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Knowing, believing, and acting as if you know

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Dilip Ninan*
Department of Philosophy, Tufts University, Miner Hall, Medford, MA02155, USA.;


Phillips et al. argue that our capacity for representing knowledge is more basic than our capacity for representing belief. But they remain neutral on the further claim that our “belief capacity” depends on our “knowledge capacity.” I consider how this further claim might help to explain some of the generalizations the authors catalog, and explore one way of understanding it.

Open Peer Commentary
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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