The primary significance of scientific theories, laws, models, etc. lies in how they enable prediction and control of some part of the world that interests us. Pragmatists see this as the whole story with science; science is problem-solving inquiry that helps us when our habitual anticipations and practices fail us. What scientific inquiry delivers is new modes of prediction and control that resolve such problematic situations. Further talk of “pure” science, of the role of “explanatory virtues” beyond the empirical and practical, the pragmatist is wont to dismiss as “quasi-religious” and metaphysical claptrap. All of this is right, except the dismissiveness and the epithet “claptrap.” There is a perfectly pragmatic account to be given of this other (genuine and important) element of science, and it depends on taking seriously the social and personal role of religion and mythos. We may need science to play a key role in this secular age: providing synoptic understanding of the place of humanity in the universe and the meaning of it all. This suggests complex criteria for the synthetic and visionary parts of science that can fulfill this role.

Chapter 3 argues that Tokugawa Japan exerted an important influence on the way global geographers mapped and conceptualized what is known today as “the Pacific.” It shows how the ocean has been the object of diverging metageographical categorizations in different cultural and political contexts in Japan, Asia, and Oceania. Over the Tokugawa period, its meanings changed radically in Japan. In fact, even decades after the issue of maritime prohibitions, in 1675, the Tokugawa shogunate successfully explored and mapped the then-uninhabited Bonin Islands. For Japanese intellectuals, the subsequent “discovery” of the Pacific coincided with an intellectual emancipation from the continent, as Hayashi Shihei’s late-eighteenth century works illustrate. Concepts and geographical data created in the process were highly classified, yet they were among the first Japanese texts to be translated in Europe in the early nineteenth century, where they entered globalizing geographical discourses. Like the malleable category of Nan’yō or “the South Sea,” some metageographical categories remained politically distinct until the twentieth century.

In light of global crises such as biodiversity loss, climate change, and viral pandemics, scholars increasingly emphasize the epistemic authority of science while embracing its value-laden nature. This chapter challenges this “New Orthodoxy of Value-Laden Science” to engage with the roles of science in enabling environmental destruction and accelerating social inequality, particularly in the Global South. Using examples from agriculture and biodiversity, the chapter highlights contradictions where science is both a solution to and a cause of social-environmental crises. Moving beyond the New Orthodoxy, the chapter advocates for a justice-oriented approach that emphasizes distribution, recognition, and representation to make science not only epistemically but also socially just. This approach emphasizes the need to bridge the gap between critical scholarship and public trust, fostering a science that genuinely serves global justice.

The world of research and innovation is no exception to a broader societal demand (at least in liberal democracies) for more direct participation of citizens in various areas of public and political life, as attested by the significant development of various forms of “citizen science” programs. Such inclusiveness is nowadays commonly considered a means to better align the outputs of scientific research and innovation with the values and needs of society, hence fostering a more humanistic science. This chapter discusses the cogency of this requisite by addressing both epistemological and political challenges raised by opening up the process of knowledge production to nonprofessional inquirers and stakeholders. It assesses the prima facie tension between the inclusion of stakeholders in scientific research and traditional expectations of objectivity and impartiality. It also challenges the valuation of culturally well-entrenched features of science such as the valuation of unpredictable and unforeseen applications of scientific developments. Finally, it identifies various challenges to be met to enable a more inclusive science to effectively reduce the gap between its outputs and society’s needs, such as the need for an evolution of the professional training of scientists and of incentives from scientific institutions.

The well-posedness of the Cauchy problem for linear symmetric hyperbolic systems is proven, and consequences are worked out.

The rediscovery that the Vienna Circle’s neopositivist philosophy of science was not an exercise in theory for theory’s sake, but regarded by some of its most prominent practitioners as closely related to ongoing struggles for the social, economic, and political transformation of society (in his North American exile Rudolf Carnap spoke of “scientific humanism”), has attracted the attention of feminist and anti-racist philosophers. This chapter seeks to establish that two doctrines also associated with neopositivism (and shared by Carnap and Otto Neurath) need not prove as rebarbative for contemporary activist scholars as they may appear initially. It is argued, first, that understood as a qualified adoption of Max Weber’s position their conception of scientific value freedom (better: scientific value neutrality) does not undermine their ambition that science and its philosophy serve their sociopolitical engagement, and, second, that their conception of value noncognitivism does not at all render discussions of nonepistemic normative matters meaningless, but only bars deciding them as intersubjectively binding on a priori philosophical or empirical scientific grounds. Joint deliberation is needed.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East signal the return of geopolitics. This book challenges conventional approaches that ignore border change, arguing that geopolitics is driven by nationalism and focusing on how nationalism transforms the state. Using geocoded historical maps covering state borders and ethnic groups in Europe, the authors’ spatial approach shows how, since the French Revolution, nationalism has caused increasing congruence between state and national borders and how a lack of congruence increased the risk of armed conflict. This macro process is traced from early modern Europe and widens the geographic scope to the entire world in the mid twentieth century. The analysis shows that the risk of conflict may be increased by how nationalists, seeking to revive past golden ages and restore their nations’ prestige, respond to incongruent borders. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

The concern of this chapter is with varieties of philosophical humanism and their own conceptions of the nature and significance of science. After an initial characterization of major themes in Renaissance humanism, it describes three main varieties that are evident in twentieth-century European philosophy – humanism as essentialism, humanism as rational subjectivity, and existential humanism. Different varieties of humanism are associated with different conceptions of science, some allied to the sciences, others antipathetic to them, while yet others offer subtler positions. The upshot is that there are different tales to tell about the relationship of (varieties of) philosophical humanism to (conceptions of) science, only some of which fit popular modern celebratory claims about a necessary alliance of humanism and science. If we take a wider look at the history of philosophy, we find ongoing experimentation with forms of humanism and explorations of diverse ways of understanding and evaluating scientific knowledge and ambitions. What we find is what we ought to expect of social, creative, epistemically sophisticated, self-expressive creatures: endless variety.

The relationship between states, cities and international organizations is a useful prism to assess broader trends of the development of the international system. Engaging with sub-national actors like cities and their networks adds a level of complexity to the question of how independent an organization is and how it relates to the preferences of its member states. This chapter provides historical context to this current debate. It looks at how a conceivable international role of cities became an issue in the interwar era. In particular, it looks at how the ‘Union Internationale des Villes’, founded in 1913, sought some form of formal recognition from the League of Nations, but also fostered more modest ties with the International Labour Organization (ILO). This historical episode might not equip us with straightforward ‘lessons’ for today. But it might help us to adopt a more nuanced and informed perspective on current debates about international institutional reform and the promise that cities and their associations and networks can play in this regard.

Chapter 8 observes the emergence of frontier tycoons toward the close of the nineteenth century, carried by a wave of “South Sea Romanticism” in literature and politics, propagated publicly by a pathos of drift and discovery. Fueled by insurgent demands of popular rights in the 1870s, grassroots expansionists claimed a “national right” to adventure and opportunity in the ocean frontier. Petty entrepreneurs of questionable reputation and ambivalent attitudes towards the law “opened” remote isles where state control faded. Others, like the entrepreneur Koga Tatsushirō who appropriated the Senkaku (Diaoyu) islands in 1895, enjoyed governmental backing. Such island colonies were eventually absorbed by the empire’s corporate infrastructure and were refashioned as sandboxes for colonial administration. “Rogue entrepreneurs” meanwhile traveled as far as the Caroline Islands in Micronesia, where one businessman, operating below the government’s radar, eventually facilitated the installation of a Japanese South Seas Protectorate. The chapter argues that the Japanese empire’s modalities of expansion carried the imprint of these experiences.