. We then analyze the reasons behind the inconsistency phenomenon affecting multiplicative quantifiers. After interpreting the exponentials in affine logic as vacuous quantifiers, we show how such a logic can be simulated within a truth-free fragment of a system with multiplicative quantifiers. Finally, we establish that the logic for these multiplicative quantifiers (but without disquotational truth) is consistent, by proving that an infinitary version of the cut rule can be eliminated. This paves the way to a syntactic approach to the proof theory of infinitary logic with infinite sequents.

In this article we define a logical system called Hybrid Partial Type Theory ($\mathcal {HPTT}$). The system is obtained by combining William Farmer’s partial type theory with a strong form of hybrid logic. William Farmer’s system is a version of Church’s theory of types which allows terms to be non-denoting; hybrid logic is a version of modal logic in which it is possible to name worlds and evaluate expressions with respect to particular worlds. We motivate this combination of ideas in the introduction, and devote the rest of the article to defining, axiomatising, and proving a completeness result for $\mathcal {HPTT}$.

We show that the first-order logical theory of the binary overlap-free words (and, more generally, the $\alpha $-free words for rational $\alpha $, $2 < \alpha \leq 7/3$), is decidable. As a consequence, many results previously obtained about this class through tedious case-based proofs can now be proved “automatically,” using a decision procedure, and new claims can be proved or disproved simply by restating them as logical formulas.

Given a three-valued definition of validity, which choice of three-valued truth tables for the connectives can ensure that the resulting logic coincides exactly with classical logic? We give an answer to this question for the five monotonic consequence relations $st$, $ss$, $tt$, $ss\cap tt$, and $ts$, when the connectives are negation, conjunction, and disjunction. For $ts$ and $ss\cap tt$ the answer is trivial (no scheme works), and for $ss$ and $tt$ it is straightforward (they are the collapsible schemes, in which the middle value acts like one of the classical values). For $st$, the schemes in question are the Boolean normal schemes that are either monotonic or collapsible.

${\mathsf {CAC\ for\ trees}}$ is the statement asserting that any infinite subtree of $\mathbb {N}^{<\mathbb {N}}$ has an infinite path or an infinite antichain. In this paper, we study the computational strength of this theorem from a reverse mathematical viewpoint. We prove that ${\mathsf {CAC\ for\ trees}}$ is robust, that is, there exist several characterizations, some of which already appear in the literature, namely, the statement $\mathsf {SHER}$ introduced by Dorais et al. [8], and the statement $\mathsf {TAC}+\mathsf {B}\Sigma ^0_2$ where $\mathsf {TAC}$ is the tree antichain theorem introduced by Conidis [6]. We show that ${\mathsf {CAC\ for\ trees}}$ is computationally very weak, in that it admits probabilistic solutions.

We obtain, for the first time, a modular many-valued semantics for combined logics, which is built directly from many-valued semantics for the logics being combined, by means of suitable universal operations over partial non-deterministic logical matrices. Our constructions preserve finite-valuedness in the context of multiple-conclusion logics, whereas, unsurprisingly, it may be lost in the context of single-conclusion logics. Besides illustrating our constructions over a wide range of examples, we also develop concrete applications of our semantic characterizations, namely regarding the semantics of strengthening a given many-valued logic with additional axioms, the study of conditions under which a given logic may be seen as a combination of simpler syntactically defined fragments whose calculi can be obtained independently and put together to form a calculus for the whole logic, and also general conditions for decidability to be preserved by the combination mechanism.

We present a proof system for a multimode and multimodal logic, which is based on our previous work on modal Martin-Löf type theory. The specification of modes, modalities, and implications between them is given as a mode theory, i.e., a small 2-category. The logic is extended to a lambda calculus, establishing a Curry–Howard correspondence.