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Knowledge and the brain: Why the knowledge-centric theory of mind program needs neuroscience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Adam Michael Bricker Open the ORCID record for Adam Michael Bricker [Opens in a new window]
Adam Michael Bricker*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Cologne Center for Contemporary Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition (CONCEPT), Universität zu Köln, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Köln, Germany. adam.michael.bricker@gmail.com; https://sites.google.com/view/adam-michael-bricker
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Abstract

The knowledge-centric theory of mind research program suggested by Phillips et al. stands to gain significant value by embracing a neurocognitive approach that takes full advantage of techniques such as fMRI and EEG. This neurocognitive approach has already begun providing important insights into the mechanisms of knowledge attribution, insights which support the claim that it is more basic than belief attribution.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e146
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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