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Beliefs for human-unique social learning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Hilary Richardson Open the ORCID record for Hilary Richardson [Opens in a new window]
Hilary Richardson*
Affiliation:
School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9JZ, UK. hilary.richardson@ed.ac.uk https://hilaryrichardson.github.io/
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Abstract

Phillips et al. argue that understanding what others know is central to social cognition across species and that this understanding underlies human-unique accumulation and transmission of cultural knowledge. Knowledge representations can't be both what we have in common with our evolutionary ancestors and what sets us apart from them. Belief representations are necessary for human-unique social learning.

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Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e165
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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