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Do “knowledge attributions” involve metarepresentation just like belief attributions do?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Rachel Dudley Open the ORCID record for Rachel Dudley [Opens in a new window]  and
Ágnes Melinda Kovács
Rachel Dudley
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, Budapest, Oktober 6 u. 7, 1051, Hungary. dudleyr@ceu.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/rachelelainedudley; kovacsag@ceu.edu https://people.ceu.edu/agnes-melinda_kovacs
Ágnes Melinda Kovács
Affiliation:
Department of Cognitive Science, Cognitive Development Center, Central European University, Budapest, Oktober 6 u. 7, 1051, Hungary. dudleyr@ceu.edu; https://sites.google.com/site/rachelelainedudley; kovacsag@ceu.edu https://people.ceu.edu/agnes-melinda_kovacs
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Abstract

The authors distinguish knowledge and belief attributions, emphasizing the role of the former in mental-state attribution. This does not, however, warrant diminishing interest in the latter. Knowledge attributions may not entail mental-state attributions or metarepresentations. Even if they do, the proposed features are insufficient to distinguish them from belief attributions, demanding that we first understand each underlying representation.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e149
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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