Central theories of public policy imply that lobbying is demand‐driven, meaning highly responsive to the levels of access that political gatekeepers offer to interest organizations. Others stress drivers at the supply side, especially the severity of disturbances which affect an organization's constituency. We test these central arguments explaining lobbying activities in a comparative survey experiment conducted in 10 polities in Europe. Our treatments vary the severity of two types of external threats faced by interest organizations: (1) barriers that restrict their access to decision‐makers and (2) disturbances that compromise an organization's interests. We operationalize these threats at the demand and supply side of lobbying based on an (at that point) hypothetical second wave of COVID‐19. Our findings show that while severe access barriers trigger a flight response, whereby groups suspend their lobbying activities and divert to protest actions, higher disturbances mobilize groups into a fight mode, in which organizations spend more lobbying resources and intensify different outside lobbying activities. Our study serves novel causal evidence on the important dynamic relationship between policy disturbances, political access and lobbying strategies.

A large strand of scholarly inquiry has built on the assumption that being active in legislatures helps further representatives’ career prospects by enhancing their media and public visibility. Previous studies suggest some visibility‐boosting effects of parliamentary work, but results vary considerably across political settings and research designs. Moreover, there is little research on the extent to which the visibility‐boosting effect of being active in parliament varies across representatives. Specifically, do legislators with high news value benefit more from legislative speechmaking, or can other representatives make up for lower news value by taking the parliamentary floor? We believe that this lack of focus on the conditional nature of the link between political work and media visibility restricts our understanding of the consequences of political work. This study therefore presents a unique combination of data covering nearly 600,000 news appearances and 850,000 parliamentary speeches of members of parliament (MPs) in the United Kingdom (2000–2015) and Norway (2000–2016) to examine the link between legislative speechmaking and the news visibility of legislators. Our results suggest that the media appearances of representatives in the United Kingdom and Norway are associated positively with the number of legislative speeches representatives make and that this positive association between speechmaking and media visibility is differential across groups of representatives, with senior MPs and government party MPs benefiting more from being active on the parliamentary floor.

Proactive language control is thought to regulate the interference from the nontarget language in bilingual contexts in a sustained way. This study examined the persistence of proactive control in cued picture naming. Participants first named pictures in L1 (German) and L2 (English) in pure blocks, then in mixed language blocks and finally again in pure blocks. In mixed blocks, there were language switch costs, and L1 responses were generally slower than L2 responses (“L1 slowing”). Critically, L1 remained slower than L2 even in postmixing single-language blocks. This persisting L1 slowing suggests overshooting control that downregulates lexical access to L1 representations in a sustained manner. Yet, this persistence of L1 slowing was found only in the first single-language block after the mixed language blocks and no longer in the second postmixing block, suggesting that proactive control has inertia but dissipates over time.

This article presents novel methods and theories for estimation and inference about parameters in statistical models using machine learning for nuisance parameter estimation when data are dyadic. We propose a dyadic cross-fitting method to remove over-fitting biases under arbitrary dyadic dependence. Together with the use of Neyman orthogonal scores, this novel cross-fitting method enables root-n consistent estimation and inference robustly against dyadic dependence. We demonstrate its versatility by applying it to high-dimensional network formation models and reexamine the determinants of free trade agreements.

Western publics show a sizable support for experts’ involvement in political decision making, that is, technocratic attitudes. This article analyzes two key aspects of these attitudes: technocratic attitudes’ stability and the heterogeneity in the demand for experts depending on the context. We first analyze how technocratic attitudes have been affected by an external event, the COVID‐19 pandemic, that has placed experts’ role at the forefront of the public debate; this allows us to analyze the stability or change in these attitudes. Second, given that the pandemic quickly evolved from being a public health issue to becoming a political issue combining economic and public health dimensions, we examine whether framing the COVID‐19 pandemic exclusively as a public health problem or as including a prominent economic dimension as well affects the type of public officials who are preferred to lead the political management of the crisis (independent experts with diverse professional skills or party politicians belonging to different parties and with a specialization in different policy fields). We pursue these two research goals through a panel survey conducted in Spain at two different time points, one before and another during the pandemic, in which we measure technocratic attitudes using an exhaustive battery; and through a survey experiment combining a conjoint design and a framing experiment. Results show that, first, technocratic attitudes have significantly increased as a consequence of the coronavirus outbreak; second, people's preference for experts prevails against any other experimental treatment such as party affiliation; and, finally, preferences for the type of experts vary depending on the problem to be solved. In this way, this paper significantly increases our knowledge of the factors that affect variation in public attitudes towards experts’ involvement in political decision‐making.

