Both -ity and -ness are frequent and productive suffixes in English that fulfill the same core function: turning adjectives into nouns that denote the state or quality of whatever the adjective denotes. This well-known affix rivalry raises two core questions: 1. What determines the choice between -ity and -ness for a given base word? 2. Are the two affixes synonymous? For the first question, previous work has focused on morphological and phonological properties of the bases, but not their semantics. For question 2, the literature fails to give a convincing answer, with some studies, faced with doublets like ethnicity/ethnicness, arguing for a semantic difference, but most assuming synonymy. Using pretrained distributional vectors, I show empirically first that the semantics of the bases plays a major role in affix selection and second that the two affixes induce similar meaning shifts.

We show that attention constraints on decision-makers create barriers to financial inclusion. Using administrative data on retail loan-screening processes, we find that attention-constrained loan officers exert less effort reviewing applicants of lower socioeconomic status (SES) and reject them more frequently. More importantly, when externally imposed increases in loan officers’ workloads tighten attention constraints, loan officers are even more prone to quickly reject low-SES applicants but quickly accept very high-SES applicants without careful review. Such selective attention allocation further widens the approval rate gap between high- and low-SES applicants—a unique prediction of this attention-based mechanism.

Much mainstream political philosophy assumes that states have a broad right to decide who is granted entry and membership into their political community. On this conventional view, admission of migrants and refugees is understood as mostly a matter of general humanitarian duty or voluntary beneficence rather than as a specific obligation of justice. Through an analysis of climate-related migration from Central America's Dry Corridor to the United States, I argue that many such migrants may in fact be owed admission as reparation for injustice, and that the character of this injustice raises broader challenges for the conventional view.

Recent years have seen the development of a range of approaches concerned with theorizing and empirically demonstrating the significance of “transboundary entanglements” – patterns of connections between and across social sites. This work, spanning disciplines from sociology to international relations, and including subfields from postcolonial scholarship to global history, seeks to transcend the methodological nationalism associated with much preexisting historical social science by examining how, and with what effect, transboundary entanglements are formed and transformed over time. To date, however, the rich theoretical and substantive contributions made by these approaches have not been matched by comparable attention to the methodological principles and transposable procedures that can be used to analyze transboundary entanglements. This article contributes to this task. We make the case for a principle we call “global methodological relationalism” and explore how this principle can be operationalized through a three-step procedure: first, track relations across a boundary; second, follow these relations over time and across cases to establish variation; and third, provide an explanation of this variation. We highlight sites of overlap and contrast with existing methods for case selection, tracing historical processes, and making causal claims in small-N research, and establish the ways in which a “global historical sociology” oriented around “global methodological relationalism” can assess the significance of “transboundary entanglements.”

Our social identity affects what we believe. But, how should we epistemically evaluate this doxastic impact? Achieving a robust picture of the epistemic significance of social identity requires us to explore the understudied intersection of irrelevant influences and standpoint epistemology, which leads us to cases of double higher-order evidence. Reflecting on social identity through the lens of irrelevant influences gives us higher-order evidence of error, while reflecting through the lens of standpoint advantage gives us higher-order evidence of accuracy. We must weigh the strength of each piece of higher-order evidence case by case to epistemically evaluate the doxastic impact of social identity.

As part of the “Solar Geoengineering: Ethics, Governance, and International Politics” roundtable, this essay examines dilemmas arising in exploring nonideal scenarios of solar geoengineering deployment. Model-based knowledge about solar geoengineering tells us little about possible climatic responses to malicious, self-interested, or competing deployments, and even less about political or cultural responses outside of the climate system. The essay argues that policy for governing solar geoengineering in a world of multiple states and uneven power relations requires a broader base for solar geoengineering knowledge, beyond that offered by modeling, and a better understanding of nonideal scenarios, especially those motivated by logics beyond reducing climate impacts. It highlights the interests of military and security actors in such knowledge, and the potential for it to facilitate securitization and further reduce the prospect of multilateral collaborative governance of geoengineering in the public interest. The essay concludes that further research can be ethically justified but must be comprehensively governed.

Global disruption, technological advances, and population demographics are rapidly affecting the types of jobs that are available and the workers who will fill those jobs in the future of work. Successful workers in the dynamic and uncertain landscape of the workplace of the future will need to adapt rapidly to changing job demands, highlighting the necessity for lifelong learning and development. With few exceptions, industrial-organizational (I-O) psychologists have tended to take an organization-centered perspective on training and development; a perspective that promotes worker development as a means to organizational success. Hence, we call for a broadening of this view to include a person-centered perspective on workplace learning focused on individual skill development. A person-centered perspective addresses lifelong learning and skill development for those already in the labor force, whether they are working within or outside of organizations (e.g., gig workers), or those looking for work. It includes the most vulnerable people currently working or seeking work. We describe the factors affecting the future of work, the need to incorporate a person-centered perspective on work-related skill learning into I-O research and practice, and highlight several areas for future research and practice.

