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Three cognitive mechanisms for knowledge tracking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Dora Kampis Open the ORCID record for Dora Kampis [Opens in a new window]  and
Gergely Csibra Open the ORCID record for Gergely Csibra [Opens in a new window]
Dora Kampis
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade 2A, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark dk@psy.ku.dk
Gergely Csibra
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Science, Central European University, Október 6. u. 7, 1051 Budapest, Hungary. csibrag@ceu.edu
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Abstract

We welcome Phillips et al.'s proposal to separate the understanding of “knowledge” from that of “beliefs.” We argue that this distinction is best specified at the level of the cognitive mechanisms. Three distinct mechanisms are discussed: tagging one's own representations with those who share the same reality; representing others' representations (metarepresenting knowledge); and attributing dispositions to provide useful information.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e157
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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