Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) has called for bioethics to end talk about personhood, asserting that such talk has the tendency to confuse and offend. It will be argued that this has only limited application for (largely) private settings. However, in other settings, theorizing about personhood leaves a gap in which there is the risk that the offending concept will get uptake elsewhere, and so the problem Blumenthal-Barby nominates may not be completely avoided. In response to this risk, an argument is presented in support of the idea that the role of philosophers and bioethicists, far from ending talk of personhood, ought to be to clarify the concept, and to do so in nuanced ways, given its application for specific kinds of impairments. The case of dementia is used to illustrate this in the context of person-centered care. Ironically, given the stigma attached to dementia, far from the need to end talk of personhood, bioethicists are needed to rescue the concept and clarify its role.

Of all the principles in classical Jewish law that stand out from a comparative legal perspective perhaps none is more notable than the ban on self-incrimination in criminal procedures. Contrary to the most basic evidentiary assumptions of other ancient legal systems, this principle differs fundamentally from the right to remain silent that is part of both early modern and modern legal systems. Only rabbinic jurisprudence incorporates an outright exclusion of criminal confessions. Despite receiving much scholarly attention over the centuries, this principle’s fundamental justification relating to the rule of law and the public pursuit of justice has gone unnoticed. This article explores this salient jurisprudential perspective, and sheds new light on this principle by contrasting the Jewish legal approach with the primary modes of criminal adjudication that were adopted in the West. What emerges from this comparative analysis is that this seemingly anomalous principle actually reveals much about the core commitments and values of Jewish law. These, in turn, have substantial implications for certain contemporary legal practices and dilemmas.

This article examines the business strategies employed by early twentieth-century Bombay mill owners in work organization and wage differentiation. The traditionally highly segmented and fluctuating domestic textile markets in India were further complicated by colonial free trade policies, making them highly competitive. This prompted Bombay mills to adopt various strategies, including maintaining a flexible workforce, product diversification, tailoring sales strategies to the Indian market, and increasing labour inputs, related to their heavy reliance on short-stapled Indian raw cotton. Using detailed and disaggregated data reported by textile mills in Bombay during the 1920s and 1930s, this article investigates how employers adopted these strategies in tandem with distinct wage-setting systems as management tools to depress the wage bill. By analysing the motivations behind the adoption of or resistance to these tools across different operations within the production process – such as weaving, spinning, reeling, and winding – the article reveals how gendered and social-class stratifications shaped these strategies and led to wage disparities across the industry. Ultimately, these labour-intensive strategies, conditioned by the broader colonial context in which India's textile industry developed, were at the root of the lower productivity of Indian workers, with long-run adverse consequences for India's general industrial development.

The procreation asymmetry is a widely held view in ethics, claiming that one should make existing people happy but has no reason to make happy people. Here, I shall present a new objection demonstrating from modest premises that one has a reason to take a sequence of actions that simply creates a happy person; yet this judgment in combination with plausible principles about sequences of actions entails that one has some reason to simply create a happy person. Additionally, I will argue that one's reasons to create a happy person are quite strong.

During the ill-fated 1897 Andrée balloon expedition, Nils Strindberg allegedly dropped a small tin containing a last message for his fiancée onto the island Fuglesongen in northwestern Svalbard, as the expedition crew passed over it in their hydrogen balloon, Örnen. Despite at least one lengthy search on Fuglesongen, the tin has never been found. This paper investigates the hypothesis that the tin was accidentally dropped onto Klovningen, a neighbouring island similar in size and shape, situated approximately 2.4 km east of Fuglesongen. A re-analysis of Strindberg’s original handwritten notes from the balloon flight, along with other primary sources and meteorological analyses, suggests that a targeted search for the tin on Klovningen could be a promising next step in solving this enduring mystery.

During the French Revolution, thousands of revolutionaries and royalists fled the turmoil in French islands. Many went to nearby islands, from which they could observe events. Situated between Martinique and Guadeloupe, Dominica had a majority French population and a long history of connection with its French neighbors. This article uses the case of Dominica to explore the effects of the French Revolution on a non-French island in the Eastern Caribbean. From the start, its proximity to the French islands led to its entanglement in revolutionary politics. It was the first British island to receive refugees, and the influx of people of all racial, social, and political backgrounds into Dominica posed challenges for island officials. Officials had to determine on what terms to admit emigrants, whether they posed a threat to the colony, and how to feed and house them. They also worried about the influences of foreigners and revolutionary ideas on their own disaffected free and enslaved populations. This article argues that Dominica's location, heterogeneous population, and internal instability allowed it to become a node for regional migration and information networks that embroiled it in the turmoil that engulfed its neighbors and ultimately threatened British control of the island.

I formulate a compatibilism that is distinctively responsive to skeptical worries about the justification of punishment and other moral responsibility practices. I begin with an evolutionary story explaining why backward-looking reactive attitudes are “given” in human society. Cooperative society plausibly could not be sustained without such practices. The necessary accountability practices have complex internal standards. These internal standards may fully ground the appropriateness of reactive attitudes. Following a recent analogy, we can similarly hold that there are no external standards for what is funny; the norms of comedy are complex, but funny is funny. However, this is compatible with moral reasons to change the practices themselves, and therefore change what is fitting within them: in the first instance, a moralistic “that's not funny” is ill-fitting, but “that shouldn't be funny” can be apt. The analogous reformist position prescribes practices constituting the minimal responsibility norms necessary for cooperative society.

