Hostname: page-component-89b8bd64d-46n74 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-05-07T17:54:56.436Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Knowledge prior to belief: Is extended better than enacted?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Mirko Farina Open the ORCID record for Mirko Farina [Opens in a new window]  and
Andrea Lavazza
Mirko Farina
Affiliation:
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Universitetskaya St, 1, Innopolis, Republic of Tatarstan 420500, Russian Federation m.farina@innopolis.ru; http://mirkofarina.weebly.com/
Andrea Lavazza
Affiliation:
Centro Universitario Internazionale, Via Antonio Garbasso 42, 52100 Arezzo, AR, Italy. lavazza67@gmail.com; https://www.cui.org/andrea-lavazza/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In this commentary, we argue that Phillips et al.'s findings can be used to provide new important insights in the debate between externalists’ theories of cognition. In particular, we claim that the results presented in this target article may offer us the conceptual palette needed for a sustained defence of an extended account of cognition over an enactive one.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e152
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Article purchase

Temporarily unavailable

References

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. (1998). The extended mind. Analysis, 58(1), 7–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, A., & Toribio, J. (1994). Doing without representing? Synthese, 101(3), 401–431.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farina, M. (2013). Neither touch nor vision: Sensory substitution as artificial synaesthesia? Biology & Philosophy, 28(4), 639–655.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farina, M. (2020). Embodiment: dimensions, domains, and applications. Adaptive Behavior, 29(1), 73–99. http://doi.org/10.1177/1059712320912963.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Farina, M., & Levin, S. (In Press). The extended mind thesis: Domains and application. In Michael, R. & Thomas, L. (Eds.), Embodied psychology: Thinking, feeling, and acting. Springer. (accepted)Google Scholar
Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2020). The phenomenological mind. Routledge.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibson, J. J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Houghton Mifflin.Google Scholar
Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2012). Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without content. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kiverstein, J., Farina, M., & Clark, A. (2013). The extended mind thesis. Oxford University Press. http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0099.xmlCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Menary, R., & Protevi, J. (2007). Cognitive integration: Mind and cognition unbounded. Palgrave McMillan.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Noë, A. (2004). Action in perception. MIT Press.Google Scholar
Rowlands, M. J. (2010). The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sutton, J., Harris, C. B., Keil, P. G., & Barnier, A. J. (2010). The psychology of memory, extended cognition, and socially distributed remembering. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9(4), 521–560.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Thompson, E., & Stapleton, M. (2009). Making sense of sense-making: Reflections on enactive and extended mind theories. Topoi, 28(1), 23–30.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ward, D., Silverman, D., & Villalobos, M. (2017). Introduction: The varieties of enactivism. Topoi, 36(3), 365–375.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the cognitive world: The next step. A Bradford Book.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zahavi, D. (2002). First-person thoughts and embodied self-awareness: Some reflections on the relation between recent analytical philosophy and phenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 7–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar