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Do knowledge representations facilitate learning under epistemic uncertainty?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 November 2021

Isaac J. Handley-Miner Open the ORCID record for Isaac J. Handley-Miner [Opens in a new window]  and
Liane Young Open the ORCID record for Liane Young [Opens in a new window]
Isaac J. Handley-Miner
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA. isaac.handley-miner@bc.edu; liane.young@bc.edu; https://moralitylab.bc.edu/
Liane Young
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA. isaac.handley-miner@bc.edu; liane.young@bc.edu; https://moralitylab.bc.edu/
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Abstract

Phillips and colleagues argue that knowledge representations are more fundamental than belief representations because they better facilitate social learning. We suggest that existing theory of mind paradigms may be ill-equipped to adequately evaluate this claim. Future study should explore learning in situations where there is uncertainty about one's own and others’ knowledge, which better mirror real-world social learning contexts.

Information

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 44 , 2021 , e156
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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