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Relational mentalizing after any representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Eliane Deschrijver Open the ORCID record for Eliane Deschrijver [Opens in a new window]
Eliane Deschrijver*
Affiliation:
Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Henri Dunantlaan 2, 9000, Ghent, Belgium School of Psychology, University of New South Wales (UNSW), Library Walk, Kensington, NSW 2033, Australia. e.deschrijver@unsw.edu.au; www.elianedeschrijver.com
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Abstract

Autistic, developmental, and nonhuman primate populations fail tasks that are thought to involve attributing beliefs, but not those thought to reflect the representation of knowledge. Instead of knowledge representations being more basic than belief representations, relational mentalizing may explain these observations: The tasks referred to as reflecting “belief” representation, but not the “knowledge” representation tasks, are social conflict designs. They involve mental conflict monitoring after another's mental state is represented – with effects that need to be accounted for.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e148
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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