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There's more to consider than knowledge and belief

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

David M. Sobel Open the ORCID record for David M. Sobel [Opens in a new window]
David M. Sobel*
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive, Linguistic, and Psychological Sciences, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, USA. Dave_Sobel@brown.edu
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Abstract

Phillips et al. present a number of arguments for the premise that knowledge is more basic than belief. Although their arguments are coherent and sound, they do not directly address numerous cases in which belief appears to be a developmental precursor to knowledge. I describe several examples, not necessarily as a direct challenge, but rather to better understand their framework.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e170
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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