To save content items to your account,
please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies.
If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account.
Find out more about saving content to .
To save content items to your Kindle, first ensure no-reply@cambridge.org
is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings
on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part
of your Kindle email address below.
Find out more about saving to your Kindle.
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations.
‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi.
‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
In 1932, von Neumann proposed classifying the statistical behavior of differentiable systems. Joint work of B. Weiss and the author proved that the classification problem is complete analytic. Based on techniques in that proof, one is able to show that the collection of recursive diffeomorphisms of the 2-torus that are isomorphic to their inverses is $\Pi ^0_1$-hard via a computable 1-1 reduction. As a corollary there is a diffeomorphism that is isomorphic to its inverse if and only if the Riemann Hypothesis holds, a different one that is isomorphic to its inverse if and only if Goldbach’s conjecture holds and so forth. Applying the reduction to the $\Pi ^0_1$-sentence expressing “ZFC is consistent” gives a diffeomorphism T of the 2-torus such that the question of whether $T\cong T^{-1}$ is independent of ZFC.
Let $\to $ be a continuous $\protect \operatorname {\mathrm {[0,1]}}$-valued function defined on the unit square $\protect \operatorname {\mathrm {[0,1]}}^2$, having the following properties: (i) $x\to (y\to z)= y\to (x\to z)$ and (ii) $x\to y=1 $ iff $x\leq y$. Let $\neg x=x\to 0$. Then the algebra $W=(\protect \operatorname {\mathrm {[0,1]}},1,\neg ,\to )$ satisfies the time-honored Łukasiewicz axioms of his infinite-valued calculus. Let $x\to _{\text {\tiny \L }}y=\min (1,1-x+y)$ and $\neg _{\text {\tiny \L }}x=x\to _{\text {\tiny \L }} 0 =1-x.$ Then there is precisely one isomorphism $\phi $ of W onto the standard Wajsberg algebra $W_{\text {\tiny \L }}= (\protect \operatorname {\mathrm {[0,1]}},1,\neg _{\text {\tiny \L }},\to _{\text {\tiny \L }})$. Thus $x\to y= \phi ^{-1}(\min (1,1-\phi (x)+\phi (y)))$.
Using the category of metric spaces as a template, we develop a metric analogue of the categorical semantics of classical/intuitionistic logic, and show that the natural notion of predicate in this “continuous semantics” is equivalent to the a priori separate notion of predicate in continuous logic, a logic which is independently well-studied by model theorists and which finds various applications. We show this equivalence by exhibiting the real interval $[0,1]$ in the category of metric spaces as a “continuous subobject classifier” giving a correspondence not only between the two notions of predicate, but also between the natural notion of quantification in the continuous semantics and the existing notion of quantification in continuous logic.
Along the way, we formulate what it means for a given category to behave like the category of metric spaces, and afterwards show that any such category supports the aforementioned continuous semantics. As an application, we show that categories of presheaves of metric spaces are examples of such, and in fact even possess continuous subobject classifiers.
We isolate two abstract determinacy theorems for games of length $\omega_1$ from work of Neeman and use them to conclude, from large-cardinal assumptions and an iterability hypothesis in the region of measurable Woodin cardinals that
(1) if the Continuum Hypothesis holds, then all games of length $\omega_1$ which are provably $\Delta_1$-definable from a universally Baire parameter (in first-order or $\Omega $-logic) are determined;
(2) all games of length $\omega_1$ with payoff constructible relative to the play are determined; and
(3) if the Continuum Hypothesis holds, then there is a model of ${\mathsf{ZFC}}$ containing all reals in which all games of length $\omega_1$ definable from real and ordinal parameters are determined.
We prove the Decomposability Conjecture for functions of Baire class $2$ from a Polish space to a separable metrizable space. This partially answers an important open problem in descriptive set theory.
We calculate the complexity of Scott sentences of scattered linear orders. Given a countable scattered linear order L of Hausdorff rank $\alpha $ we show that it has a ${d\text {-}\Sigma _{2\alpha +1}}$ Scott sentence. It follows from results of Ash [2] that for every countable $\alpha $ there is a linear order whose optimal Scott sentence has this complexity. Therefore, our bounds are tight. We furthermore show that every Hausdorff rank 1 linear order has an optimal ${\Pi ^{\mathrm {c}}_{3}}$ or ${d\text {-}\Sigma ^{\mathrm {c}}_{3}}$ Scott sentence and give a characterization of those linear orders of rank $1$ with ${\Pi ^{\mathrm {c}}_{3}}$ optimal Scott sentences. At last we show that for all countable $\alpha $ the class of Hausdorff rank $\alpha $ linear orders is $\boldsymbol {\Sigma }_{2\alpha +2}$ complete and obtain analogous results for index sets of computable linear orders.
We investigate relationships between versions of derivability conditions for provability predicates. We show several implications and non-implications between the conditions, and we discuss unprovability of consistency statements induced by derivability conditions. First, we classify already known versions of the second incompleteness theorem, and exhibit some new sets of conditions which are sufficient for unprovability of Hilbert–Bernays’ consistency statement. Secondly, we improve Buchholz’s schematic proof of provable $\Sigma_1$-completeness. Then among other things, we show that Hilbert–Bernays’ conditions and Löb’s conditions are mutually incomparable. We also show that neither Hilbert–Bernays’ conditions nor Löb’s conditions accomplish Gödel’s original statement of the second incompleteness theorem.
We provide a finite basis for the class of Borel functions that are not in the first Baire class, as well as the class of Borel functions that are not $\sigma $-continuous with closed witnesses.
In this note we give a simplified ordinal analysis of first-order reflection. An ordinal notation system $OT$ is introduced based on $\psi $-functions. Provable $\Sigma _{1}$-sentences on $L_{\omega _{1}^{CK}}$ are bounded through cut-elimination on operator controlled derivations.
In this paper, we present a version of Fraïssé theory for categories of metric structures. Using this version, we show that every UHF algebra can be recognized as a Fraïssé limit of a class of C*-algebras of matrix-valued continuous functions on cubes with distinguished traces. We also give an alternative proof of the fact that the Jiang–Su algebra is the unique simple monotracial C*-algebra among all the inductive limits of prime dimension drop algebras.
We shall define a general notion of dimension, and study groups and rings whose interpretable sets carry such a dimension. In particular, we deduce chain conditions for groups, definability results for fields and domains, and show that a pseudofinite $\widetilde {\mathfrak M}_c$-group of finite positive dimension contains a finite-by-abelian subgroup of positive dimension, and a pseudofinite group of dimension 2 contains a soluble subgroup of dimension 2.
Is a logicist bound to the claim that as a matter of analytic truth there is an actual infinity of objects? If Hume’s Principle is analytic then in the standard setting the answer appears to be yes. Hodes’s work pointed to a way out by offering a modal picture in which only a potential infinity was posited. However, this project was abandoned due to apparent failures of cross-world predication. We re-explore this idea and discover that in the setting of the potential infinite one can interpret first-order Peano arithmetic, but not second-order Peano arithmetic. We conclude that in order for the logicist to weaken the metaphysically loaded claim of necessary actual infinities, they must also weaken the mathematics they recover.
State spaces are, in the most general sense, sets of entities that contain information. Examples include states of dynamical systems, processes of observations, or possible worlds. We use domain theory to describe the structure of positive and negative information in state spaces. We present examples ranging from the space of trajectories of a dynamical system, over Dunn’s aboutness interpretation of fde, to the space of open sets of a spectral space. We show that these information structures induce so-called hype models which were recently developed by Leitgeb (2019). Conversely, we prove a representation theorem: roughly, hype models can be represented as induced by an information structure. Thus, the well-behaved logic hype is a sound and complete logic for reasoning about information in state spaces.
As application of this framework, we investigate information fusion. We motivate two kinds of fusion. We define a groundedness and a separation property that allow a hype model to be closed under the two kinds of fusion. This involves a Dedekind–MacNeille completion and a fiber-space like construction. The proof-techniques come from pointless topology and universal algebra.
In this paper, we axiomatize the deontic logic in Fusco (2015), which uses a Stalnaker-inspired account of diagonal acceptance and a two-dimensional account of disjunction to treat Ross’s Paradox and the Puzzle of Free Choice Permission. On this account, disjunction-involving validities are a priori rather than necessary. We show how to axiomatize two-dimensional disjunction so that the introduction/elimination rules for boolean disjunction can be viewed as one-dimensional projections of more general two-dimensional rules. These completeness results help make explicit the restrictions Fusco’s account must place on free-choice inferences. They are also of independent interest, as they raise difficult questions about how to “lift” a Kripke frame for a one-dimensional modal logic into two dimensions.