What are the legal and political criteria that distinguish between ‘correct’ and ‘unacceptable’ legal mobilisation? How does populism facilitate legal mobilisation? The questions of the workshop organizers led us back in Hungary to the democratic transition from socialism to liberal democracy in 1989, when legal mobilisation for the rule of law, democracy and human rights was led first and primarily by non-state actors (National Round Table). Participants of the democratic transition prepared the complete revision of the 1949 Constitution, which was an emblematic element in addition to the many legislative drafts of the transitory nature of the creation of the new system. In 2010, after the successful political mobilisation, the populist party coalition (lead by Viktor Orban) gained a two-thirds constitution-making majority in Parliament (in the absence of two opposition parties), and the Parliament adopted the new Fundamental Law (new constitution). This was also an emblematic element of the new legal mobilisation conducted by the two-thirds populist Government majority. This article will describe how populism – through the instrumentalisation of the law (disregarding the inherent values in/of law based on value choice) and the destruction of institutional checks and balances – facilitated new legal mobilisation. Based on this experience of the outcome of the equally strong and effective legal mobilisation in Hungary of the liberal and the illiberal (democratic and autocratic, respectively) transitions, in this article we aim to make valid theoretical propositions on how to assess ‘correct’ and ‘incorrect’ legal mobilisation and what influences the relevance of non-state actors in populism.

The role of social movements and civil society actors in rights advancement has been frequently emphasised. The assumption is that legal mobilisation by civil society actors works towards the extension of rights and the emancipation and advancement of justice for distinctive (minority) groups in society. While traditionally, socio-legal attention on social movement and civil society actions around rights promotion was particularly prominent in the US, for some time now the European context has also been approached from such a socio-legal lens. However, a one-sided, liberal–progressive understanding of social mobilisation around rights has, importantly, been put to the test by recent manifestations of societal actors. Conservative actors tend to (1) promote a restrictive interpretation or a radical reinterpretation of existing rights (e.g. abortion, free speech), (2) limit the diffusion of new rights (e.g. the rights to euthanasia or legalizing surrogate maternity) and/or (3) call for the interruption of the further extensions of rights (e.g. with regard to same-sex marriage, LGBTIQ issues). The analysis of legal mobilisation by such conservative right-wing actors indicates that mobilisational repertoires are strikingly similar to those of liberal actors. This article will discuss the notions of civil society and legal mobilisation and call for a rethinking of these concepts, in part because of the increasing manifestation of societal actors that are in contrast to the traditional liberal paradigm. The article will subsequently engage in a detailed study of one such actor – the Polish legal think tank Ordo Iuris (OI) – with regard to its third-party or amicus curiae interventions at the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), stressing the difference of orientation of such interventions from those of liberal actors and also indicating dimensions of ambivalence and similarity in their approaches.

This paper analyses the growing litigation before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) by conservative European Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) who exploit legal opportunities and other advocacy tactics. These actors oppose the liberal insistence on permissive individual freedom, minority rights and mandatory vaccination. Instead, they promote the sanctity of life, traditional values and harsh terrorism penalties. In this study we show that conservative legal mobilisation is not only related to litigation but also covers the execution of certain ECtHR judgments and the nomination of some European judges. We analyse their tactics using legal and sociolegal methodology (interviews, analysis of legal documents and jurisprudence and network analysis) to characterise their influence on the European human rights system and the reactions of the Council of Europe. We reflect on the moral values claimed by conservative NGOs and their liberal counterparts by analysing how powerful private actors, driven by material and moral interests, take creative initiatives that shape or reshape case law and its politicisation through alliances with so-called ‘illiberal’ and ‘populist’ states.

This article serves as an introduction to the special issue on ‘Populism and Right-Wing Legal Mobilization in Europe’. We point to the dependence of populists in power on non-state actors: populist governments have ideological and political reasons to need the support of civil society’s right-wing representatives and have the financial and institutional means to strengthen those organizations. We then map right-wing legal mobilization in Europe based on the analyses in the special issue. By right-wing legal mobilization, we understand the organized efforts, resources, and strategies employed by individuals, groups, or organizations with conservative or right-leaning ideologies to embody their values in positive law and its interpretation. The text concludes with a dynamic normative framework to assess this type of mobilization. Drawing on recent contributions from comparative constitutional law, human rights, and socio-legal studies, we argue that the analysis and evaluation of right-wing legal mobilization could be based on a comprehensive analysis of three bundles of issues: (1) the relationship between mobilizing actors and the courts, as well as the local standard of judicial independence, (2) the relation of right-wing argumentation to systemic linkages and historical trajectories of human rights, (3) the redistributive effect (economic and symbolic) and the potential success of such mobilization on the legal capacities of other actors who may have opposing interests. From this perspective, the problematic part of right-wing legal mobilization in the context of populism is, therefore, not its ideological, conservative character but its influence on the rule of law to gain strategic advantage. In the process, the very idea of the rule of law and the related issue of civic agency may be compromised.