In electoral systems with districts that vary in magnitude, the number of seats to be filled in each district will be even or odd. We argue that such a variation has crucial political consequences, called the ‘odd–even effect’. In low‐magnitude districts, elections are more competitive when the district magnitude is odd than even; the incentives for coordination are thus stronger in the former scenario than in the latter. Employing quasi‐experimental data from 780 districts in Spain's lower house elections, we show that the number of parties is smaller in low‐magnitude districts with an odd number of seats than in low‐magnitude districts with an even number of seats. The elite‐ and voter‐level mechanisms driving the odd–even effect are examined using data on mobilisation efforts and wasted votes at the district level.

While cross‐sectional research has consistently shown graduates are less Eurosceptic than non‐graduates, little is known about the causal role of university study in determining these attitudes, as few longitudinal studies have explored this. This study does so, providing robust causal estimates of higher education's effect on Euroscepticism through applying individual‐ and sibling fixed‐effect modelling techniques to British Household Panel and Understanding Society data from 1999–2022. Both specifications provide consistent results; suggesting university study does little to decrease Euroscepticism in the short‐run but has substantial long‐run effects. This alludes to an ‘allocation’ effect, whereby it is largely not the experience of obtaining a degree itself, but the opportunities afforded by virtue of doing so that shape attitudes towards Europe. Our novel findings not only demonstrate that within‐sibling estimates of higher education's effect can be generalised to the wider British population but also advance our understanding of the mechanisms linking education with Euroscepticism.

I discuss two colloquial Italian idioms expressing respectively emphatic negation and objection, col cavolo (lit. ‘with the cabbage’) and un cavolo (lit. ‘a cabbage’). Despite superficial similarities, they represent two very different strategies at syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic level. Col cavolo belongs to a class of non-verbal polar predicates selecting a clausal complement and expressing the speaker’s degree of strength of sincerity towards the proposition (Repp 2013). Col cavolo expresses high commitment to ¬p: it is base-generated in the left periphery, as confirmed by its limited polarity-licensing abilities and impossibility of agreement with a TP-level negative PolP. Instead, un cavolo is a metalinguistic objector (Martins 2020), an echoic responsive move (Farkas & Bruce 2010); it originates as a vulgar minimiser and can function as an ‘utterance minimiser’, predicating minimal relevance of the associate and rejecting it globally rather than reversing its truth conditions. Finally, I compare col cavolo with similar cross-linguistic expressions, and offer a generalisation for left-peripheral negators: those participating in a movement or agreement chain with the TP-level PolP have full semantic and polarity-licensing capabilities, while base-generated ones, being non-local to the lower proposition, only license weak polarity items and yield double negation with a lower negative PolP.

The extent and ways in which popular preferences influence government policy are absolutely central to our understanding of modern democracy. Paul Warwick's discussion of these in the European Journal of Political Research in 2010 puts itself at the heart of the debate with its critique of the median mandate theory of McDonald and Budge, proposing an alternative ‘bilateralist’ concept of representation. This article questions whether this concept has much to add to our theoretical understanding of representational processes. However, Warwick's further conceptual points deserve serious consideration. These concern the time horizons within which representative processes work, and the status of the median position given multi‐motivated voting. At the evidential level, Warwick argues that survey‐based measures of voter and party left–right positions fail to produce the correspondence between median and government policy positions that median mandate theory would have us expect. However, survey‐based measures of median voter and party placements obscure important cross‐national variation. Using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES 2007), as Warwick does, this article shows that survey respondents norm their own and their country's party positions to their national context. The consequence is to make the political centre in all nations appear similar. Allowing for the relevant cross‐national differences brings the relationship between the median voter and government position back in line with expectations.