Zermelo’s Theorem that the axiom of choice is equivalent to the principle that every set can be well-ordered goes through in third-order logic, but in second-order logic we run into expressivity issues. In this note, we show that in a natural extension of second-order logic weaker than third-order logic, choice still implies the well-ordering principle. Moreover, this extended second-order logic with choice is conservative over ordinary second-order logic with the well-ordering principle. We also discuss a variant choice principle, due to Hilbert and Ackermann, which neither implies nor is implied by the well-ordering principle.
A set $U \subseteq {\mathbb {R}} \times {\mathbb {R}}$ is universal for countable subsets of ${\mathbb {R}}$ if and only if for all $x \in {\mathbb {R}}$, the section $U_x = \{y \in {\mathbb {R}} : U(x,y)\}$ is countable and for all countable sets $A \subseteq {\mathbb {R}}$, there is an $x \in {\mathbb {R}}$ so that $U_x = A$. Define the equivalence relation $E_U$ on ${\mathbb {R}}$ by $x_0 \ E_U \ x_1$ if and only if $U_{x_0} = U_{x_1}$, which is the equivalence of codes for countable sets of reals according to U. The Friedman–Stanley jump, $=^+$, of the equality relation takes the form $E_{U^*}$ where $U^*$ is the most natural Borel set that is universal for countable sets. The main result is that $=^+$ and $E_U$ for any U that is Borel and universal for countable sets are equivalent up to Borel bireducibility. For all U that are Borel and universal for countable sets, $E_U$ is Borel bireducible to $=^+$. If one assumes a particular instance of $\mathbf {\Sigma }_3^1$-generic absoluteness, then for all $U \subseteq {\mathbb {R}} \times {\mathbb {R}}$ that are $\mathbf {\Sigma }_1^1$ (continuous images of Borel sets) and universal for countable sets, there is a Borel reduction of $=^+$ into $E_U$.
The class forcing theorem, which asserts that every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ admits a forcing relation $\Vdash _{\mathbb {P}}$, that is, a relation satisfying the forcing relation recursion—it follows that statements true in the corresponding forcing extensions are forced and forced statements are true—is equivalent over Gödel–Bernays set theory $\text {GBC}$ to the principle of elementary transfinite recursion $\text {ETR}_{\text {Ord}}$ for class recursions of length $\text {Ord}$. It is also equivalent to the existence of truth predicates for the infinitary languages $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\omega }(\in ,A)$, allowing any class parameter A; to the existence of truth predicates for the language $\mathcal {L}_{\text {Ord},\text {Ord}}(\in ,A)$; to the existence of $\text {Ord}$-iterated truth predicates for first-order set theory $\mathcal {L}_{\omega ,\omega }(\in ,A)$; to the assertion that every separative class partial order ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a set-complete class Boolean completion; to a class-join separation principle; and to the principle of determinacy for clopen class games of rank at most $\text {Ord}+1$. Unlike set forcing, if every class forcing notion ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a forcing relation merely for atomic formulas, then every such ${\mathbb {P}}$ has a uniform forcing relation applicable simultaneously to all formulas. Our results situate the class forcing theorem in the rich hierarchy of theories between $\text {GBC}$ and Kelley–Morse set theory $\text {KM}$.
The prevalent interpretation of Gödel’s Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of the underlying mathematical theorem depends on several arbitrary formalisation choices. In this paper I examine the theorem’s dependency regarding Gödel numberings. I introduce deviant numberings, yielding provability predicates satisfying Löb’s conditions, which result in provable consistency sentences. According to the main result of this paper however, these “counterexamples” do not refute the theorem’s prevalent interpretation, since once a natural class of admissible numberings is singled out, invariance is maintained.
We consider the Lambek calculus, or noncommutative multiplicative intuitionistic linear logic, extended with iteration, or Kleene star, axiomatised by means of an $\omega $-rule, and prove that the derivability problem in this calculus is $\Pi _1^0$-hard. This solves a problem left open by Buszkowski (2007), who obtained the same complexity bound for infinitary action logic, which additionally includes additive conjunction and disjunction. As a by-product, we prove that any context-free language without the empty word can be generated by a Lambek grammar with unique type assignment, without Lambek’s nonemptiness restriction imposed (cf. Safiullin, 2007).