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Why is knowledge faster than (true) belief?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Evan Westra Open the ORCID record for Evan Westra [Opens in a new window]
Evan Westra*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, ONM3J 1P3, Canada. ewestra@yorku.ca; https://sites.google.com/site/ewestraphilosophy
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Abstract

Phillips and colleagues convincingly argue that knowledge attribution is a faster, more automatic form of mindreading than belief attribution. However, they do not explain what it is about knowledge attribution that lends it this cognitive advantage. I suggest an explanation of the knowledge-attribution advantage that would also help to distinguish it from belief-based and minimalist alternatives.

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Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e175
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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