The delegation of governance tasks to third parties is generally assumed to help governments to avoid blame once policies become contested. International organizations, including the European Union (EU), are considered particularly opportune in this regard. The literature lacks assessments of the blame avoidance effects of delegation, let alone of the effects of different delegation designs. To address this gap in the literature, we study public blame attributions in the media coverage of two contested EU policies during the financial crisis and the migration crisis. We show that the blame avoidance effect of delegation depends on the delegation design: When agents are independent (dependent) of government control, we observe lower (higher) shares of public blame attributions targeting the government (blame shifting effect), and when agents are external (internal) to the government apparatus, overall public blame attributions for a contested policy will be less (more) frequent (blame obfuscation effect). Our findings yield important normative implications for how to maintain governments’ accountability once they have delegated governance tasks to third parties.

In Western Europe, as immigration flows increase – or at least become more salient – and austerity measures place welfare states under pressure, policy reforms that extend or restrict access to the welfare state for immigrants are highly contested. Much academic attention has been paid to restrictive or ‘welfare chauvinist’ policy reforms and the role played by far‐right parties and sympathisers in the policy‐making process. Yet, left‐wing parties, often considered the most susceptible to the ‘progressive's dilemma’ between open borders and strong welfare states, remain under‐researched. Using new data on immigrant welfare rights for 14 European countries from 1980 to 2018, and differentiating between social democrats, the greens and far‐left parties, we show that social democrats engage in both reforms that restrict as well as expand, but on average, they tend to be negatively associated with immigrant welfare rights. However, our evidence shows that context matters: We find that that social democrats are less likely to retrench immigrant welfare rights when they share power with the far left, and become more likely to retrench as unemployment rises.

Following referenda held in September 1997 (see the Political Data Yearbook 1998), a devolved Scottish Parliament was established in Edinburgh (empowered to take responsibility for domestic policy in Scotland over areas such as education, health, housing, the legal system, the environment and transport) and a Welsh Assembly (with rights of secondary legislation) in Cardiff. The inaugural elections to these bodies were held on 6 May 1999. The new parliament at Holyrood has 129 members who are elected under a variant of the Additional Members System (AMS). While 73 (57%) are elected by the SMP method using the existing Westminster constituencies, a further 56 ‘additional members’ are elected by a closed list system using Scotland’s 8 European Parliamentary constituencies. The additional members are allocated in such a way as to ameliorate the disproportional effects of the results in the SMP seats. The electoral system used for the Welsh Assembly is very similar: the Assembly consists of 40 members elected by SMP voting, plus 20 additional members elected by party list votes in the principality’s 5 European parliamentary constituencies.

The literature suggests that legislative politics among European Union Member States is characterised by economic exchanges, and constrained by the social norms of a European community of legislators. Both views draw a clear line between the legislative process and the conflicts over sovereignty that have left their mark on treaty making and European public opinion since the 1990s. This article suggests revisiting this view, based on an analysis of why Member States have opted out of legislation from the 1970s to today. It argues that differentiation, while once a response to capacity problems of relatively poor countries, has recently become driven by sovereignty concerns of the Union's wealthy and nationally oriented Members that oppose the EU's intrusion into core state powers. The article presents evidence for the impact on legislative outcomes of factors so far thought not to matter. The results indicate greater European‐level legislative responsiveness towards national sovereignty demands than previously recognised. They underline that the nature of European politics has been changing with the EU's push into core state powers.

