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Are knowledge- and belief-reasoning automatic, and is this the right question?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Andrew D. R. Surtees Open the ORCID record for Andrew D. R. Surtees [Opens in a new window]  and
Andrew R. Todd
Andrew D. R. Surtees
Affiliation:
School of Psychology, University of Birmingham and Birmingham Children's Hospital, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK A.Surtees@Bham.ac.uk https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/staff/profiles/psychology/surtees-andrew.aspx
Andrew R. Todd
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis, Davis, CA 95616, USA. atodd@ucdavis.edu https://psychology.ucdavis.edu/people/atodd
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Abstract

Phillips et al. conclude that current evidence supports knowledge-, but not belief-reasoning as being automatic. We suggest four reasons why this is an oversimplified answer to a question that might not have a clear-cut answer: (1) knowledge and beliefs can be incompletely equated to perceptual states, (2) sensitivity to mental states does not necessitate representation, (3) automaticity is not a single categorical feature, and (4) how we represent others' minds is dependent on social context.

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Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e172
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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