Sudan’s political distortions under Bashir’s regime between 1989 and 2018 resulted in multiple economic crises and civil wars. After assuming office in 2019, the Transitional Government implemented economic reforms aiming to stabilize the economy. It sought support from donors and international financial institutions, who conditioned support on stringent conditions. Civil society publicly decried the economic reforms and warned of the implications of discounting Sudan’s political distortions. Ultimately, the military orchestrated a coup citing poor economic management. Sudan’s experience highlights the importance of contextual policymaking during political transitions and the limitations of the approach employed by donors and multilateral organizations.

This article examines the history of Haitian-owned freighters that have been trading between Haiti and the Miami River since the 1970s, how this shipping economy became racialized in ways that marked it and the river with a “threatening” Haitian Blackness, and how local government agencies, real estate developers, and law enforcement officials worked to remake the aesthetics of the river as something other than Haitian and Black. Projects to re-racialize the riverway played with the spurious surface-and-subsurface spatial logic of racial discourses more generally—that is, the mistaken but widely-held belief that visible, physical markers of race reveal hidden capacities and propensities. Policing that pushed Haitian commerce into an economy of containerization—a race- and class-marked shipping technology on the river—allowed the Haiti trade to “pass” as non-Haitian on a gentrifying waterway. Law enforcement programs that seized and sank Haitian freighters to create artificial reefs off the Florida coast bluewashed the river’s surface and its ethnoracially coded, “polluting” vessels by transforming them into subsurface, “White” recreational ecologies. These processes reveal how politically fraught contests over racialization recruit layered material environments as part of larger projects of policing, re-racialization, and urban renewal. In exploring this history, the article pushes against arguments from some quarters for a “post-critical” turn by demonstrating that reflexive critique, with its focus on the hidden and the submerged, remains necessary for grasping the ways racialization processes operate through structures of material and discursive layering.

This article explores the path of the microscopic phylloxera insect as it made its way from the United States to the Eastern Mediterranean in the late nineteenth century. As the pest devastated vineyards in Western Europe it also catalyzed grape production in the western Ottoman Empire around Izmir, before this region, too, succumbed. One response to the outbreak was the first legal code controlling plant traffic across nations, and another was an effort to plant American rootstocks, which were relatively resistant. The Ottoman response to phylloxera offers another example of the ways in which the alleged “sick man of Europe” was actually much more dynamic than its detractors insisted. The invocation of phylloxera moreover became a way for post-Ottoman states like Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Serbia to protect their national grape economies. The article’s broader analysis explains how the shared environment of the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean incubated both the spread of phylloxera and—in the protectionist legal regimes formed in response—the architecture of the region’s peculiarly integrated disconnection. The article closes by considering the agriculture of displacement amidst the Greek-Turkish Population Exchange, and how it further entrenched these dynamics as migrants took vines with them and planted them in the remarkably similar environments of their new national homes.

This article concerns the criteria for when a group can collectively hold a belief. By proposing a cognitive non-summative account of group belief (GB), I highlight three necessary features at the individual level: commonality, mutuality, and group-based considerations. My account asserts that group G believes proposition p if and only if a sufficient majority of its members believe (1) pG, where pG is “Given some G-based considerations, p,” and (2) “the majority of G also believe that pG.” The article critiques three significant accounts of GB: Anthony Quinton's simple summative account, Margaret Gilbert's and Raimo Tuomela's conative non-summative views, and Jennifer Lackey's modified summativism.

In Morality by Degrees, Alastair Norcross presents contextualist accounts of good and right acts as well as harm and free will. All of his analyses compare what is assessed with “the appropriate alternative,” which is supposed to vary with context. This paper clarifies Norcross's approach, distinguishes it from previous versions of moral contextualism and contrastivism, and reveals difficulties in adequately specifying the context and the appropriate alternative. It also shows how these difficulties can be avoided by moving from contextualism to a kind of contrastivism that does not claim that any alternative is or is not appropriate or relevant.

Response-dependence about moral responsibility argues that someone is morally responsible if and only if, and because, they're an appropriate target of reactive attitudes. But if we can be partially morally responsible, and if reactive attitudes are too coarse-grained to register small differences in normatively significant features of agents, then response-dependence is false. Shawn Wang dubs this the “Granularity Challenge.” This article rejects the second premise of the Granularity Challenge. Human emotions are fine-grained enough to register small differences in normatively significant features of agents. One illustrative example of this, I argue, is how children gradually emerge as partially responsible agents.