During a crisis, the public expects the government to handle the situation. In parliamentary democracies, these expectations are directed to the cabinet and its ministers. Cabinet ministers are expected to be highly involved in policy making under their jurisdiction and in general. During periods of politics as usual, ministers differ in their policy involvement. This paper asks whether that changes during a crisis. Based on an analysis of cabinet ministers in Israel during the first wave of the COVID19 crisis, this paper finds that ministers’ policy involvement during a crisis is relatively low. Most ministers are little involved in issues outside their jurisdiction. Ministers less central to the crisis management are also little involved in issues under their jurisdiction. Ministers central to the crisis management are highly involved in introducing decisions on issues under their jurisdiction, but not necessarily in other aspects of policy making. These findings have implications for issues of accountability and trust.

Interest group networks are crucial for understanding European Union (EU) integration, policymaking and interest representation. Yet, comparative analysis of interest organisation networks across EU policy areas is limited. This study provides the first large‐scale investigation of interest group information networks across all EU policy domains. We argue that interest groups prioritise access to trustworthy and high‐quality information coming from partners with shared policy goals. Thus, interest organisations form network ties with other organisations if the latter are from the same country, represent the same type of interest, or are policy insiders. The effect of these three factors varies across policy domains depending on the extent to which the institutional setting assures equal and broad organisational access to decision‐making. Our empirical analysis operationalises information ties as Twitter‐follower relationships among 7,388 interest organisations. In the first step of the analysis, we use Exponential Random Graph Models to examine tie formation in the full network and across 40 policy domains. We find strong but variable effects of country and interest type homophily and policy insiderness on the creation of network ties. In the second step, we examine how the effect of these three variables on tie formation varies with policy domain characteristics. We find that shared interest type and policy insiderness are less relevant for tie formation in (re‐)distributive and especially regulatory policy domains characterised by more supranational decision‐making. Sharing an interest type and being a policy insider matters more for tie formation in foreign and interior policies where decision‐making is more intergovernmental. The effect of country homophily is less clearly related to policy type and decision‐making mode. Our findings emphasise the importance of institutional and policy context in shaping interest group networks in the EU.

Attitudes towards social spending and the welfare state have been characterised by one of the longest standing and widest gender gaps. Past research suggests that parenthood deepens this divide further. Yet, the exact relationship between parenthood and support for social policies – and the gendered nature of this process – has been difficult to establish because it can vary across welfare policy areas and the age of the children, which past studies, relying on cross‐sectional data, has found difficult to unravel. Using panel data from the Swiss Household Panel, we examine individual level changes in fathers’ and mothers’ views towards specific welfare state policies. We find that individuals’ support for social spending fluctuates at different stages of parenthood, and that mothers’ demands differ from fathers’ in relation to care related but not in terms of educational spending. This implies that parents are not a homogeneous group that parties could target with uniform electoral pledges. As a result, building widespread electoral support for expanding a broad range of social investment policies is likely to be challenging in a context where, first and foremost, self‐interest appears to drive (or depress) individuals’ support for specific welfare state policies.

In the last decade, studies have documented how autocrats use elections as a way of legitimising and stabilising their regimes. Simultaneously, a literature on negative external actors (also known as ‘black knights’) has developed, emphasising how various international actors use anti‐democracy promotion strategies to undergird authoritarian regimes. In this article, these two literatures are fused in an attempt to shed light on the external dimension of authoritarian elections and what is termed ‘black knight election bolstering’. First, five mechanisms are elucidated, through which external assistance increases the chances of ‘winning’ elections in authoritarian settings (signaling invincibility, deterring elite defection, undermining opposition activities, dealing with popular protests, and countervailing pressure from foreign democracy promoters). Second, it is argued that external actors are most likely to offer election bolstering when they face a particularly acquiescent partner or when electoral defeat is perceived to lead to radical and undesired regime change. The relevance of both factors is augmented when uncertainty of the electoral outcome is high. Finally, four cases of Russian intervention during elections in three authoritarian neighbour countries (Ukraine in 2004, Belarus in 2006, and Moldova in 2005 and 2009) are analysed. The case studies corroborate the theoretical arguments: not only does Russia engage in all five types of black knight election bolstering, but it does so only when one or more of the three explanatory factors are present.